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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the evolution of the foreign policy of the African 
National Congress (ANC) predominantly towards Southern Africa, 1960-1999. It 
addresses three periods in the ANC‟s historical trajectory. These are the formulation 
and implementation of the ANC‟s foreign policy in exile from 1960 until 1990; the 
search for a „new‟ direction during South Africa‟s transition from apartheid to 
democracy, 1990-1994; and the initial stages of democratic rule under the leadership 
of the ANC, until 1999. In doing so, this dissertation charts the important continuities 
and discontinuities in the formulation and implementation of the movement‟s foreign 
policy from exile to political power.  
By tying together themes, previously treated in isolation, this thesis 
overcomes important limitations in the literature. In particular, by taking the entire 
forty year period as a whole, it develops new insights into not only the historic 
evolution of the ANC‟s foreign policy, but the very nature of the ANC as a liberation 
movement and political party. It is an approach that takes on particular significance 
when the defining events of foreign policy formulation during South Africa‟s 
transition, 1990-1994, are taken into account. This thesis argues that the transition 
period is a pivotal hinge and is informed as much by the trajectory of South Africa‟s, 
and the ANC‟s own histories, as the changing international world order of the early 
1990s. The events and decisions of the transition era had significant effects on the 
formation of a „new‟ foreign policy for South Africa. These under-researched years 
are crucial to understanding the future shape and direction of South African foreign 
policy under the ANC-led government after 1994. By establishing historic 
continuities, by emphasising the pivotal moment of the transition, and by 
disaggregating „the‟ ANC, this thesis suggests new ways of interpreting the ANC‟s 
foreign policy. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
 Since its inception in 1912, the African National Congress (ANC), a 
movement created initially to campaign for increased rights for black South Africans, 
has had an international dimension to its activities. Although the ANC‟s early 
attempts at petitioning the international community (specifically the British Empire) 
were unsuccessful, these initial international activities began a long and important 
series of interactions with external actors. The movement‟s focus on the international 
community as an agent of change became more urgent after 1948 when the new 
National Party (NP) government set about extending and furthering institutionalised 
racial segregation in the country through the system known as apartheid. In April 
1960, following the Sharpeville Massacre, the ANC was banned by the NP 
government, a decision which forced the movement into exile. The ANC‟s inability 
to operate legally in South Africa meant that its interactions and links with external 
actors, chiefly the Soviet Union and independent Southern African states, took on an 
added significance in the 1960s. Indeed, they became imperative for the movement‟s 
very survival. External assistance provided by these countries had a significant 
influence on the ANC‟s perceptions of the world, and came to shape the course of 
the movement‟s exile based struggle.  
Yet, once the ANC was unbanned by South African President F. W. De Klerk, 
in February 1990, the role of the (by now western-dominated) international 
community during the country‟s transition had an enormous influence on the 
subsequent direction and content of the movement‟s and, ultimately, South Africa‟s 
post-apartheid foreign policy. Once in government, the ANC leadership of course 
became deeply involved in foreign policy activities, as South Africa reintegrated 
itself into the wider world. In many respects it is therefore impossible to separate the 
historic activities of the ANC as an exiled liberation movement, from the ANC as the 
ruling political party of South Africa, from its interactions with, and the influences of, 
Southern Africa and the wider international community. It is these interactions and 
influences which this thesis sets out to investigate. Because of the vital international 
dimension to the history of the ANC, this thesis seeks to provide a greater 
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understanding of the evolution of the movement‟s foreign policy, beginning with its 
exile from South Africa in 1960, through to the end of Nelson Mandela‟s presidency 
in 1999.
1
 Although the focus of this study is primarily on the ANC‟s interactions 
with Southern Africa, this is at certain times broadened out to look at its relations 
with other nations and regions, where international influences crucially shaped its 
foreign policies.  
The significance of this study is three fold. Where the history of the ANC has 
been examined, there is a tendency in the literature to separate into three distinct 
periods the ANC in exile; South Africa‟s transition from apartheid to democracy; and 
the ANC in government. Although this periodisation is eminently sensible for 
practical reasons, representing distinct periods of ANC history, it creates an artificial 
division in the movement‟s experience. The result is that important continuities and 
discontinuities in the ANC‟s foreign policy perspectives and activities are frequently 
overlooked in the historiography. By taking a „long-view‟, this thesis can more 
effectively chart the evolution of the ANC‟s foreign policy, providing greater 
insights into how and why it pursued particular international activities during each of 
the three phases. For instance, it is difficult to fully understand and explain the 
policies of the ANC in government after 1994, without prior knowledge of the events 
and decisions which took place during the exile period and particularly the transition, 
both of which had a significant impact on the movement‟s foreign policy. Such an 
approach allows for an in-depth historical analysis of the ANC‟s foreign policy.  
The existing literature‟s periodisation of ANC foreign policy has meant that 
both the legacy of the exile period and the impact of vital decisions made during the 
transition have been diminished or even neglected. By breaking with the pattern of 
past historiographical approaches and connecting seemingly disjointed themes 
together, this thesis overcomes some of the limitations in the literature. Of particular 
importance to this study is South Africa‟s negotiated transition from apartheid to 
democracy. There is a remarkable absence of studies in the current literature which 
assess foreign policy formulation during South Africa‟s transition and as a 
consequence, the neglect of this pivotal moment has undoubted implications for the 
historiography. Chapters Four and Five demonstrate how first, the ANC began the 
                                               
1 The concept of how the ANC‟s international activities can be said to constitute a „foreign policy‟ 
will be discussed in greater depth later in this chapter. 
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process of formulating its own foreign policy vision after returning from exile, and 
secondly, the ways in which the international community and the South African 
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) manipulated the unfolding events to tie the 
new government into a foreign policy acceptable to the west. These two neglected 
and potentially contradictory developments had serious implications for foreign 
policy in the initial years of democratic rule in South Africa. By focusing on events 
and decisions taken during the transition, this thesis provides a clearer interpretation 
and new explanation of some of the ANC‟s policies in government after 1994. The 
ANC-led government‟s foreign policy has subsequently been criticised as lacking 
coherence or being haphazardly implemented. By providing a broader analytical 
approach and utilising newly available archival documents, Chapters Six and Seven 
illustrate how contradictory pressures, predominantly emanating from the transition, 
affected the ANC-led government‟s foreign policy. A primary purpose of this thesis 
therefore, is to re-evaluate certain aspects of post-apartheid South Africa‟s foreign 
policies in the context of decisions made between 1990 and 1994. This has 
significant implications for the analysis of South Africa‟s foreign policy since 1994.  
Finally, this thesis takes a different approach from the dominant trends in the 
literature, arguing that the ANC, as an exiled liberation movement, had a foreign 
policy. Although undoubtedly the ANC as a governing political party had a 
significant role in conducting and shaping South African foreign policy after 1994, 
for the exile period it is less clear cut. There is a substantial literature covering many 
aspects of the ANC in exile, but given the context of its international activities, there 
is remarkably little written about the movement‟s „foreign policy‟. Indeed, in the 
limited number of studies that do focus on the ANC‟s international activities, the 
term foreign policy is almost never used (see below).
2
 Therefore, in contrast to this 
                                               
2 For studies which focus on the ANC‟s „foreign policy‟ in exile see: A. Lissoni, „The South African 
Liberation Movements in Exile, c. 1945-1970‟, PhD., (University of London, 2008); A. Lissoni, 
„Transformations in the ANC external mission and Umkhonto we Sizwe, c.1960-9,‟ Journal of 
Southern African Studies, Special Issue: Liberation Struggles, Exile and International Solidarity, 35 
(2009), pp. 287-301; S. Ndlovu, „The ANC‟s Diplomacy and International Relations‟, in SADET, The 
Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 2, 1970-1980 (Pretoria, 2006), pp. 615-667; S. Ndlovu, 
„The ANC in exile, 1960-1970‟, in SADET, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 1, 1960-
1970 (Cape Town, 2004), pp. 411-478; S. Ndlovu, „The ANC and the World, 1960-1970‟, in SADET, 
The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 1, 1960-1970 (Cape Town, 2004), pp. 541-571; R. 
Pfister, „Gateway to international victory: the diplomacy of the African National Congress in Africa, 
1960-1994‟, Journal of Modern African Studies, 1 (2003), pp. 51-73; V. Shubin, The ANC: A View 
from Moscow (Cape Town, 1999); S. Thomas, The Diplomacy of Liberation: The Foreign Relations of 
the ANC since 1960 (London, 1996). 
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prevailing theme in the literature, this thesis uniquely contends that the ANC‟s 
international activities in exile constituted a foreign policy.   
It is obvious that the ANC conducted the vast majority of its activities in an 
international setting due to its banning within South Africa. However, the question is, 
are these best understood as a foreign policy? On the face of it, the strategies 
employed by the ANC appear to closely resemble what could be described as a 
foreign policy. Many of its activities bear close comparison to the characteristics of 
foreign policies employed by states, including an over-riding focus on security, 
international diplomacy and the forging of alliances. Of course, by a strict definition, 
and with specific reference to international relations theory, the ANC could not have 
had a „foreign policy‟ in exile. Traditionally, foreign policy is considered to be the 
sole preserve of the state, particularly under the Realist or Statist schools of thought. 
Andrew Linklater states that „only sovereign states can be members of international 
society (and not individuals or business corporations)‟. 3  Foreign policy is thus 
understood to consist of the official interactions between states in the pursuit of 
specific goals, predominantly to secure particular national interests, defined overall 
in terms of power.
4
 Therefore, according to such an interpretation, the ANC as a 
movement could not have had a foreign policy. Nevertheless, in the modern 
globalised world, foreign policy is far more complex than the rather static, Realist 
notions of unitary state actors in the international system. Thus, it would be difficult 
to argue that states are not influenced by the actions of external actors such as 
multinational corporations and international organisations. The Liberal school of 
thought has accepted that there can be input from external influences, and this allows 
for a far more fluid concept of foreign policy, conceding that there is a degree of 
plurality in state actions. Therefore the Liberal premise holds that the foreign policy 
of the state can be influenced by a multitude of non-state actors.
5
 Although 
Liberalism provides space for the input of non-state actors such as liberation 
movements, the underlying assumption is still that foreign policy remains the 
prerogative of the state.  
                                               
3 A. Linklater, „The English School‟, in S. Burchill (eds.), Theories of International Relations (Fourth 
Edition, Basingstoke, 2009), p. 93.  
4 H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York, 1985), p. 4-
17.   
5 K. Mingst, Essentials of International Relations (New York, 1999), pp. 69, 138-39. 
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But can a strict international relations approach adequately explain the nature 
of the ANC‟s international activities from 1960? Arguably an inflexible adherence to 
such theories does not adequately help define or explain the ANC‟s international 
actions during the exile period. Likewise, in trying to solve this dilemma the current 
literature on the ANC in exile is deficient in conceptualisation and content. The vast 
majority of studies do not provide any attempt to define or explain the nature or 
significance of the ANC‟s international activities. More often than not, the issue is 
simply neglected or merely taken for granted. For example, Vladimir Shubin‟s 
authoritative book on the ANC in exile does not even discuss the issue of foreign 
policy, simply referring to the movement as having „direct links‟ with several 
African nations.
6
 Only Scott Thomas, in his PhD thesis and subsequent book, 
attempts to tackle the issue in any depth. In his thesis, Thomas argues that the ANC‟s 
activities must be understood as the political stance it chose to pursue in the 
international system in order to advance its stated objectives.
7
 The result is that 
Thomas describes the ANC‟s international activities in exile as „diplomatic‟.8 Yet his 
book The Diplomacy of Liberation does not settle on a single term to explain the 
ANC activities, interchanging between „diplomacy‟, „foreign relations‟ and „foreign 
policy‟. 9  Even high profile figures in the anti-apartheid struggle such as Enuga 
Reddy, the former Director of the United Nations (UN) Centre against Apartheid, are 
on record as describing the ANC as having both a „foreign policy‟ and a „foreign 
relations position‟.10 What emerges is a general lack of consensus regarding how to 
depict the ANC‟s international activities.  
For the purposes of this thesis the ANC will be described as having a foreign 
policy in exile. This author contends that in international society non-state actors can 
and do have foreign policies.
11
 This notion is supported by the relatively new 
phenomenon in the study of international relations, paradiplomacy, which challenges 
the conventional idea of foreign policy being solely the preserve of states. Stefan 
Wolff defines paradiplomacy as the „foreign policy capacity of sub-state entities, 
                                               
6 Shubin, Moscow, p. 70. When referring to the South African Communist Party‟s (SACP) links with 
the USSR, Shubin describes these as „bilateral relations‟, p. 33. 
7 S. Thomas, „The Diplomacy of Liberation: The International Relations of the African National 
Congress of South Africa, 1920-1985‟, PhD., (LSE, 1989), p. 16.   
8 Ibid., p. 17. 
9 Thomas, Diplomacy. 
10 Email correspondence with E.S. Reddy, 9 November - 1 December 2010. 
11 The author is grateful to Professor Peter Vale for clarifying this point, email correspondence, 6 
January 2011. 
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their participation, independent of their metropolitan state, in the international arena 
in pursuit of their own specific international interests‟. 12  While this refers 
predominantly to provinces and cities within a state, Deon Geldenhuys argues „that 
there is no reason why one could not extend it to 'governments-in-waiting' or exiled 
or rebel movements contesting for power - they all engage in foreign relations‟.13 
The ANC clearly had an international political agenda, and while it may not have 
been as powerful or influential as a nation state, its actions ultimately sought to shape 
international relations in its favour. The ANC had an important role in influencing 
the foreign policies of states, especially the Soviet Union and several Southern 
African states; it achieved observer status at the UN and Organisation of African 
Unity (OAU); and was granted refuge in a variety of countries. It is important to 
stress this point, as the ANC was regarded and subsequently treated by some states 
and international organisations as the default representative (or even government-in-
waiting) of the South African people. This success was achieved through persistence, 
skilful lobbying and, as Thomas argues, diplomacy. These all formed part of the 
ANC‟s foreign policy in exile. Well before the ANC had reached the height of its 
international prestige in the 1980s, The African Communist in 1974 claimed that „the 
African National Congress and its allies have had a major impact on foreign 
policy‟.14 The importance of adopting such an approach to the ANC‟s exile history is 
that it breaks away from the conventional historiography that separates the ANC as a 
movement from the ANC as a ruling party since 1994. This allows instructive 
comparisons to be made with the ANC‟s international relations as the government of 
South Africa (see Chapters Six and Seven). Through analysing the ANC‟s 
international activities in exile, this study provides a „long-view‟ of the movement‟s 
foreign policy, which usefully points to the continuities and discontinuities of its 
approach to Southern Africa. 
In order to understand fully the evolution of the ANC‟s foreign policy 
between 1960 and 1999, it is impossible to separate it from the nature, ideology and 
structure of the movement as a whole. Indeed, the character of the ANC, both as an 
exiled movement and governing political party, has had a significant effect on the 
                                               
12 S. Wolff, „Paradiplomacy: Scope, Opportunities and Challenges‟, Bologna Center Journal of 
International Affairs, 10 (2007), p. 141. 
13 Email correspondence with Professor Deon Geldenhuys, 7 January 2011. 
14 „Domestic Crises and Foreign Affairs‟, The African Communist, 56 (1974), p. 119.  
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shape and direction of its foreign policy. After the ANC was forced into exile, its 
leaders repeatedly demanded that the movement maintain a monolithic unity in order 
to survive in its fight against the apartheid state, a practice which has continued into 
government.
15
 However, this practice of stressing external unity of purpose and 
direction masked the conflicted internal nature of the ANC. In reality, the ANC is a 
mass nationalist movement, one which harbours a range of ideological doctrines, 
encompassing anything from socialism to neo-liberalism. Yet, the ANC is also an 
elite-dominated organisation, a legacy from its exile struggle. In exile, the overall 
decision-making process was, due to matters of security, geography and ease of 
communication, confined to a relatively small number of people. This centralisation 
of power, which continued through the transition and into government, meant that 
the leaders‟ decisions went largely uncontested, with little opportunity for internal 
debate or dissent within the ANC. The opportunity for mass engagement in exile was 
severely limited; in thirty years the ANC held just two conferences: at Morogoro in 
Tanzania and Kabwe in Zambia (see Chapters Two and Three). Only after 1990, did 
it become possible for the ANC to convene regular congresses in South Africa to 
engage more widely with its supporters. The outcome was that the elite „spoke‟ on 
behalf of the wider-movement.   
But precisely because the nature of the movement and what it actually 
represents is not entirely clear given the divergence of opinions within its ranks, it is 
very difficult for the leaders to speak for „the‟ ANC. The consequence is that behind 
the ANC‟s façade of unity there are underlying tensions not only amongst the 
movement‟s supporters but also its leadership. Many of these tensions found 
expression in the ANC‟s foreign policy between 1960 and 1999. Consequently, this 
thesis will address the ideological incoherence and structural composition of the 
movement, and analyse how this has shaped the direction and implementation of 
South African foreign policy under ANC stewardship (see Chapters Six and Seven). 
By taking a long-view this study allows for these tensions and contradictions to be 
developed in greater depth, illustrating how the conflicted and contradictory nature 
                                               
15 For example, see: Speech by O.R. Tambo, Statement of the National Executive Committee on the 
occasion of the 60th Anniversary of the ANC, 8 January, 1972, 
http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=2642 (9/8/11); 
The New Age, 17 June 2011. 
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of the ANC has had an important bearing on the evolution and implementation of its 
foreign policy.    
 
Sources 
In order to explore the evolution of the ANC‟s foreign policy from exile to 
government, this thesis utilises a wide range of sources, some of which are here 
placed in the public domain for the first time. Although this study seeks to overcome 
the constraints of periodisation, the sources available however are unavoidably split 
into distinctive, specific timeframes. For Chapters Two and Three, which explore the 
ANC in exile, the main sources utilised are archival. The vast majority of the ANC‟s 
official External Mission papers are to be found in the Liberation Archive at the 
University of Fort Hare, which contains a diverse and varied selection of information 
pertaining to almost every aspect of the movements period in exile. Furthermore, 
collections of information relevant to the ANC and the wider anti-apartheid struggle 
were accessed at the Mayibuye Centre at the University of the Western Cape, and the 
South African History Archive at the University of Witwatersrand.
16
 These 
collections contain the most comprehensive selection of the ANC‟s reports, 
memorandums, speeches and internal documentation from its exile.
17
 In addition, 
depositories of material such as speeches, reports, posters and interview transcripts 
are at the Bodleian Library at the University of Oxford and the Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies in London, which have both provided many useful 
documents from individuals and organisations involved in the anti-apartheid struggle. 
Furthermore, these have been complimented by the extensive use of official ANC 
and South African Communist Party (SACP) journals, such as Sechaba, Mayibuye, 
Dawn and the African Communist, which can be accessed via the Digital Innovation 
                                               
16 For more information concerning the nature of the collections at these South African archives, see: 
M. Graham, „Finding Foreign Policy: Researching in Five South African Archives‟, History in Africa, 
37 (2010), pp. 379-387. 
17 Although these are the most comprehensive depositories of information they are by no means 
complete. This stems from the fact that the ANC as a liberation movement is under no compulsion to 
release documents, with much of its private collection still housed at its headquarters, Shell House, in 
Johannesburg. The Liberation Archive in particular does not have complete series of documents, and 
according to many researchers has been „weeded‟ of sensitive information. This pays true in a careful 
analysis of the documentary trail; for example a report on the political situation in Mozambique 
indicated that it was the forty-fourth in an ongoing series, but only one exists in the archive. See: 
University of Fort Hare (hereafter UFH), Liberation Archives, ANC Mozambique Mission, Box 10, 
File 63: Reports 1986-1988. 
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South Africa Project (DISA), and which were vital in finding the „voice‟ of the ANC 
in exile.
18
 The official ANC website has also been of immense value to this thesis, as 
it contains a cross section of information about the movement from its exile through 
to the current day. This collection includes, but is not limited to, items such as the 
1955 Freedom Charter, proceedings and resolutions from all of the ANC‟s 
conferences, and a selection of its leaders‟ speeches.19  
 The evolution and formulation of foreign policy throughout South Africa‟s 
transition, which is covered in Chapters Four and Five, encompasses an array of 
sources from the depositories mentioned above. In addition it utilises a previously 
unused new documentary collection: the John Barratt Collection housed in the 
William Cullen Library, at the University of Witwatersrand. This collection contains 
a large selection of documents from the Sub Council on Foreign Affairs (SCFA), a 
part of the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) that governed South Africa from 
November 1993 through until the country‟s first democratic elections in April 1994. 
John Barratt, as the Director of the South African Institute of International Affairs 
(SAIIA), was a member of the SCFA and the official documents he collected from 
the process illustrate the significant influence the sub-council had upon post-
apartheid foreign policy. The John Barratt Collection provides a window into this 
largely unresearched history of South African foreign policy, offering many crucial 
insights. The importance of this collection is demonstrated by the fact that all the 
official government documents have still not been released by the Foreign Affairs 
Archive in Pretoria and will not be for some time. This collection of information was 
further complimented by an extensive interview with Tom Wheeler, former DFA 
liaison officer to the SCFA. The interview proved invaluable, as Wheeler offered his 
own in-depth perceptions on the SCFA process, the importance of the sub-council, 
the DFA‟s role, as well as useful insights into its activities and members. He 
supplemented these insights by kindly allowing use of his own personal papers 
which included information from the SCFA, but also important documents from the 
DFA, which offered a different perspective on the process, helping to fill some of the 
gaps in the John Barratt Collection.   
                                               
18 For the various digitalised journals available see: 
http://www.disa.ukzn.ac.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=73 (20/6/11). 
19 For the ANC‟s documents and publications online see: http://www.anc.org.za/# (20/6/11). 
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 Chapters Six and Seven, which explore post-apartheid foreign policy during 
Mandela‟s presidency, employ a quite different selection of sources. Archival 
sources are largely unavailable for this very recent period, but a variety of different 
sources are available. For example, these two chapters utilise diverse media sources, 
ranging from newspaper articles from a number of South African and international 
publications, as well as international press agency reports, television and radio 
transcripts from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Reports 
service and cartoons by the satirist Zapiro.
20
 Official speeches and statements by the 
leaders of the ANC such as President Nelson Mandela, Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo, 
and Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad offer a useful insight into the party‟s 
perspectives on foreign policy issues, particularly in their interactions with different 
international audiences.
21
 In addition, the ANC‟s own documents including 
conference resolutions and reports illustrate some of the factors shaping foreign 
policy decision-making under the Mandela presidency, but also demonstrate the 
aspirations of party leaders and members for South Africa‟s international relations. 
The ANC documents are used alongside official South African government and civil 
service sources, such as DFA discussion documents.
22
 Furthermore, the reports 
published by a number of NGOs which focus on a breadth of international matters, 
such as arms control, proved useful sources of information.
23
 Lastly, every effort was 
made to interview a wide range of people, including former ANC politicians, a 
British High Commissioner, journalists and academics, all of whom helped complete 
an extensive insight into the foreign policy of the ANC.
24
 Interviewees included, the 
former Africa editor of the Financial Times Michael Holman who provided many 
useful opinions on the ANC; and the former Oxford don and polemicist R.W. 
Johnson who offered many critical insights on post-apartheid South Africa. 
                                               
20 The vast majority of these media sources were located using the NewsBank newspaper database 
search tool, which also offers access to the FBIS, which is the USA‟s „principal record of political and 
historical open source intelligence‟. 
21 Many of the speeches are available on the ANC‟s own website (http://www.anc.org.za/#), the South 
African government information website (http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/index.htm), or via 
NewsBank and the FBIS.   
22 For the location of official DFA documents see: 
http://www.info.gov.za/view/DynamicAction?pageid=528 (20/6/11). 
23 Examples of reports from NGOs include those from the Institute of Security Studies (ISS) or the 
South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). 
24 For a full list of interviewees, refer to the bibliography.  
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 It must be acknowledged that some of the sources used have obvious 
problems of potential and actual bias. To take just one example, official exile 
journals such as Sechaba were written in a highly ideological charged environment, 
acting as a propaganda tool for the ANC to spread news of its aspirations and 
successes to its worldwide supporters. However, despite this dimension, they provide 
a valuable insight into the ANC perspectives and activities during this thirty year 
period. Furthermore, important interviews were secured with former ANC MP‟s 
Andrew Feinstein and Raymond Suttner, both of whom were well placed insiders in 
the post-apartheid government, and whose perspectives on the internal culture of the 
ANC, its foreign policy-making process and South Africa‟s international direction 
proved invaluable. However, it must be noted that both figures have left the ANC 
and feel betrayed by the party leadership and the direction it has taken South Africa. 
Unfortunately attempts to secure interviews with currently high-ranking ANC 
officials were unsuccessful. Requests for interviews with other past and present ANC 
members were not returned. 
 
Chapter Summary 
In addition to explaining the structure of this thesis and some of the key 
definitions, the following section will act as a point of reference for each of the 
chapters. The six core chapters which make up this thesis are ordered chronologically, 
so that each chapter covers a distinct period, without losing sight of the central focus. 
Beginning with the movement‟s banning in 1960, Chapter Two examines 
the changing fortunes and difficulties of the ANC in exile until 1976, with a 
particular focus on its interactions in Southern Africa. The aim is to chart how the 
ANC initially responded to its exile from South Africa and to explain the ways in 
which the movement went about establishing relationships with independent 
Southern African states and the region‟s various national liberation movements. The 
chapter attempts to cut through the public rhetoric of both the ANC and its allies to 
uncover what their relations were like in practice. In doing so, it points towards some 
signs of strength in the ANC‟s foreign policy manoeuvres, yet also to the fragility of 
the movement‟s position in Southern Africa, especially at the end of the 1960s. 
Although the focus is on the immediate region, it is impossible to ignore the role of 
12 
 
the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc in relation to the ANC‟s struggle (and indeed 
its survival) and its undoubted influence on its foreign policy. Therefore the chapter 
will demonstrate the ways in which the communist bloc assisted the ANC, and the 
benefits this alliance subsequently brought. Furthermore, the chapter identifies how 
geo-political changes in Southern Africa in the 1970s such as Portuguese 
decolonisation, combined with domestic challenges in South Africa exemplified by 
the Soweto Uprising, drastically altered the international position of the ANC. The 
chapter assesses these challenges to the ANC, how it adapted to them, and the 
significant impact they had upon the course of its struggle. 
Chapter Three explores how by 1976, the changed situation in Southern 
Africa enabled the ANC to exploit its new found opportunities to pursue a more 
proactive foreign policy, most notably by dramatically escalating its armed struggle. 
This chapter will analyse how the ANC attempted to secure its position in Southern 
Africa, the strategies it took to isolate and damage the apartheid regime, and the 
measures taken to publicise its cause to a global audience. The chapter will also seek 
to demonstrate the ways in which South Africa counter-acted these efforts, and the 
significant effect this had on not only the ANC, but also its hosts and allies in 
Southern Africa. Although the ANC in exile had been particularly active in the 
international arena, it had failed to fully articulate its foreign policy objectives and it 
was only by the mid-1980s that the movement set about rectifying this. This chapter 
will therefore assess the findings, recommendations and resolutions of the 1985 
Kabwe Conference and use it to identify the ANC‟s foreign policy and the evolution 
that this process had undergone since 1960. The chapter will conclude by discussing 
the dramatic international changes that occurred in the late 1980s, and demonstrate 
the significant impact this had on Southern Africa, domestically within South Africa, 
and ultimately the end of the ANC‟s exile. 
The collapse of global communism brought about vast changes 
internationally, undermining the central principles which had underpinned many 
aspects and assumptions of the ANC about international relations. In the context of 
these changes, President De Klerk in February 1990 announced the unbanning of the 
ANC, setting in motion South Africa‟s transition from apartheid to democracy. 
Chapter Four explores the various ways the NP government and the ANC competed, 
domestically and internationally, to gain legitimacy for their visions for post-
13 
 
apartheid South Africa. It will assess how the ANC adapted to its new found legality, 
not only structurally, but also ideologically, and the impact this had upon foreign 
policy formulation. Using the resolutions and recommendations from two ANC 
conferences during this period, as well as a number of planning documents, this 
chapter examines how the ANC‟s foreign policy perspectives gradually evolved 
during the transition period. In doing so, it will highlight some of the debates which 
raged over South Africa‟s future foreign policy and the ways in which the final 
policies enshrined in „Foreign Policy in a new Democratic South Africa‟ were 
established. Through such an analysis, the chapter explores a number of pertinent 
issues concerning the ANC as an organisation, and the ownership of its stated foreign 
policy, which had undoubted implications for post-apartheid South Africa. As 
Chapters Four and Five are closely related, they also demonstrate the ways in which 
the ANC‟s exile experiences influenced the movement‟s actions during the transition 
and the effect this had upon its foreign policy.  
Chapter Five is closely linked to the previous chapter, which explores the 
previously understudied, yet important TEC and its composite sub-councils, most 
notably the activities of the SCFA. Through a range of examples, this chapter 
documents the SCFA‟s work and activities, pinpointing how the DFA manipulated 
the proceedings towards its favoured approach for South African foreign policy after 
1994. Through these examples, it will illustrate that, despite the neglect in the 
literature, the SCFA‟s final recommendations had a significant impact on the shape 
and direction of post-apartheid foreign policy. In fact, as will be explored, when the 
events of Chapters‟ Four and Five converged in May 1994, the cumulative pressures 
of these quite different and incompatible influences became evident in South Africa‟s 
foreign policy immediately after 1994.      
  Chapter Six demonstrates how foreign policy formulation during its exile 
(see Chapters Two and Three) and the transition (see Chapters Four and Five) 
combined to influence how the movement acted as a governing party, while also 
constraining the ANC-led government‟s room for manoeuvre after it came to power 
in 1994. In the initial years of the Government of National Unity (GNU), these 
divergent visions clashed, resulting in a foreign policy riddled with numerous 
contradictions, which was widely criticised domestically and internationally. These 
criticisms will be analysed in light of the new evidence unearthed in Chapters Four 
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and Five in a bid to provide greater understanding based on the historical trajectory 
of the ANC‟s foreign policy. The chapter uses several pertinent examples to illustrate 
these contradictions at work, most notably exploring South Africa‟s initial policies 
towards and relationships with Africa, its handling of the Nigerian Crisis, the 
country‟s links to „pariah‟ nations and, despite its ostensible commitment to a 
morally driven foreign policy its sale of weapons to dubious countries. South 
Africa‟s actions will be analysed to offer greater insight into the direction of the 
ANC‟s initial foreign policy up until 1996. 
Chapter Seven examines the ANC and DFA‟s efforts at reviewing the 
country‟s international relations from 1996 onwards. The chapter explores this 
evolution by examining three core documents produced in this period: „South 
African Foreign Policy Discussion Document‟; „Developing a Strategic Perspective 
on South African Foreign Policy‟; and the „White Paper on South African 
Participation in International Peace Missions‟. Through these documents, the chapter 
identifies some of the contradictory, yet competing pressures on South African 
foreign policy formulation, the debates surrounding the direction of its foreign policy, 
the ways in which foreign policy decision-making was reached and the extent to 
which it was a democratic process. It also argues that due to significant changes 
within South Africa, the period saw the ANC leadership become much more 
assertive over foreign policy than previously, which had a major impact in later years, 
particularly under Mbeki‟s presidency. In addition, using the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) proposal for an Organ on Politics, Defence and 
Security as a case-study, the chapter explores some of the ANC-led government‟s 
interactions with the region by charting its fluctuating relationships with its 
neighbours.  
Chapter Eight consolidates the key arguments of this thesis, tying them 
together and offering conclusions about the ANC‟s foreign policy between 1960 and 
1999. The concluding chapter elucidates the contribution this thesis makes to the 
history of the ANC‟s foreign policy, and its place in the existing literature.     
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Chapter Two 
The ANC in Exile, 1960-1975 
 
By the end of three decades of exile from South Africa, the African National 
Congress (ANC) had become one of the world‟s most significant and respected 
national liberation movements. By 1990, the ANC had successfully mobilised global 
support and achieved international legitimacy in its bid to isolate the South African 
regime. Yet, the fact that it took the movement thirty years to force the apartheid 
government to the negotiating table, illustrates the immense difficulties it faced in 
exile. One observer analysing the ANC‟s record in exile in 1985, claimed perhaps 
cruelly, that it was „the world‟s least effective liberation movement‟.1 The fortunes of 
the ANC certainly fluctuated, from being effectively moribund in the 1960s, to a 
widely feted international movement by the end of the 1980s. Such a dramatic 
transformation was in no way inevitable, and was achieved in part by the tireless 
efforts of the ANC‟s leaders to engage and garner support from a wide spectrum of 
international actors; and the generosity which was reciprocated to them in return, 
most notably by the Soviet Bloc, western-based campaigning organisations and 
independent African states. Without sustained support, for example, in areas such as 
military training, education, financial donations, and the provision of refuge, the 
ANC would not have been able to survive in exile, let alone wage such a 
comprehensive international campaign against apartheid. The importance of external 
support to the ANC was emphasised by the South African Communist Party (SACP) 
leader Joe Slovo, who claimed in 1986 that „in this day and age there is no struggle 
which can be separated from the international context, but in the case of South Africa 
the international factor plays a unique role; because the evil of apartheid, like no 
other issue, cuts across the world ideological divide‟.2 Although internal opposition 
(such as the United Democratic Front or UDF) definitely played its part in bringing 
about the end of apartheid, a significant factor in its demise was the concerted efforts 
                                               
1 J. Lelyveld, Move Your Shadow: South Africa Black and White (London, 1985), p. 328. 
2 J. Slovo, „SACP one of the Great Pillars of our Revolution‟, The African Communist, 107 (1986), p. 
28. 
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of the ANC, and the global Anti-Apartheid Movement to internationalise the South 
African struggle from 1960.
3
   
The ANC‟s thirty year exile began in April 1960, after a protest on the 21 
March, organised by the rival Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), culminated in the 
Sharpeville Massacre, leaving sixty-nine people dead. The incident sparked a week 
of demonstrations and protests across South Africa, after which the National Party 
(NP) government declared a state of emergency, banning the ANC and PAC.
4
 Plans 
to form an external section of the ANC had been discussed in December 1959, „to 
carry abroad the message of its vision and solicit support for the movement‟, but in 
the aftermath of Sharpeville this had to be brought forward.
5
 In the course of these 
discussions the ANC leadership had designated its Deputy President Oliver Tambo 
as the person to leave South Africa and form an External Mission to co-ordinate the 
ANC‟s international efforts. Tambo secretly left the country in April 1960, first 
making his way to the British Protectorate of Bechuanaland (now Botswana), and 
then on to Tanganyika (now Tanzania).
6
 He quickly set about the task of raising 
awareness and gaining support for the ANC by touring friendly states and fostering 
links with international backers, which enabled Tambo „to establish ANC missions in 
Egypt, Ghana, Morocco and in London‟. 7  However, despite the South African 
government‟s banning of the ANC, there was no immediate exodus of its members; 
many remained in South Africa to carry out clandestine activities. Only after the 
arrest of the ANC‟s leaders at Rivonia in July 1963, and their subsequent 
imprisonment, did the organisation finally abandon its formal structures within South 
Africa.
8
 Until 1963, the ANC had managed to maintain an illegal presence in the 
country, albeit one that was severely limited by sustained repression and harassment 
                                               
3 H. Sapire, „Liberation Movements, Exile, and International Solidarity: An introduction‟, Journal of 
Southern African Studies, 35 (2009), p. 273. For more on the internal struggle see, for example: A. 
Jeffery, People’s War: New Light on the Struggle for South Africa (Johannesburg, 2009); A. Marx, 
Lessons of Struggle: South African Internal Opposition, 1960-1990 (Cape Town, 1992); J. Seekings, 
The UDF: A History of the United Democratic Front in South Africa 1983-1991 (Cape Town, 2000); 
R. Suttner, The ANC Underground in South Africa to 1976 (Auckland Park, 2008).  
4 S. Johns, „Obstacles to Guerrilla Warfare – a South African Case Study‟, The Journal of Modern 
African Studies, 11 (1973), p. 271. 
5 L. Callinicos, Oliver Tambo: Beyond the Engeli Mountains (Cape Town, 2004), p. 253. 
6 Callinicos, Tambo, pp. 258-261. 
7 The Anti-Apartheid Movement (hereafter AAM) Archive, Bodleian Library of Commonwealth and 
African Studies, University of Oxford, MSS AAM 938, Death of Oliver Tambo, ANC Chairperson, 
April 1993, Memoriam O.R.Tambo Programme. 
8 J. Barber, South Africa in the Twentieth Century, a political history: in search of a nation state 
(Oxford, 1999), p. 169.  
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by the state. Although the bulk of the leadership had remained, its ability to direct the 
struggle effectively was greatly diminished. The internal military and political 
structures of the ANC were thoroughly destroyed after the Rivonia Trial, and with its 
leaders in prison or in exile, control of the organisation shifted to the External 
Mission.
9
  
As has been fully elucidated in the introduction, this thesis contends that the 
ANC did have a foreign policy in exile. However, as this chapter and Chapter Three 
will both illustrate, the ANC‟s foreign policy was by no means consistent or coherent. 
The very nature of being an exiled political movement meant that for practical 
purposes the ANC had to be relatively flexible in its approach to external actors, as 
world events unfolded over which it had little or no influence. Although the ANC 
espoused socialist ideals throughout its exile (which in turn were not always 
consistently expressed), the movement appealed to both western and communist 
nations for help; quite clearly a different message was required for these very 
different audiences. For the purposes of political expediency, a fluid approach to 
foreign policy was thus required. Additionally, as will be seen in this, and Chapter 
Three, the ANC did not produce many clear statements of what its foreign policy 
actually was. The two clearest examples were the Freedom Charter, written in 1955, 
before its exile, and the „Report of the Commission on Foreign Policy‟ tabled at the 
Kabwe Conference held in 1985.
10
 While these two documents provide some insight 
into the ANC‟s priorities, they are quite limited documents, with a lack of 
information about its foreign policy ideals. Although this thesis ascribes the ANC as 
having a foreign policy in exile, it is important to take into account the limitations the 
ANC faced in developing an explicit and consistent policy.  
 The historiography concerning the ANC‟s experiences in exile is vast, 
spanning a diverse range of themes and approaches.
11
 Because the vast majority of 
                                               
9 University of Fort Hare (hereafter UFH), Liberation Archives, ANC Lusaka Additions (Mayibuye 
II), Box 36, File 1, Morogoro Conference Resolutions. 
10 „The Freedom Charter‟, adopted at the Congress of the People, Kliptown, 26 June 1955, 
http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=72 (25/11/09); „Second National Consultative Conference: 
Report of the Commission on Foreign Policy, 17 June 1985, Kabwe, Zambia‟, UFH, Liberation 
Archives, ANC Lusaka Additions (Mayibuye II), Box 37, File 1, Conference Documents and reports. 
11 Some examples include: H. Barrel, MK: The ANC’s armed struggle (Johannesburg, 1990); S. Ellis 
and T. Sechaba, Comrades against Apartheid: The ANC & the South African Communist Party in 
exile (London, 1992); S, Ellis, 'The ANC in Exile', African Affairs, 90 (1991), pp. 439-447; R. Kasrils, 
Armed and Dangerous: From undercover struggle to freedom (London, 1998); M. Legassick, 'Myth 
and Reality in the Struggle Against Apartheid', Journal of Southern African Studies, 24 (1998), pp. 
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studies touch on, but do not elaborate upon the ANC‟s foreign policy activities, it is 
difficult to disregard the international dimensions of the struggle. Notable exceptions 
in the current historiography which focus predominantly on the ANC‟s foreign 
policy (although the term is never explicitly used, see Chapter One) include the 
works of Arianna Lissoni, Sifiso Ndlovu, Roger Pfister, Vladimir Shubin, and Scott 
Thomas.
12
 The result is that the key events of the exile period such as the Morogoro 
Conference have been studied quite extensively. Therefore this chapter will not 
retrace every aspect of the ANC‟s international interactions; rather it will focus on 
the most important events in the chronological evolution of the ANC‟s foreign 
relations. These include: the impact of the 1969 Lusaka Manifesto; the formation of 
alliances with likeminded Soviet-sponsored liberation movements; the decolonisation 
of Portuguese Africa; and the 1985 Kabwe Conference. 
 
The 1960s 
 The first decade of exile was a traumatic and turbulent experience for the 
ANC. The movement found itself ill prepared for its banning and subsequent life in 
exile.
13
 Major problems challenged the very existence of the ANC during the 1960s. 
Primarily, the ANC was left entirely dependent on the goodwill and benevolence of 
states such as Tanzania and Zambia for refuge, as well as the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Bloc for financial and military support. Another key concern for the 
                                                                                                                                     
443-458; T. Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945 (London, 1987); A. Marx, Lessons of 
the Struggle: South African Internal Opposition 1960-1980 (Cape Town, 1992); N. Manghezi, The 
Maputo Connection: ANC Life in the world of FRELIMO (Auckland Park, 2009); D. Mckinley, The 
ANC and the liberation struggle: A critical political biography (London, 1997); F. Meli, A History of 
the ANC: South Africa Belongs to Us (Harare, 1988); S. Morrow, 'Dakawa Development Centre: An 
African National Congress Settlement in Tanzania, 1982-1992', African Affairs, 97 (1998), pp. 497-
521; P. Trewhela, Inside Quatro: Uncovering the exile history of the ANC and SWAPO (Auckland 
Park, 2009). 
12 A. Lissoni, „The South African Liberation Movements in Exile, c. 1945-1970‟, PhD., (University of 
London, 2008); A. Lissoni, „Transformations in the ANC external mission and Umkhonto we Sizwe, 
c.1960-9,‟ Journal of Southern African Studies, Special Issue: Liberation Struggles, Exile and 
International Solidarity, 35 (2009), pp. 287-301; S. Ndlovu, „The ANC‟s Diplomacy and International 
Relations‟, in SADET, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 2, 1970-1980 (Pretoria, 
2006), pp. 615-667; S. Ndlovu, „The ANC in exile, 1960-1970‟, in SADET, The Road to Democracy 
in South Africa, Volume 1, 1960-1970 (Cape Town, 2004), pp. 411-478; S. Ndlovu, „The ANC and the 
World, 1960-1970‟, in SADET, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 1, 1960-1970 (Cape 
Town, 2004), pp. 541-571; R. Pfister, „Gateway to international victory: the diplomacy of the African 
National Congress in Africa, 1960-1994‟, Journal of Modern African Studies, 1 (2003), pp. 51-73; V. 
Shubin, The ANC: A View From Moscow (Cape Town, 1999); S. Thomas, The Diplomacy of 
Liberation: The Foreign Relations of the ANC since 1960 (London, 1996). 
13 Ellis, „The ANC in Exile‟, p. 442. 
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movement was the co-ordination of its international efforts, as the ANC leadership 
was dispersed across Africa and Europe, almost completely cut off from its domestic 
support base.
14
 Additional crises faced the ANC including: unanticipated competition 
for African support and patronage from its rival movement the PAC;
15
 a mutiny 
amongst members of its armed wing Umkhonto we Sizwe (often referred to as MK)
16 
after the defeat of its guerrilla fighters during the Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns of 
1967-68;
17
 and expulsion from Tanzania in 1969 by the President Julius Nyerere.
18
 
Despite these substantial difficulties, the 1960s was not as bleak for the ANC as it 
may first appear. The achievement of simply surviving as a (largely) unified 
movement in the first decade of exile should be viewed in itself as a major 
accomplishment. Furthermore, although the ANC became dependent on external aid, 
it was relatively successful in attracting international support for its cause; it began 
the process of forging alliances with Southern African liberation movements such as 
the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU); and was involved in the process 
leading to South Africa leaving the Commonwealth in 1961.  
  Although the ANC had envisaged that its exile from South Africa would 
only be temporary, the leadership realised the pressing importance of attracting 
external support. In 1960, the primary foreign policy goals of the External Mission 
were to isolate South Africa internationally and secure material and moral support 
for the cause. Initial efforts to win external backing and to isolate the apartheid 
regime were predominantly focused on Britain as the former colonial power, and 
international organisations such as the UN, which were thought capable of exercising 
influence over South Africa.
19
 However, the failure of western states (excluding 
Scandinavian countries) to back the ANC, or take effective action against apartheid, 
                                               
14 R. Fatton Jr., „The African National Congress of South Africa: The limitations of a revolutionary 
strategy‟, Canadian Journal of African Studies, 18 (1984), p. 598. 
15 University of Western Cape (hereafter UWC), Mayibuye Centre Historical Papers (hereafter MCH) 
70, Survey of the External Mission of the African National Congress of South Africa, February 1965. 
16 On the 16 December 1961, a series of explosions across South Africa marked the formation of the 
guerrilla fighting force known as Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation). After Sharpeville there 
had been a division of opinion within the ANC leadership about the turn to armed struggle, 
particularly in light of the ANC‟s historical commitment to non-violence. The result was that MK, a 
semi-autonomous group, was thus separate from ANC structures, but contained members from both 
the ANC and SACP under the leadership of Nelson Mandela and Joe Slovo.     
17 R. Moses Ralinala, J. Sithole, G. Houston and B. Magubane, „The Wankie and Sipolio Campaigns‟, 
in SADET, The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 1, 1960-1970 (Cape Town, 2004), pp. 
479-540. 
18 G. Houston, „International Solidarity: Introduction‟, in SADET, The Road to Democracy in South 
Africa, Volume 3, International Solidarity (Pretoria, 2008), p. 35. 
19 Thomas, Diplomacy, p. 2. 
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forced the movement to look towards communist states as an alternative base of 
support. The Eastern Bloc, led by the Soviet Union, but with important contributions 
from states such as Cuba and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), became a 
vital and consistent ally of the ANC throughout its exile. These states provided 
financial backing, military hardware and instruction, education, visas for travel and 
even temporary shelter to the ANC. However, this turn to the east further reinforced 
the west‟s negative perceptions of the ANC as a Soviet backed terrorist group. In the 
context of the Cold War, the white minority governments of Southern Africa were 
perceived by the west to be bulwarks against the spread of communism in Africa, 
and were thus supported economically and politically, at the expense of national 
liberation movements. 
A major practical problem which dogged the ANC, particularly during the 
first few years of exile, was the geo-political climate of Southern Africa, as South 
Africa was buttressed by a series of white minority regimes.
20
 The British 
Protectorates of Bechuanaland (Botswana) and Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) were the 
primary destinations for South Africans fleeing the country, but Pretoria exercised its 
economic and political leverage throughout Southern Africa to prevent the ANC 
from settling in these countries. After a wave of decolonisation and independence 
had swept the region by the mid-1960s, South Africa‟s dominance of its neighbours 
ensured that the ANC was still kept a considerable distance from its borders.
21
 Dr 
Hilgard Muller told the South African Parliament in June 1965 of the extensive 
„administrative links, the interwoven economy of the region and the existing 
technological co-operation‟ particularly with Basutoland, Bechuanaland and 
Swaziland.
22
 Sifiso Ndlovu provides an example of how South Africa exercised its 
                                               
20 The countries buffering South Africa from „black Africa‟ in 1960 included the annexed territory of 
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power in this region, and argued that as a consequence, „there is no doubt that the 
colonial government of Bechuanaland was unhappy with the presence of South 
African exiles in the territory‟. 23  Likewise, Shubin provides, amongst others, 
evidence of British colonial authorities in Northern Rhodesia arresting and deporting 
ANC members back to South Africa for imprisonment.
24
 Therefore, in 1960, the 
nearest safe haven for the ANC was Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, leaving the 
movement over 1,500 miles away from the borders of South Africa.
25
 Only as other 
states, with amenable governments, such as Zambia (1964) gradually became 
independent, could the ANC begin to establish additional bases for the training of its 
guerrilla fighters and from which to pursue its diplomatic offensive. Although states 
such as Tanzania generously sustained the ANC in the 1960s, the movement often 
had strained relationships with the various host governments, finding itself beholden 
to their preferences and interests. This will be illustrated in greater depth in the 
course of this chapter.  
 
The South Africa United Front and the Commonwealth, 1960-1962 
An early and significant achievement in the struggle against apartheid was the 
mobilisation of international opinion against South Africa‟s continued membership 
of the Commonwealth. This resulted in part from the activities of the short-lived 
South Africa United Front (SAUF), which was officially launched in September 
1961 by the exiled representatives of the ANC, PAC, South African Indian Congress 
(SAIC), and South West African National Union (SWANU).
26
 In a bid to isolate 
South Africa internationally, these organisations temporarily put aside their 
differences, allowing them to jointly raise funds and speak with one voice. 
Apparently formed as a result of pressure by African states such as Ghana, the SAUF 
established offices in London, New York, Accra and Cairo.
27
 During its eighteen-
month existence the SAUF published information about apartheid to mobilise 
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opinion and lobbied international organisations such as the UN to apply sanctions.
28
 
According to Yusuf Dadoo, the SAIC representative to the SAUF, „much was 
achieved in the early stage of the United Front‟s existence… We succeeded in 
winning wide international support for our cause‟.29   
The SAUF was fortunate that the South African government provided it with 
new grievances against which to campaign. In October 1960, at the request of 
President Hendrik Verwoerd, a whites-only referendum was held to decide whether 
South Africa should become a Republic. By a narrow margin of 52.14% to 47.42%, 
the majority voted in favour and it was announced that South Africa would become a 
Republic in May 1961.
30
 The international consequence of the referendum was that it 
required South Africa to reapply for its Commonwealth membership.
31
 Although 
British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan was keen for South Africa to remain a 
member of the organisation, a groundswell of opposition from the British public and 
recently independent Afro-Asian nations developed against Pretoria‟s reapplication. 
In the run-up to the Commonwealth meeting in London, representatives of the SAUF 
visited or wrote to member nations, to argue the case for South Africa‟s expulsion.32 
At the London Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in March 1961, 
pressure was put on Verwoerd to alter South Africa‟s racial policies, particularly by 
Canada and the Afro-Asian block, but he proved immovable on the issue.
33
 After 
protracted discussions broke down, an official communiqué announced „that in the 
light of the views expressed on behalf of other member Governments, and the 
indications of their future intentions regarding the racial policy of the Union 
Government, he [Verwoerd] had decided to withdraw his application for South 
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Africa‟s continuing membership of the Commonwealth‟.34 The SAUF heralded it as 
„a significant victory for all opponents of Dr. Verwoerd‟s racial policies. It marks the 
point beyond which the world will not sit idly looking on while South Africa 
continues practising inhuman policies… this heralds the beginning of a rapid world 
movement towards the complete isolation of South Africa‟.35 James Barber and John 
Barratt later argued that „while formally it was a „withdrawal‟, in reality the Republic 
had been forced out‟.36    
However, the success of the SAUF was fleeting. According to Jack Spence, 
South Africa‟s „departure from the Commonwealth… did not have the damaging 
consequences‟ which had been predicted, with the links between South Africa and 
Britain remaining strong.
37
 In addition, the unity between South African movements 
proved only temporary, and the incompatibility and mutual hostility of the ANC and 
PAC leaderships quickly came to the fore. A number of factors contributed to the 
collapse of the SAUF. These included regular attacks by the PAC, via the shared 
Voice of Africa radio station, against the ANC‟s communist links, and the complete 
breakdown in working relations during the Pietermaritzburg All-in Conference, in 
March 1961.
38
 The result was that on 15 March 1962 the SAUF was formally 
disbanded.
39
 The collapse of the SAUF had damaging consequences for the ANC‟s 
foreign policy in Africa, which will be explored further in this chapter. A 
contributing factor to the ANC‟s damaged international relations was that PAC 
propaganda led many African leaders to believe the ANC was overwhelmingly 
communist and controlled by whites. Ben Turok later observed that „the PAC had 
persuaded Africa‟s leaders that the ANC‟s multiracialism was a mechanism for 
domination by white communists‟.40 According to Slovo, during the early 1960s the 
PAC successfully cultivated a „myth‟ that it was „more militant and more 
revolutionary movement‟ than the ANC, resulting in suspicions of the latter from 
nations such as Tanzania, which had closer links to the Peoples Republic of China 
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than the Soviet Union.
41
 Although the PAC had considerable weaknesses, they were 
not wrong about the communist influences within the ANC, as both Slovo and Turok 
were also influential members of the SACP. 
 
Mandela’s 1962 Tour of Africa   
In January 1962, Nelson Mandela secretly left South Africa to attend the 
Conference of the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa 
(PAFMECA) in Addis Ababa, after which he embarked on a tour of independent 
African states.
42
 Mandela‟s tour provided a means of fulfilling some of the ANC‟s 
foreign policy objectives, namely the isolation of South Africa, gaining international 
support for the movement and, more importantly since 1961, securing funds and 
training for its guerrilla fighters. This latter point was the primary purpose of his trip.  
The ANC‟s decision to wage an armed struggle was one of the most 
significant events of the 1960s, and shaped the course of the entire exile period. The 
turn to violence was made by the remnants of the internal leadership in June 1961. 
Although the decision to adopt violent methods was officially announced in 
December 1961, the first group of cadres had already been sent to China for military 
training in early 1960, far in advance of the launch of MK.
43
 However, it was not a 
unanimous decision, especially because of the ANC‟s long stated commitment to 
non-violence.
44
 Mandela revealed that debates about the use of violence had been 
ongoing since 1960 but, sensitive to internal opposition, the new armed wing, MK, 
was kept separate from the political wing. It was only during the Lobatse Conference 
in 1962 that the ANC officially confirmed its ties to MK and the armed struggle.
45
 
Stephen Davis later argued that the conditions for armed struggle were unfavourable 
in 1961 and that it was „an act of sheer policy desperation‟ from the ANC.46 The 
official announcement in December 1961 came with a series of attacks against 
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government installations throughout South Africa. However, the timing proved 
somewhat embarrassing for the ANC‟s foreign policy, as its President, Chief Albert 
Luthuli, received the Nobel Peace Prize the same month (although it had been 
awarded in 1960). The award angered the NP government, but it was forced to allow 
Luthuli to leave the country to accept it, wary of potential negative international 
publicity if it refused.
47
 The award of the Nobel Peace Prize was highly symbolic and 
somewhat of a propaganda coup for the ANC in the west, though Mandela later 
acknowledged that it made launching the armed struggle somewhat awkward.
48
 The 
consequence of this turn to violence was that from this moment on, the primary (but 
originally unintended) priority of the External Mission was to seek support for MK 
operations.  
At the PAFMECA conference, Mandela grasped the chance to address the 
collected heads of state, in which he described to African leaders the situation in 
South Africa and stressed the vital importance of continental assistance to the 
ANC.
49
 Mandela saw the conference as an „opportunity to furnish important 
connections for the ANC… and [the] best chance for us to enlist support, money, and 
training for MK‟.50 Edward Feit observed that many of the conference delegates were 
united against apartheid, making them receptive to Mandela‟s message, and 
prompting a number of countries such as Algeria, Ethiopia, Morocco and Nigeria to 
pledge finances and military training to the ANC.
51
 The ANC had hoped that African 
unity and support for the struggle would materialise after PAFMECA, and the initial 
signs were positive. One outcome was that a number of MK cadres were sent for 
military training in the aforementioned nations over the following few years. After 
the conference in Ethiopia, Mandela embarked on an extensive tour of the continent 
(along with a brief stop in London) to meet leaders, ascertain their commitment to 
the ANC and to secure training for MK.
52
 During his visits to Morocco and Ethiopia, 
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Mandela met with several African liberation movements, including Algerian freedom 
fighters, giving him the chance to discuss tactics, as well as undergoing a course of 
basic military instruction.
53
 Turok argued that Mandela was „highly successful at 
winning important commitments from many heads of state who received him as an 
equal‟.54 However, soon after his return to South Africa in August, Mandela, the NP 
government‟s most wanted fugitive, was arrested.55  
As noted above, the dissemination of propaganda by the PAC had a negative 
impact on the ANC‟s effectiveness and relations during and after the PAFMECA 
conference, something which Mandela and Tambo fought hard to counteract. The 
ANC found that its multi-racial character and close links with the SACP 
compromised its nationalist credentials.
56
 Many delegates, particularly from counties 
such as Ghana with strong pan-Africanist ideals, were hostile to the involvement of 
whites in the ANC. For example, during Mandela‟s stop in Ghana, the President 
Kwame Nkrumah declined to meet him, and he also endured hostility from some 
government officials who were closer to the PAC.
57
 Kenneth Kaunda, the leader of 
the United National Independence Party (UNIP) and future President of Zambia, 
similarly expressed his apprehension about the ANC‟s links to communism.58 In his 
autobiography Mandela articulates his growing concern as „one African leader after 
another had questioned our relations with white and Indian communists, sometimes 
suggesting that they controlled the ANC… In the rest of Africa, most African leaders 
could understand the views of the PAC better‟.59 It was an early indication of the 
fractious and insecure nature of the ANC‟s relations with the rest of Africa.  
In May 1963, at the Conference of Independent African States in Addis 
Ababa, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was established, providing 
enormous symbolic assistance to remaining African liberation movements.
60
 In order 
to accelerate the decolonisation process, distribute funds, and to co-ordinate the 
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activities of liberation movements, the OAU created the Liberation Committee. The 
OAU acted as a beacon against white minority rule until the 1990s, although the 
removal of apartheid was not its priority until the 1980s. The explanation for this was 
encapsulated in the „domino theory‟; this suggested that if the weakest remaining 
white/colonial regime succumbed to majority rule, it would spark off a chain reaction 
and others would fall in succession. This policy meant that in Southern Africa, the 
Liberation Committee‟s priority was the Portuguese colonies of Angola and 
Mozambique, followed by Zimbabwe, Namibia and finally South Africa, with the 
level of support provided to each liberation movement corresponding to its position 
in this chain. Therefore, the ANC (and PAC) were last in the queue, and 
consequently received relatively little assistance from the OAU. It was a strategy 
which displeased the ANC, but its protests were ignored. It quickly became apparent 
that, although the OAU stood as a beacon for liberation in Africa, it was 
predominantly a rhetorical, rather than a practical vehicle. Roger Pfister argues that 
„the OAU‟s ability to provide financial aid to African liberation movements was 
limited‟, a factor arising because „member states themselves could ill afford to be 
generous‟.61 Furthermore, Yashpal Tandon observed in 1972 that there was „a wide 
discrepancy between what is promised to these movements and what they finally 
receive‟.62 Tandon added that „the extent that the movements secure financial aid 
from sources other than the OAU [meant], they are free to flaunt its decisions, 
particularly if their respective strategies of operation conflict‟.63 The consequence 
was that movements like the ANC were forced to seek assistance from elsewhere to 
ensure their capacity to wage its guerrilla conflict. 
As illustrated above, there was some consternation across Africa about the 
ANC‟s close links with the SACP, yet it was to be an alliance which proved 
extremely beneficial to the movement. Shubin minutely details how the ANC, 
through members of the SACP, established close working contacts with the Soviet 
Union and the Eastern Bloc.
64
 The extent of communist assistance to the struggle in 
the early 1960s (and the ANC‟s gratitude for it) is reinforced by Mac Maharaj who 
was posted to the GDR, and by Ronnie Kasrils who was sent for military training in 
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the Soviet Union.
65
 Although the ANC could count numerous communists within its 
leadership who had close ideological affiliation to the Soviet Bloc and its geo-
political goals (something which would later affect the characteristics and actions of 
the ANC in exile), the decision to court communist assistance was not primarily 
ideological. The lack of meaningful western and African support ensured that the 
only logical ally was the Soviet Bloc. In discussions concerning whether to seek 
Soviet support, one ANC leader, Joe Matthews, later recalled that „it‟s not a question 
of ideology, it‟s a question of practicality… We knew that the African states, 
generally speaking, were too weak‟.66 The alliance enabled the ANC to sustain itself, 
train its fighters and (in the long-run) brought it closer to other Soviet-sponsored 
liberation movements such as the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO). 
Callinicos rightly argues „that the steady widening of the composition of the 
movement, bringing with it a spread of ideological tendencies… [was to be] the 
turning point for the ANC [and] was to have profound repercussions in the 
movement‟s international… relations for decades to come‟. 67 On the other hand, 
Thomas stated that the ANC‟s relations with the Soviet Union should be seen in the 
context of the movement‟s broader approach to foreign relations – seeking the 
diplomatic isolation of South Africa and the military training of guerrilla fighters – 
and arose because of its disillusionment with the failure of the UN, OAU and the 
west to effectively support these aims.
68
 The lack of OAU support for the ANC‟s 
foreign policy aims, and the subsequent turn to the Soviet Union, was according to 
Tom Lodge, „to be rather more valuable than pan-African support‟.69      
 However, despite negative African perceptions about the ANC‟s ties to the 
Soviets, the movement had, by 1962, successfully established offices in Algiers, 
Rabat, Cairo, Dar es Salaam, Lusaka and London, with all its African offices 
supporting its military activities.
70
 These offices became more important after the 
Rivonia raids in 1963 had dismantled the internal structures of the ANC, leaving the 
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External Mission in control of the struggle.
71
 By 1963, the ANC‟s provisional 
headquarters was located in Tanzania, the closest available point to South Africa. 
The establishment of the liberation movements‟ headquarters in Dar es Salaam was 
actively encouraged by Julius Nyerere, who willingly provided facilities for all 
„credible‟ movements, giving the ANC opportunities to develop closer links with 
likeminded regional movements.
72
 However, relations were not always good. For 
example, only a year after establishing headquarters in Dar es Salaam, the ANC was 
forced to move to Morogoro because, Nyerere decreed in November 1964, that only 
four representatives from each liberation movement could reside in the capital.
73
 
Shubin argues this was particularly damaging to ANC foreign policy activities, 
because Morogoro was a provincial town „far from any international activity‟. 74 
Turok observed that Nyerere and his government sent conflicting signals to the ANC; 
on the one hand it offered protection to the movement, yet on the other, Tanzanian 
ministers would regularly and openly criticise it.
75
 Furthermore, Turok argued that 
„conditions in Tanzania were unfavourable for the ANC since important elements 
within the government, including the head of the OAU‟s Liberation Committee, 
favoured the PAC‟.76 A similar situation arose in Zambia after its independence in 
1964, following which President Kenneth Kaunda allowed the ANC to settle in 
Lusaka. Although the ANC had a presence in Lusaka from 1964, it was not until 
1967 that the military headquarters and its President‟s office moved to the city.77 
Kaunda walked a delicate tightrope because Zambia was more directly exposed to 
potential South African, Rhodesian and Portuguese military actions than Tanzania. 
The ANC had wanted to locate itself in Zambia because it was closer to South Africa, 
but the very nature of hosting the movement meant that Zambia was open to 
potential reprisals for the ANC‟s activities. Regardless of the fact that the ANC were 
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present in Zambia, the official policy was that Zambia did not encourage or provide 
facilities for its guerrillas. In a bid to maintain this mirage, any guerrillas entering the 
country were forced to surrender weapons to the government, allowing Zambia to 
exert some control over the foreign fighters in its territory.
78
 It also meant that the 
ANC leadership could maintain discipline within the country, preventing the 
possibility of mutiny amongst its cadres. However, despite the official restrictions on 
military activity in Zambia, the government in practice provided the bases for joint 
ANC-ZAPU incursions into Rhodesia (see below).        
 
The ZAPU alliance and the Wankie Campaign 
 By the mid-1960s, although the ANC had managed to survive and 
successfully establish international ties with numerous backers, demoralisation was 
setting in amongst its cadres. The ANC was scattered across Africa, South Africa 
remained largely unaffected by its posturing, and MK fighters were left frustrated in 
camps across Tanzania, with little prospect of engaging with the enemy. This latter 
point was to become a recurring problem throughout the ANC‟s exile history. By 
1966, the ANC had organised training for MK cadres in China, Ethiopia and the 
USSR, but these fighters remained redundant, thousands of miles from South Africa. 
These guerrillas had of course joined MK in order to fight the apartheid state, yet 
several years later they languished in their bases, with no immediate prospect of 
doing so. A key obstacle to their return was the lack of underground structures in 
South Africa and the inaccessibility of the border from their current locations.
79
 
  MK cadres became increasingly frustrated by the lack of action and the poor 
conditions in the camps, prompting one group in Tanzania in 1966 to commandeer a 
truck in an attempt to express their grievances to the leadership at Morogoro. 
However, the group was intercepted and arrested by the Tanzanian army before they 
reached Morogoro, accused of being deserters.
80
 The interception of the group by the 
Tanzanian army was a significant incident, of a type repeated throughout the period 
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of the ANC‟s exile. It was one example amongst many of a friendly African 
government utilising its armed forces to assist the ANC leadership in suppressing 
dissent within the movement. It demonstrates that the ANC leadership had developed 
sufficiently close working relationships with its hosts to persuade them to assist in 
this manner.
81
 Similar incidents will be explored later in this and the following 
chapter. Although no disciplinary action was taken, it prompted the leadership to 
seriously explore the possibilities of accelerating the infiltration of MK fighters into 
South Africa. But it was not just the ANC‟s cadres that were getting impatient. 
Callinicos argues that „the OAU was growing impatient with the lack of progress by 
the liberation movements… the armed struggle seemed to have been a deplorable 
failure‟.82 The ANC found that its African benefactors were increasingly frustrated 
by the lack of practical activity, with the Tanzanian and Zambian governments, along 
with the OAU, applying pressure upon the leadership to act.                
The embarrassing fact that the ANC had been in exile for seven years, during 
which it had failed to send a single guerrilla back to South Africa, was made more 
acute by the impressive guerrilla activities of FRELIMO in Mozambique.
83
 Due to 
these internal and external pressures on the ANC, the leadership sought to act on its 
rhetorical claims of engaging militarily with South Africa. In October 1967, the ANC 
and ZAPU announced an historic alliance between the two liberation movements.
84
 
The communiqué marked an important stage in the ANC‟s foreign policy, in that it 
strengthened the process of cementing enduring alliances with likeminded liberation 
movements in Southern Africa. Tambo described at the time how the alliance with 
ZAPU developed: 
We have had close political relations with ZAPU and these 
developed into relations at the military level until we were in a 
position to fight together. We are facing a common enemy, fighting 
for a common purpose, hence a combined force for a common 
onslaught against the enemy at every point of our encounter as we 
march down for the liberation of our respective countries.
85
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The ANC and ZAPU planned to infiltrate their forces into Rhodesia, with MK 
hoping to create a „Ho Chi Minh trail‟ to the South African border.86 In August 1967, 
the first unit, known as the Luthuli Detachment, crossed into Rhodesia, and initiated 
the Wankie Campaign.
87
 The guerrilla incursion was however, quickly spotted by 
Rhodesian security forces, which according to ANC sources, were initially shocked 
by the ferocity of the attack by MK.
88
 This prompted Sechaba to claim somewhat 
dramatically that „the enemy has suffered untold casualties‟.89 However, the better 
armed Rhodesians, aided by South African reinforcements, regrouped. They forced 
some guerrillas to flee into neighbouring Botswana, capturing or killing the others.
90
 
Those who retreated to Botswana, including the detachment‟s Political Commissar 
and future MK Commander Chris Hani, were arrested, given lengthy prison 
sentences, and subsequently deported to Zambia in 1968.
91
 In late 1967 and early 
1968 further incursions (the „Sipolilo Campaign‟) were launched, with similar results. 
The ANC attempted to claim victory, but it was obvious that its forces had been 
defeated.
92
 The defeats of 1967-68 exposed the limitations of the ANC‟s military 
strategy; its forces had not even come close to South Africa‟s borders.  
These failures were nevertheless a turning point for the ANC and marked the 
true beginnings of the ANC‟s armed struggle. They demonstrated that the ANC was 
prepared to engage militarily with South Africa, proving to its detractors that it was 
willing to take action. The military activities were also an attempt to quell discontent 
within the movement, and re-establish its credentials in the eyes of its international 
supporters as a revolutionary movement. The campaigns created the movement‟s 
first martyrs for the armed struggle and provided symbolic evidence of resistance to 
apartheid. Although unsuccessful, the Wankie Campaign provided the ANC with 
propaganda opportunities; because „the movement was largely in the doldrums, it 
had to be presented as being engaged in armed struggle in the same way as 
FRELIMO [Liberation Front of Mozambique], MPLA [People‟s Movement for the 
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Liberation of Angola] and PAIGC [African Party for the Independence of Guinea 
and Cape Verde]‟.93 It also apparently boosted confidence in the ANC and raised the 
political consciousness of the masses. As Fatton argues, „the alliance [with ZAPU] 
and the ensuing armed clashes were in this sense a stimulus to increased and 
improved political mobilisation‟. 94  Yet the defeats also prompted a bout of soul 
searching within the ANC. The desired boost to morale did not materialise and 
dissatisfaction remained widespread. Eventually, in April 1969, in a bid to stem 
mounting criticism from the rank and file, the ANC leadership convened the 
Morogoro Conference so that grievances could be aired and tactics formulated for 
the next stage of the struggle.  
 
1969: A year of upheaval 
 For the ANC, 1969 was in many respects a year of upheaval, but also one 
which afforded several opportunities to advance its foreign policy. During 1969 the 
ANC enhanced and cemented alliances with Soviet-sponsored Southern African 
liberation movements at the Khartoum Conference and its own conference at 
Morogoro. However, the ANC was also expelled from Tanzania, and was negatively 
affected by the signing of the Lusaka Manifesto by many of its African state allies, 
which adopted a relatively conciliatory stance towards South Africa. 
 
The Khartoum Conference 
 In January 1969, the first International Conference of Solidarity with the 
Peoples of Southern Africa and the Portuguese Colonies was held in the Sudanese 
capital Khartoum. It was attended by six liberation movements, namely the PAIGC 
(Guinea and Cape Verde), MPLA (Angola), FRELIMO (Mozambique), ZAPU 
(Zimbabwe), the South West Africa People‟s Organisation (SWAPO) (Namibia) and 
the ANC (South Africa).
95
 The Khartoum Conference was sponsored by the Soviet 
Union, organised jointly by the Afro-Asian Peoples` Solidarity Organization 
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(AAPSO) and the World Council for Peace, and was attended by delegates from over 
fifty countries and international organisations.
96
 The conference called upon all 
democratic and progressive governments and organisations to offer greater moral and 
material support for the liberation movements. However, it was the decision to 
extend exclusive recognition to the six invited liberation movements which was to 
have a significant impact on the ANC‟s foreign policy through to the current day. 
The result was the formation of the Khartoum Alliance, a bloc of „legitimate‟ or 
„authentic‟ liberation movements, backed by the Soviet Union and united by a 
common political and ideological association.
97
 Thus, the conference defined the 
ANC‟s „natural allies‟ in the region, providing a degree of international legitimacy to 
its struggle. Additionally, the alliance created a network of solidarity and cooperation 
in the region, endorsing the ANC‟s foreign policy; the six movements subsequently 
combined to lobby as a bloc at international organisations such as the UN and 
OAU.
98
 The full impact of the Khartoum Alliance was not however felt until after 
1975, with Portuguese decolonisation from Angola and Mozambique. As will be 
discussed later, members of the Khartoum Alliance came to power in both countries 
and opened up their territories for the ANC to establish diplomatic and military bases 
closer to South Africa. However, the alliance also created splits in the regional 
struggles as it challenged the authority of the OAU. In addition, the „non-authentic‟ 
movements sponsored by China such as the Zimbabwe African National Union 
(ZANU), the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and 
the PAC were excluded.
99
 In the case of Zimbabwe, after its independence in 1980, 
relations between President Robert Mugabe and the ANC were extremely frosty as a 
result, reflecting the latter‟s close affiliation with Mugabe‟s bitter rival ZAPU.  
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The Morogoro Conference 
 While the Khartoum Conference was taking place, Chris Hani was being 
deported from Botswana to Zambia. According to Hugh Macmillan, Hani, on his 
return from prison, was shocked to find the poor organisational state of the ANC in 
Zambia and identified its failure to learn from the lessons of the disastrous Wankie 
Campaign as a major cause for concern.
100
 Accusations were made that Wankie was 
poorly planned and rushed forward by the movement‟s leadership, and (more 
worryingly) that it had provided a means of having dissenters eliminated. As a way 
of expressing their dissatisfaction and grievances to the ANC leadership, Hani and 
six others wrote, what became known as, the Hani Memorandum in early 1969.
101
 
The Memorandum unsettled a leadership unused to being criticised, as it aired 
grievances about some of the ANC‟s leaders (particularly MK Commander-in-Chief 
Joe Modise) and publicly exposed the malaise within the movement as a whole. The 
document laid bare criticisms including: the absence of a debriefing after the Wankie 
Campaign; accusations that the ANC leadership in exile was „careerist‟ and 
„divorced from the situation in South Africa‟; that MK and the ANC were run 
separately from each other with no co-ordinated strategy; and that the Security 
Department of the ANC was internally focused, handing out brutal punishments to 
cadres in the camps without fair trials.
102
 For having the temerity to criticise the 
leadership, Hani and the other signatories were expelled from the movement by a 
tribunal (they were later reinstated), and were apparently sentenced to death, but 
saved only by the vigorous appeals of Mzwai Piliso.
103
 The Memorandum was a 
reflection of the immense dissatisfaction amongst the rank and file of the ANC about 
the state of the movement and the lack of progress after nearly a decade in exile. 
There was also a realisation that the struggle until this point had largely failed. 
According to the ANC journal Mayibuye, it had become „clear that the External 
Mission as then constituted was not organizationally geared to undertake the urgent 
task of undertaking this role‟.104   
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Acutely aware of the extent of discontent within the movement, the 
leadership was forced to urgently resolve the situation, and in April 1969 it 
announced that a National Consultative Conference would be held at Morogoro. The 
conference provided an opportunity for all cadres in the movement to participate, if 
not in person, then through written submissions. The conference was presented with 
fifty-three documents, nineteen of which originated from various units of the ANC, 
and thirty-four of which were individual contributions, covering a wide range of 
subjects, criticisms and opinions.
105
 An example of such a submission was Turok‟s 
scathing memorandum entitled „What is Wrong?‟, which illustrated some of the 
criticisms of the ANC.
106
 Over seventy delegates attended the conference, which 
according to the ANC, initiated a rare process of self-reflection „in an atmosphere of 
complete frankness‟.107  
One of the most important documents tabled at the conference, largely 
written by Slovo, was „Strategy and Tactics‟, which outlined the situation the 
movement found itself in and the direction it should embark upon.
108
 It was at this 
moment that the ANC fully committed itself to a revolutionary strategy of a People‟s 
War and this document explicitly advocated this approach. The document argued that 
the revolutionary struggle was „the only method left open‟ to achieve freedom in 
South Africa, emphasising the centrality of the armed wing in achieving this.
109
 
However, it also struck a note of caution, arguing that the ANC „must reject all 
manifestations of militarism that separate armed people‟s struggle from its political 
context‟. 110  The document recognised that without the politicisation and active 
participation of the masses, the armed struggle could not hope to succeed. Yet, this 
warning was not heeded, and the ANC consistently failed to act upon this message. 
Throughout its exile, the ANC was unable to establish „liberated areas‟ or cells 
within South Africa with the capability to shelter or supply infiltrating guerrillas. 
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This scenario meant that guerrillas that did manage to enter South Africa were 
largely isolated, leaving them more susceptible to arrest (see Chapter Three).  
A significant outcome of the conference was the decision to officially allow 
non-Africans to be part of the ANC; this had not hitherto been permitted, despite the 
non-racial approach adopted in the Freedom Charter. Paradoxically, several leading 
members of the SACP and MK, such as Dadoo, Slovo and Kasrils were non-African 
and, despite living in exile and sharing the principles and goals of the ANC, they had 
been prevented from becoming members.
111
 „Strategy and Tactics‟ declared that 
„those belonging to the other oppressed groups and those few White revolutionaries 
who show themselves ready to make common cause with our aspirations, must be 
fully integrated on the basis of individual equality‟.112 The decision allowed the ANC 
to coherently fulfil its pledge to a non-racial approach to the struggle originally 
outlined in the Freedom Charter. Although non-Africans were admitted for the first 
time, they were still prevented from joining the highest structure of the movement, 
the National Executive Committee (NEC), perhaps due to lingering suspicions 
amongst „Africanists‟.  
Following considerable criticism of the leadership in the run-up to Morogoro, 
the conference provided an important opportunity for the ANC to restructure and 
streamline the External Mission in order to create a more dynamic movement, and to 
bring the military and political wings together under an umbrella structure. A 
Presidential Council and a (multi-racial) Revolutionary Council were established „to 
improve efficiency and decision making‟.113 Johns argued that the creation of the 
Revolutionary Council was „an expression of the hope that greater effectiveness 
could be achieved if the direction and oversight of the armed struggle were made the 
responsibility of a specialised body free from other tasks‟.114 Additionally, the NEC, 
which had been regarded as unwieldy due to the number of representatives, was 
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reduced in size, with the aforementioned structures made accountable to this body.
115
 
In a bid to appease the ANC‟s cadres about the unaccountable nature of the 
leadership, new officials were appointed, and Oliver Tambo stepped down as Acting 
President General at the start of the conference, only to be unanimously reinstated.
116
   
The Morogoro Conference was predominantly focused on internal 
organisational restructuring and strategies for the future, so the international 
dimension of the struggle was not explicitly discussed. The key decision to escalate 
the armed struggle did however have an important impact on the ANC‟s foreign 
policy. The conference reiterated that the task of the External Mission was to ensure 
the success of the armed struggle and the promotion of internal mass activism. 
However, these two separate, yet intertwined aspects of foreign policy were never 
effectively linked. According to Barrell, „ANC strategy continued as if armed 
activity was the primary politicising agent‟.117 The only other international issues 
discussed, outlined in the Political Report of the National Executive Committee and 
reported in Sechaba, revolved around the nature of the ANC‟s alliances in Southern 
Africa, the opposition forces that it faced in the region, and the desire for greater 
unity and solidarity amongst all revolutionaries.
118
  
 
The Lusaka Manifesto 
 
In early April, immediately before the Morogoro conference, the Fifth 
Conference of East and Central African Heads of State convened in Lusaka to 
discuss the situation in Southern Africa. During the summit the delegates from 
fourteen states produced a landmark document known as the Lusaka Manifesto.
119
 
The Lusaka Manifesto is, in general, perceived as a significant step forward in 
African, and more specifically Southern African state‟s support for the liberation 
struggles of the region. The Manifesto publicly committed Southern Africa to 
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opposing the racist regimes in the region, which on the face of it offered greater 
opportunities to the liberation movements. However, the Manifesto also affirmed that 
the region‟s struggles had to be dealt with one by one, in line with the OAU‟s 
domino theory (see above). The document also explicitly distinguished the illegal 
regimes of Rhodesia and Portuguese colonialism from the legitimate state of South 
Africa. The Manifesto was therefore to have a significant and negative effect upon 
the ANC‟s standing in the region.  
The Manifesto began by condemning racial subjugation in Southern Africa, 
and called for the self-determination of its people.
120
 Ironically, since Tanzania and 
Zambia had exerted pressure on the ANC to engage in military activities in 1967, the 
document adopted a conciliatory and peaceful tone towards South Africa. This was a 
serious problem, because only weeks later at Morogoro, the ANC advocated the 
intensification of its armed struggle. Some of the signatories of the Manifesto were 
amongst the ANC‟s closest allies, which had knowingly allowed the movement to 
locate and launch guerrilla fighters from its territory. These governments were now 
expressing an unwillingness to support this approach to the South African regime in 
favour of a negotiated outcome. The Manifesto was subsequently endorsed by the 
OAU and the UN as the preferred course of action for the region.  
 The second pertinent issue for the ANC was that it had always maintained 
that the South African regime was illegal according to international law. However, 
the Manifesto challenged this assumption by arguing that „South Africa is itself an 
independent sovereign State and a Member of the United Nations... On every legal 
basis its internal affairs are a matter exclusively for the people of South Africa‟.121 
Effectively, Frontline States were claiming they could not interfere with, or alter the 
policies of the apartheid government. The heads of state not only recognised South 
Africa‟s legitimacy, they openly stated they would not interfere in what they hoped 
would be a peaceful transition. It meant that any changes would have to be the 
prerogative of the South African government. Even if this was a partly tactical retreat, 
in line with the domino theory, it had a negative consequence for the ANC‟s policy. 
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 To make matters worse, none of the liberation movements had been invited to 
the conference, or been consulted on a declaration which was to have drastic 
repercussions for them. The Lusaka Conference was in stark contrast to the 
Khartoum Conference in which the six Marxist-inspired Southern African 
movements had actively participated. The SACP‟s African Communist wryly 
observed that in contrast to Khartoum „unfortunately and conspicuously-none from 
the fourteen states… were represented at Lusaka‟. 122  The journal scathingly 
condemned the heads of state for „their failure to speak out unequivocally [which] 
can only arouse lively apprehensions of a real, and not merely a verbal sell-out‟. 123 
Its most damning observation was that the independent African states that endorsed 
the Manifesto had gained their independence relatively easily, and the Lusaka 
Manifesto was thus „insufferably patronising and even arrogant‟.124 
 The consequence was that the ANC found itself unsure of its standing in the 
region. Thomas Karis and Gail Gerhart argued that the Manifesto meant that „now 
even the continued support by Tanzania and Zambia and, in general, the solidarity of 
African states with the liberation struggle appeared shaky‟. 125  The movement 
depended on the benevolence of these nations, so could not afford to be overly 
critical, yet privately it was furious at what it interpreted as a betrayal. The Manifesto 
was a warning to the ANC about its tenuous position. Shubin argued that by the time 
of the Lusaka Manifesto, „ANC activities in African countries were faltering… 
Umkhonto [MK] lost its capacity to operate from Zambian territory‟. 126  The 
Manifesto also coincided with South African attempts at the end of the decade to 
establish closer links with Africa, known as the „Dialogue‟ process. 127  This 
development posed a serious threat to the ANC, and will be examined further in the 
section discussing the 1970s.  
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The ANC’s expulsion from Tanzania 
 If the Lusaka Manifesto was damaging to the ANC, its expulsion from 
Tanzania was even more devastating. By the end of the 1960s Tanzania and Zambia 
were increasingly under pressure from the white minority ruled states and although 
they were never targeted to the extent of other Southern African states, Rhodesia and 
South Africa had threatened them with military action.
128
 For example, Vorster had 
threatened in 1967 to „hit Zambia so hard that she would never forget it‟.129 Both 
governments were therefore increasingly vigilant in the wake of sabotage attempts 
against key infrastructure including the oil pipeline between the two countries.
130
 
These countries could not compete militarily with the white regimes, and „many 
(including Zambia) for solely economic reasons needed or wanted to trade‟ with 
South Africa.
131
 The fact that the host countries were suffering because of the 
liberation movements meant that official attitudes hardened towards their guests. 
Immediately before the Tanzanian expulsion, Kaunda had ordered the complete 
withdrawal of all MK members from Zambia, and although the threat was not carried 
out, it demonstrates the rising tensions at this time and the uncertainty surrounding 
the ANC‟s position. 132  Furthermore, in September 1969, Kaunda ordered all the 
liberation movements resident in Lusaka to provide lists of their members in Zambia, 
insisting that no military personnel could stay in the country. One additional factor 
contributing to the ANC‟s expulsion from Tanzania was its leaders‟ refusal to testify 
in the treason trial of former Foreign Minister Oscar Kambona. Tambo insisted that 
the ANC should remain neutral in the affairs of other countries, to which Nyerere 
and other Tanzanian officials took exception.
133
 Conversely, it appears that only the 
South African movements (the ANC and PAC) were made examples of by Tanzania 
over this incident, as other regional liberation movements remained in the country at 
this time.
134
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 The consequence was that in July 1969, the ANC was ordered to vacate the 
military camp at Kongwa within fourteen days, officially because MK was deemed a 
security risk.
135
 The announcement by Nyerere sparked panic amongst the ANC 
leadership, as there was no possibility that MK could infiltrate its guerrillas into 
South Africa in such a short period of time, and no other African state was willing to 
host its fighters. The longstanding alliance with the Soviet Union paid dividends 
once again, as it provided an airlift, en masse, of all its cadres from Dar es Salaam. It 
was an immense undertaking for the Soviet Union, physically and financially, as it 
now had to sustain the whole of the ANC‟s fighting force.136 The ANC‟s expulsion 
from Tanzania marked an inglorious finale to the decade, with its forces now located 
further from South Africa than ever before. 
 
The Early 1970s 
 After a decade of exile, the ANC‟s position in Africa was arguably weaker 
than it had been in 1960. The armed struggle had not progressed in the manner 
expected, discontent was rife within the movement, and its expulsion from Tanzania 
and relocation to the Soviet Union was a serious setback to its position within 
Southern Africa. Additionally, the publication of the Lusaka Manifesto demonstrated 
the increasing willingness of African states to treat South Africa as a legitimate state, 
which was a blow to a key tenet of ANC foreign policy – the isolation of the 
apartheid regime. The ANC‟s malaise continued during the early 1970s, as numerous 
African nations began to put the Manifesto into practice, initiating a period of closer 
links to apartheid South Africa. During this Dialogue Process, South Africa 
attempted to break its international isolation by establishing political and economic 
relations with amenable African states.
137
 Dialogue infuriated the ANC, but there 
was little it could do to influence the governments involved, particularly in the light 
of its then precarious standing in Africa.
138
 According to Jack Simons, during this 
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period „the ANC was stagnant in the frontline areas, had undergone a loss of purpose, 
made little contact with people in South Africa, and was suffering from arrested 
development‟. 139  It was not until 1975 that the ANC‟s fortunes changed. 
Decolonisation in Angola and Mozambique acted as a catalyst for African liberation 
in Southern Africa; two „authentic‟ movements of the Khartoum Alliance had taken 
power, opening up new opportunities for military-bases and the infiltration of 
guerrillas into Rhodesia and South Africa. After Portugal‟s retreat from Africa, the 
ANC‟s vibrancy and viability was further boosted by the Soweto Uprising in 1976, 
which resulted in a new wave of young, militant South Africans fleeing the country 
and joining the ANC; although this eventuality did also generate some conflict 
within the movement. This section will examine how these events affected the 
ANC‟s foreign policy during this stage of the struggle.    
 
The Dialogue Process 
 It would be no exaggeration to argue that the Dialogue Process threatened the 
ANC‟s relations with a number of African countries. Before Dialogue began in 
earnest, Malawi‟s President Hastings Banda had been the first African leader to 
establish official economic and political relations with South Africa in 1967.
140
 
Banda‟s decision incurred the wrath of the ANC, whose mouthpiece Sechaba 
repeatedly condemned the activities of Malawi, labelling the President as an „African 
Judas‟ committing acts of „brazen treachery‟.141 Banda further claimed that African 
states which criticised him were hypocrites: „while they are criticising me for trading 
with South Africa openly, they themselves are trading with South Africa secretly‟.142 
Banda‟s statement provides an indication of the double standards of some African 
nations and their increasingly close ties to South Africa. Following the Lusaka 
Manifesto‟s conciliatory tone towards South Africa, and aided by his success with 
Malawi, Vorster accelerated the process of pragmatically reaching out to receptive 
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African states.
143
 As a result, a number of African leaders grudgingly accepted the 
apartheid regime and expressed privately a desire to forge closer ties.
144
 If the Lusaka 
Manifesto was a setback to the ANC‟s foreign policy, the Dialogue Process posed an 
even graver threat. Its hard work of establishing diplomatic and military links with 
independent Africa was rapidly being undone by the overtures of South Africa. In 
spite of revolutionary rhetoric and claims of overt support, some African states were 
increasingly seduced by the economic advantages of relations with Pretoria. The 
irony is that a similar approach was later replicated by the ANC in government, when 
it established ties with „pariah‟ nations in return for economic benefits (see Chapters 
Six and Seven). The standard-bearers of the Dialogue Process were Presidents 
Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast and Banda, who were joined by countries such 
as Ghana, Gabon, and Madagascar.
145
 They justified Dialogue by both their 
expressed desire for peaceful coexistence in Africa and by economic factors. The 
Prime Minister of Ghana criticised the ANC‟s armed struggle as „sending a few 
people to slaughter‟, and Houphouet-Boigny argued that, instead of violence, 
diplomats should peacefully invade South Africa.
146
 Although only a minority of 
African countries made public statements about rapprochement with Pretoria, by 
mid-1971 it looked increasingly likely that South Africa‟s efforts at attracting 
African support were being successful. 
 The ANC was alarmed and incensed by this dramatic shift in African 
attitudes. However, there was very little it could do to alter continental opinion. The 
movement initially denounced all African states which embraced Dialogue, accusing 
them of damaging African unity, betraying the struggle when it was most in need of 
support, and succumbing to the forces of racism and fascism. Sechaba asserted that 
Dialogue was „a slap in the face… for those men of vision who held such high hopes 
in the sixties… what a retreat from the ideal of African freedom… as espoused by 
the founders of the institutions of African Unity‟.147 The ANC even went so far as to 
question whether the pro-Dialogue governments had been persuaded by western 
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governments to reappraise their stance towards South Africa.
148
 The Dialogue 
controversy rumbled on, but was not properly considered by African leaders until the 
17
th
 Session of the Council of Ministers of the OAU, in June 1971. At this meeting, 
despite the inroads made by Vorster, backed by the vocal bloc of pro-Dialogue 
nations in the OAU, the majority of the Council accepted the ANC‟s incessant 
protests, rejecting the idea, and „emphatically declar[ing] that there exists no basis 
for a meaningful dialogue‟ with South Africa.149 An additional important outcome of 
the meeting was that the OAU decided that from this point forward it should consult 
more with the liberation movements. After the divisiveness of the Dialogue debate, 
the OAU felt the need to a reaffirm its unconditional commitment to the struggle.
150
 
The OAU‟s announcement came as an enormous relief to the ANC, providing a 
modicum of security that had been previously lacking. This rejection of Dialogue 
blunted South Africa‟s attempts at breaking its isolation, but it did not prevent 
interstate relations between Pretoria and some Southern African states from 
continuing, albeit covertly. Following the failure of Dialogue, South Africa‟s 
outward looking policy was not deterred, and it soon heralded a new period known as 
Détente, after Vorster had offered Africa „the way of peace‟ in 1974.151 It was a 
message well received by some African leaders, such as Kaunda who described it as 
„the voice of reason‟. However, Détente‟s constructive diplomatic potential was 
severely undermined by South Africa‟s invasion of Angola in 1975-1976.152 Yet, in 
reality, what really mattered to the ANC was the practical stance of Southern African 
states, such as Tanzania and Zambia since they were in a position to provide refuge 
and support to the ANC.  
 
The Internal and External Situation of the ANC in the early 1970s 
 By the early 1970s the ANC had begun to diversify its international sources 
of financial and material aid. The Soviet Union remained by far its most important 
ally, but the ANC did successfully reach out to Scandinavian countries. In 1973, it 
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received its first direct aid from Sweden, marking the beginning of a long and close 
relationship, with this assistance officially earmarked for non-violent activities such 
as administration, education and living expenses.
153
 The ANC was also granted 
observer status at the UN General Assembly and its Special Committee against 
Apartheid in 1974. This development provided the ANC with a platform from which 
to better project its goals and ideals internationally. This resulted in successfully 
denying South Africa the right to participate in meetings of the General Assembly in 
1974.
154
  
 Although the ANC was largely isolated from the internal political 
undercurrents in South Africa, there was some limited evidence of activity within the 
country. Its pamphlets and journals were smuggled in from abroad and distributed, 
sometimes spectacularly via explosions, in a bid to keep the ANC in the public 
consciousness.
155
 In addition, from the late 1960s, the ANC‟s Radio Freedom had 
been broadcasting from Zambia (it later also transmitted from Angola, Ethiopia, 
Madagascar and Tanzania) into South Africa, and it appears the station influenced 
some future members of the ANC.
156
 Also, the trials of several activists, including 
Winnie Mandela, demonstrated that there was still some internal political dissent 
against the apartheid regime.
157
 Such activity, was however, conducted haphazardly 
and, with few security precautions, often led to the swift arrest and detention of 
activists. It would thus be incorrect to extrapolate from these isolated events that the 
ANC was particularly active inside South Africa in this period. The underground 
structures had not recovered after being dismantled in the mid-1960s, and the South 
African security forces continued to successfully subdue dissent. 
 After the Morogoro Conference, the ANC leadership had planned to fulfil its 
resolve to escalate the armed struggle in South Africa and reverse the internal 
situation. Having failed to infiltrate guerrillas by land, a new plan was developed in 
1971 to land an invading force by sea. Based on the experience of the Cuban 
revolution, the plan, known as „Operation J‟, was to sail from Somalia and land 
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approximately forty-five cadres on the South African coast.
158
 According to Joe 
Matthews, the ANC had been discussing such plans with Soviet officials for some 
time, but during a visit to Moscow in 1970, they were warned of being too hasty, 
especially because „without a proper and secure machinery which could receive and 
sustain guerrillas at home, any plan was doomed to failure‟.159 Whereas the ANC 
was confident because of the success of Castro‟s revolution, the Soviets „considered 
the success of the Cuban revolution as a fluke… and should not be repeated‟.160 
Despite the lack of effective internal structures and Soviet warnings, the ANC 
pressed ahead. The ANC procured a ship in the Mediterranean and put the selected 
guerrillas through intensive training, including a period in the Soviet Union.
161
 The 
plan was however scuppered, not by South African interception, but by the failure of 
equipment on two separate occasions, prompting Slovo to consider whether 
saboteurs were to blame.
162
 In the end „Operation J‟ never went ahead, and instead 
the guerrillas were flown to Botswana and Swaziland to infiltrate into South Africa, 
but they were intercepted by South African security forces and put on trial.
163
 Slovo 
later admitted that from 1971-1976, the ANC repeatedly and unsuccessfully 
attempted to infiltrate guerrillas. However, he argued that these failures had raised 
public awareness, as „here was a committed and dedicated group which was just 
going to continue knocking their heads against this wall until somehow there was a 
crack in it. I think this was a very important side-product of the efforts‟.164  
However, the ANC was further weakened in the early 1970s by a split within 
its leadership; after years of simmering discontent, eight members led by Tennyson 
Makiwane accused the movement of having been hijacked by communists.
165
 The 
so-called „Gang of Eight‟ were branded as dissidents, intent on destabilising the 
movement, and were promptly expelled in 1975.
166
 Unable to return home and with 
the leadership on the verge of fragmenting, Davis argues that the ANC at this time 
was anaemic and lacked the strength to move forward.
167
 Karis and Gerhart agree 
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that „despite minor advances, the liberation struggle seemed stagnant and on the 
defensive‟.168    
 
The Decolonisation of Angola and Mozambique, 1974-1976 
 There is not sufficient space here to fully examine the events surrounding 
Portugal‟s retreat from Southern Africa, but it was arguably the most significant 
event to befall the region during the exile period of the ANC. In 1974, a coup 
initiated by dissatisfied military officers, overthrew the fascist rule of Marcelo 
Caetano; the military officers who took power pledged immediately to withdraw 
Portugal from its African colonies.
169
 The coup shaped the subsequent course of 
history in the region, directly bringing the Cold War to Southern African territory. 
The Portuguese withdrawal from Angola and Mozambique in 1975 resulted in two 
Marxist governments taking power which both directly supported African liberation. 
It also led to a bitter civil war in Angola between competing ideological parties, and 
prompted South Africa to take a more assertive stance in the region, including the 
destabilisation of neighbouring states and repeated incursions into Angola.
170
 
Without the events in Portugal, there is little doubt that the advancement of black 
emancipation from white minority rule would have been further delayed across 
Southern Africa. Portuguese withdrawal came as a major surprise, with neither the 
regional liberation movements nor the white minority regimes anticipating this 
eventuality. The outcome was that two of the ANC‟s staunchest allies, members of 
the Khartoum Alliance, took power, providing practical support to its activities. The 
nature of this support will be analysed further in Chapter Three.   
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The Soweto Uprising, 1976 
 Despite these welcome developments, the ANC remained largely isolated 
from the masses in South Africa, and was thus out of touch with the undercurrents of 
a new political awakening in the country. Although the ANC claimed to speak for the 
masses, it was in reality a small, centralised exile movement, disconnected from the 
people it was supposed to represent. This is reinforced by Ivan Pillay, who asserted 
that in 1971-72 the ANC only had around 100 members living in exile in Lusaka.
171
 
In the ANC‟s absence internal leadership had passed to the Black Consciousness 
Movement (BCM), led by Steve Biko and supported by militant, disaffected 
youth.
172
 On 16 June 1976, an estimated 14,000 school students gathered to protest in 
Soweto about the introduction of the Afrikaans language as the medium of 
education.
173
 The police fired upon the protestors, killing twenty-three people and 
sparking unprecedented nationwide unrest. Soweto became a national and 
international symbol of apartheid repression, and provided a powerful propaganda 
tool for the ANC. However, the ANC had no direct role in the uprising, despite 
subsequent claims by some activists.
174
 Many of the students had little or no 
knowledge of the ANC or PAC, and certainly had no association with the established 
liberation movements.
175
 Many Soweto era students fled South Africa, and 
subsequently joined the ANC in exile. However, Kasrils expressed his shock about 
these new exiles, who were „in a sense, blank about the history of the struggle, the 
role of the ANC, of MK in the earlier period... what struck me was the extent to 
which that generation had really grown up with the absence of that kind of political 
culture‟.176 Indeed, Ellis and Sechaba argue that at this time the ANC had risked 
losing all contact with events in South Africa, and was in grave danger of becoming 
irrelevant in the face of the new wave of activism.
177
 Barrell agrees that the Soweto 
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Uprising caught the ANC unprepared, with the leadership unable to offer political 
guidance to the protesters, which he believes damaged the movement‟s credibility.178 
An indication of the ANC‟s isolation from the South African milieu was later 
provided by the future UDF leader Murphy Morobe, who recalled: „we thought we 
were the first people to fight the government. We did not know about the Defiance 
Campaign and the school boycotts in the 1950s‟.179 Looking back at Soweto in the 
mid-1980s, Tambo candidly admitted:  
it was however true that in 1976-77 we had not recovered 
sufficiently to take full advantage of the situation that crystallised 
from the first events of June 16, 1976. Organisationally, in political 
and military terms, we were too weak to take advantage of the 
situation created by the uprising. We had very few active ANC 
units inside the country. We had no military presence to speak of. 
The communication links between ourselves outside the country 
and the masses of our people were still too slow and weak to meet 
the situation such as was posed by the Soweto Uprising.
180
 
There was a very real danger that the ANC would be superseded by forces outside of 
its control. This danger was intensified by a major wave of industrial action across 
South Africa in August and September 1976.
181
 In the aftermath, Tambo realised that 
the ANC needed effective propaganda to attract South Africans to its cause, and 
relate to their immediate concerns. Tambo also recognised the need for increased 
attention to political mobilisation inside the country, arguing that without this 
groundwork the people of South Africa might be reluctant to support MK guerrillas. 
He warned: „when will they ever understand that you cannot wage a liberation war 
just with the man and his guns. Who is going to receive them, who is going to feed 
them, who is going to hide them, why will those people receive them, why will those 
people feed them?‟.182  
Yet, ANC cadres stationed in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland worked hard 
to capitalise on the unfolding situation to the movement‟s advantage. Facing state 
repression in the aftermath of the uprising, as many as 4,000 people fled persecution 
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in South Africa by 1977.
183
 Acting as the first point of contact for many new exiles, 
the ANC in these forward areas assimilated the vast majority into its ranks, 
promising either military training or education. In reality many joined the ANC 
because it was the only option available to them; the PAC was effectively moribund 
by this stage. Marx argued that „the flow of exiles to the ANC is a notable example 
of how material resources, rather than ideas or prestige have determined opposition 
allegiances‟.184 Regardless of this, the wave of new young recruits was undeniably 
extremely beneficial to the ANC. However, the exodus also severely challenged the 
movement. First, it strained the ANC‟s exile structures, as it needed to accommodate 
and maintain the large number of new recruits. This forced the movement to turn to 
the Soviet Union and sympathetic Southern African states for assistance.
185
 Secondly, 
the ANC‟s failure to maintain its internal influence from exile meant that the 
majority of the new arrivals were not particularly aware of the ideology, or 
experiences of the movement, or were wedded to the beliefs of the BCM. This led to 
incidents of indiscipline and frustration as the new cadres sought rapid action against 
the apartheid regime.
186
 The Soweto generation of exiles nevertheless revitalised the 
ANC, as a new set of young, dynamic and militant people swelled its ranks.  
 
Conclusion 
By 1976, the ANC had made some considerable gains during its first sixteen-
years in exile from South Africa. Indeed, the movement‟s very survival during the 
1960s was in itself an impressive achievement. The ANC‟s cadres, spread across 
Africa and Europe, had worked hard to establish a global network of support for its 
struggle, assisted by newly independent and (largely) sympathetic Southern African 
states, such as Tanzania and Zambia. This international support was typified by its 
close and fruitful association with the Soviet Union. It was this relationship with the 
Soviet Bloc that had played a crucial role in the ANC establishing an alliance of 
likeminded Southern African liberation movements at the Khartoum Conference, 
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which was to pay dividends after 1976 (see Chapter Three). Furthermore, the 
movement began its armed struggle, and successfully organised the Morogoro 
Conference, which had in part, set about planning for the future. However, some of 
the ANC‟s gains during this period were reversed by a number of political changes. 
The movement‟s relations with some of its hosts, most notably Tanzania, 
deteriorated to such an extent that it was expelled from its bases in the country, 
forcing it to relocate its guerrilla fighters to the Soviet Union. It was to leave the 
ANC even further from the borders of South Africa. Moreover, in the early 1970s, 
South Africa‟s diplomatic efforts to break its isolation through „Dialogue‟ with 
Africa had a negative material and ideological effect on the ANC‟s ability to wage its 
struggle. These incidents served to highlight that, despite establishing its support 
network and having a close affiliation to a number of African states, the ANC‟s 
position in Southern Africa was extremely tenuous.    
Yet, it was two events in Southern Africa, that the ANC had no control over, 
which significantly aided the struggle. Firstly, the Portuguese decolonisation of 
Angola and Mozambique changed the geo-political fabric of the region. Two 
members of the Khartoum Alliance came to power, establishing Marxist inspired 
states, who promised to support the ANC through any means possible (see Chapter 
Three). Secondly, the Soweto Uprising demonstrated a renewed militant opposition 
to apartheid within South Africa. Soweto was of immense symbolic value to the 
ANC, as international attitudes, particularly those of civil society such as the Anti-
Apartheid Movement (AAM), aligned with the movement‟s goals.187 Soweto acted 
as the trigger for this shift of international opinion, prompting greater awareness 
about apartheid, reinforced by domestic campaigns to pressure countries such as 
Britain to boycott or apply sanctions against South Africa (though the majority of 
western governments ignored this upsurge). It is ironic then that two events over 
which the ANC had no control or influence, Portuguese decolonisation and the 
Soweto uprising, were the most important events that enabled the exile movement to 
pursue its foreign policy goals far more effectively after 1976.  
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Chapter Three 
From Exile to Liberation, 1976-1990 
 
 The formation of Marxist regimes in Angola and Mozambique was certainly 
a major step forward for African liberation in Southern Africa. The Khartoum 
Alliance of the late 1960s (see Chapter Two) began to truly pay dividends, providing 
the ANC with a safe haven in the region, training camps for Umkhonto we Sizwe 
(MK), infiltration routes from Mozambique, via Swaziland, into South Africa, as 
well as increased material and rhetorical support. The development opened up a new 
chapter in the ANC‟s liberation struggle. However, the support of these Marxist 
governments was tempered by the fact it brought greater western attention to 
Southern Africa. Observing the region through the prism of the Cold War, western 
governments tended to view the ANC as a Soviet-sponsored, communist movement, 
and thus took steps to halt its progress.
1
 Western actions thereby provided South 
Africa with a degree of international legitimacy and manoeuvrability, framing 
Pretoria‟s subsequent foreign policy. In the late 1970s, the NP government depicted 
the country as facing a „Total Onslaught‟ from communism and, using the Cold War 
as justification, acted with impunity against the ANC and the Marxist regimes of 
Angola and Mozambique. Using the carrot of economic ties and peaceful coexistence, 
and the stick of destabilisation and violence, the South African regime attempted to 
intimidate its neighbours into submission through its Total Strategy. As will be seen 
below, as a result of its support to the ANC, Angola and Mozambique bore the brunt 
of South African destabilisation. Indeed, ANC leader and National Executive 
Committee (NEC) member Matthews Phosa later acknowledged that „the people of 
Mozambique paid a supreme price for the struggle of South Africa‟.2   
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The ANC’s improved position in Southern Africa 
 In the second half of the 1970s, Zambian state attitudes towards the ANC 
were very mixed. In 1978, Kasrils wrote that „Zambia is not unaffected by the 
existence of revolutionary governments in Mozambique and Angola and is smack in 
the front line struggle against Rhodesia and Pretoria, giving us and ZAPU full 
support. Geo-politically this country is placed at the strategic crossroads of the battle 
to liberate southern Africa, and Kaunda is four-square behind us‟.3 According to 
Hugh Macmillan, however, „Zambian spokespeople continued to pay lip-service to 
the need for armed struggle while blowing hot and cold on the ANC‟.4 Yet, during 
the course of the 1970s, the ANC in Lusaka had managed to transform itself from a 
beleaguered, disparate community in exile into what was effectively a government-
in-waiting. With the consent of Kenneth Kaunda, the population and administration 
of the ANC rose rapidly, with around 800 non-combatants stationed in Zambia by 
1980, supported largely by Scandinavian aid. However, Kaunda‟s government was 
not always amenable. The first problem was that Kaunda had been seeking détente 
with South Africa in 1976, and a political settlement in Rhodesia, and thus hosting 
the ANC complicated these discussions.
5
 Secondly, and far more problematic for the 
ANC, was Zambian support for Angolan nationalist movement the National Union 
for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The ANC‟s close ties to UNITA‟s 
rival the People‟s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) were met with 
hostility, prompting Zambian officials to demand lists of all its members in the 
country in 1975-76, which the movement suspected would be passed on to South 
African officials.
6
 Although there were problems in the official relationship, the 
ANC was at least tolerated in Zambia, and its relationship with the government 
improved significantly during the 1980s.  
The ANC was also fortunate that the Portuguese withdrawal from Southern 
Africa and the fallout from the Soweto Uprising contributed to a sea-change in the 
region, allowing it to improve its relations with a number of sympathetic 
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governments and establish a formal presence in several countries such as Swaziland 
and Botswana (Malawi was the only country in Southern Africa with which it had no 
direct relations).
7
 For example, the international outlook of Lesotho‟s Prime Minister 
Chief Jonathan altered dramatically; according to the African Communist, 
Mozambican independence led him to demand „an alignment with the anti-apartheid 
forces, namely the ANC‟. 8  The Basotho National Party (BNP) thus established 
„closer political relations with the ANC‟ and „Prime Minister Jonathan developed an 
astonishing personal rapport with ANC President Oliver Tambo‟. 9  These 
developments allowed South African refugees to remain in Lesotho and, although 
officially the ANC could not establish bases there, numerous cadres became active in 
the country. Furthermore, previously poor relations with Tanzania were overcome by 
1978, when Julius Nyerere invited an ANC delegation led by Tambo to the country. 
Nyerere pledged to assist the ANC wherever possible, including accommodating 
guerrillas and using his influence in international forums.
10
   
 After Angolan independence, the MPLA was swift to honour the Khartoum 
Alliance, granting the ANC internal military facilities and training opportunities as 
early as 1976; a year later an ANC office was opened in Luanda.
11
 The MPLA 
government demonstrated its close affiliation to the ANC by the fact that despite the 
continued threat of UNITA and South African military action in the country, it 
provided practical assistance to the struggle.
12
 Five camps were established in the 
north of the country for military training, which was carried out by visiting East 
German, Cuban and Soviet instructors, with further specialist instruction carried out 
in the territories of the Soviet Union, Cuba, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), 
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North Korea and Bulgaria.
13
 By 1978, there were according to Vladimir Shubin 
1,167 MK fighters abroad, mainly based in Angola.
14
 Likewise, in Mozambique, the 
Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) was eager to support the ANC and its 
government allowed numerous cadres to settle in the country after 1975. Although 
Mozambique offered a transit route for guerrillas through Swaziland into South 
Africa, the majority of ANC members in the country were not guerrilla fighters. 
Mozambique instead offered a platform for the ANC to create structures 
geographically close to South Africa to facilitate the movement of cadres and 
information. For example, various senior figures from the ANC including Joe Slovo 
lived in Mozambique, and others such as Albie Sachs made important contributions 
at the Universidade Eduardo Mondlana in Maputo.
15
 The ANC was provided with 
housing by FRELIMO, and the movement also worked hard to establish a network 
and infrastructure in Mozambique.
16
 As with its previous experiences elsewhere in 
Southern Africa, Nadja Maghezi observed that despite Mozambique not being 
primarily a military location, MK matters nevertheless took precedence over political 
activities there.
17
 She believes however that this may have occurred because 
Mozambique was „originally only meant for the underground; but because of the full 
support of the Mozambican government and people, what would in other areas have 
had to be hidden or semi-hidden activities could be openly displayed‟.18 However 
(like Zambia and Tanzania in the late 1960s), the Mozambican government had to 
act carefully; because of its proximity to South Africa, it was targeted militarily by 
the apartheid regime throughout the 1980s.         
The opening up of these new fronts in the late 1970s allowed MK to infiltrate 
guerrillas back into South Africa to carry out high profile attacks, known as „armed 
propaganda‟, in a bid to stimulate a People‟s War.19 According to Dawn, acts carried 
out in the late 1970s included the scattering of pamphlets throughout the country, the 
targeting of symbols of apartheid, sabotage of infrastructure and the sending of 
                                               
13 Ndlovu, „Diplomacy‟, pp. 658-59. 
14 Shubin, Moscow, pp. 196-98. 
15 Email correspondence with Dr. Gary Littlejohn, 24 June 2011. 
16 Manghezi, The Maputo Connection, pp. 78-79. 
17 Ibid., p. 81. 
18 Ibid., p. 81. 
19 S. Ellis and T. Sechaba, Comrades against Apartheid: The ANC & the South African Communist 
Party in exile (London, 1992), p. 100. 
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parcel bombs.
20
 This upsurge in the armed struggle was illustrated by the recording 
of 82 such incidents in South Africa between 1977 and 1980.
21
 Although, these did 
not seriously challenge the military supremacy of South Africa, they marked a new 
phase in the struggle. These activities proved symbolic, demonstrating domestically 
and internationally that the ANC was actively pressurising the apartheid regime. The 
ANC designated 1979 as the „Year of the Spear‟ to represent this new stage in the 
struggle.
22
 
 Meanwhile, the ANC stepped up its international diplomatic offensive against 
apartheid. This was illustrated in July 1977 when the NEC met at Morogoro to 
discuss the future after Soweto.
23
 The final NEC report argued that the ANC‟s 
international prestige and authority had grown, aided by Tambo‟s address to the UN 
in October 1976, the conclusions reached at the Lisbon Conference of 1977 (which 
had recognised the ANC as sole representative of the South African people), and the 
regular attendance of its leaders at Frontline States (FLS) meetings and other 
important international events.
24
 The document reveals that the key international 
objective of the ANC was winning exclusive recognition as the sole representative of 
the people, declaring that it would be „“fully geared” for this task‟.25 The ANC also 
started to make useful inroads at the UN after Tambo‟s speech in 1976. A mandatory 
arms embargo against South Africa was endorsed by western powers in October 
1977, and a year later the UN declared an international year against apartheid.
26
 An 
additional boost was official meetings organised between Tambo and leaders of 
various socialist countries including Cuba, the GDR and Vietnam.
27
 In 1978, an 
ANC delegation visited Vietnam, to study and learn from its experiences of 
                                               
20 „The Battle for South Africa is on!‟, Dawn, 2 (December, 1979), pp. 15-20.  
21 D. McKinley, The ANC and the liberation struggle: A critical political biography (London, 1997), 
p. 49. 
22 „The Year of the Spear‟, Sechaba (April, 1979), p. 1. 
23 „The National Executive Council Meeting‟, Sechaba, 12 (January, 1978), p. 1. 
24 Document 108, „report on meeting of the ANC National Executive Committee, Morogoro, July 15-
24, 1977 (abridged)‟, in Karis and Gerhart, Nadir, pp. 696-701. 
25 „The National Executive Council Meeting‟, Sechaba, 12 (January, 1978), p. 1. 
26 J. Barber, South Africa in the Twentieth Century, a political history: in search of a nation state 
(Oxford, 1999), p. 217; „Year Against Apartheid‟, Sechaba (June, 1979), pp. 21-23; The 1978 UN 
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successful guerrilla struggle.
28
 According to Anthea Jeffery, the ANC learnt many 
lessons from this visit, which allowed the movement to reorganise itself towards 
achieving a „People‟s War‟. 29  These meetings provided an added impetus to the 
ANC‟s international strategy, as the links helped to further isolate South Africa in 
multilateral forums, and provided the movement with valuable assistance in a bid to 
escalate its struggle. 
 From a position of relative weakness in 1970, by the end of the decade the 
ANC‟s fortunes had successfully been reversed. Its foreign policy goals of isolating 
South Africa, intensifying the guerrilla struggle and garnering international support 
were all progressing, allowing the ANC „to make important gains in the international 
arena‟.30 However, despite these successes, there were still many problems, and it 
was arguably no closer to overthrowing the apartheid regime. In fact, as the new 
decade dawned, the South African state remained relatively unaffected by the 
international and military activities of the ANC, powerful enough to resist the 
mounting pressure against it.  
  
The 1980s  
 The events of the late 1970s had left the ANC in a far stronger position than 
ever before to escalate its international activities, ushering in a new found sense of 
optimism within the movement that the struggle would soon succeed. Throughout the 
1980s, the ANC sought to build upon this platform, through a variety of international 
measures. Most notable was the upsurge in „armed propaganda‟, which spectacularly 
targeted symbols of apartheid state power such as the Koeberg Nuclear facility.
31
 
These attacks generated publicity for the ANC at home and abroad, demonstrating its 
continued opposition to apartheid rule and providing inspiration to the movement and 
                                               
28 O. Tambo, „Political report by Oliver Tambo on the National Executive Committee to the National 
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30 Ibid., p. 52. 
31 For more on armed propaganda see: G. Houston, and B. Magubane, „The ANC Political 
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its supporters. In addition, the ANC, in collaboration with the Anti-Apartheid 
Movement (AAM), vigorously lobbied governments and multilateral forums for 
increased international measures to isolate South Africa, as well as taking steps to 
mobilise western public opinion against apartheid. These activities created a 
groundswell of international public opinion against apartheid, which ultimately 
forced several multinational companies and more importantly, major banks, to 
reconsider their ties with South Africa; the decision in 1985 by Chase Manhattan 
Bank to reduce its operations with South Africa was a major setback to the country‟s 
precarious economy. Furthermore, in this period the ANC was able to convene its 
second consultative conference at Kabwe in Zambia in 1985, at which it made 
several important decisions and made a tentative attempt to articulate its foreign 
policy objectives. Other factors which gave the ANC cause for optimism in the 
1980s included the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980, which significantly 
increased South Africa‟s exposure to „black Africa‟; the start of regular contact with 
white South African businessmen and intellectuals that set the tone for future 
negotiations; and international recognition of its preconditions for negotiations with 
Pretoria, set out in the Harare Declaration. The outcome was that by the end of the 
1980s, the ANC had firmly established itself as a highly respected government-in-
waiting. 
 However, despite this optimism, the ANC also endured some catastrophic 
reverses in its fortunes during the 1980s. The programme of „armed propaganda‟ 
prompted a fierce and brutal retaliation from South Africa, whose strikes targeted not 
only the ANC but also its hosts in Southern Africa.
32
 These acts of destabilisation 
severely impinged upon the movement‟s operational capacity in the region, forcing 
host governments to seriously reconsider their support of the ANC. Both 
Mozambique and Swaziland succumbed to Pretoria‟s acts of aggression, and the 
consequence was that each eventually signed peace accords with South Africa which 
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60 
 
stipulated the expulsion of the ANC from their territory. Other governments simply 
resorted to paying lip service to the anti-apartheid struggle with rhetorical 
expressions of support for the ANC; the outcome was that the movement‟s relations 
with its Southern African allies declined from the mid-1980s. The cumulative effect 
was that the ANC‟s ability to escalate its struggle had significantly diminished by the 
end of the decade. By 1989, the ANC was militarily in retreat, as successive 
Southern African states expelled the movement, forcing it to relocate yet further 
away from South Africa.  
The decade also saw the formation and rise to prominence of internal 
opposition groups such as the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) 
and United Democratic Front (UDF) on the one hand, and the Zulu Inkatha Freedom 
Party (IFP) on the other. The ANC had an ideological affiliation with the first set of 
movements, particularly the UDF, which adopted many of the ANC‟s symbols, and 
provided it with a foothold in South Africa.
33
 However, it would be wrong to assume 
the ANC had direct control over these movements or the course of events internally; 
the emergence of such organisations raised the very real danger that it could be 
usurped by events outside of its influence or control.
34
 According to Gerhart and 
Glaser, the ANC in the 1980s was a reactive force, „deploring Pretoria‟s latest 
manoeuvres, condemning Western complicity in apartheid‟s evils, [and] applauding 
from the sidelines‟. 35  The 1980s was thus defined by both significant gains and 
setbacks for the ANC, and although it was unbanned in February 1990, as this 
section will explore, that outcome was by no means inevitable.   
 
The ANC escalates its ‘armed propaganda’ 
 In June 1980, the ANC signalled its new military intentions by spectacularly 
striking against the SASOL coal to oil facility at Sasolburg. The strike was its first 
major attack within South Africa since the onset of the armed struggle, and the 
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destroyed facility was depicted afterwards by Sechaba as „a sea of flame, the fires of 
freedom‟.36 Joseph Hanlon rightly argued that the SASOL raid „marked the return to 
battle‟ for the ANC.37 It was a highly symbolic strike against the apartheid state, 
whose reliance on producing oil from coal was crucial to the economy; before the 
1979 Iranian Revolution, 90% of South Africa‟s oil had come from Iran, but 
Ayatollah Khomeini halted supplies.
38
 The destruction of the SASOL facility was 
also an immense boost to the ANC‟s propaganda efforts inside and outside of South 
Africa, demonstrating that apartheid was no longer infallible. The attack‟s success 
marked the beginning of a new stage in ANC‟s armed struggle. There was an 
increase in attacks within South Africa in the early 1980s, against economic 
infrastructure and police stations. Most noteworthy were: a rocket attack in August 
1981 against Voortrekkerhoogte, the South African Defence Force (SADF) 
headquarters outside Pretoria; an audacious limpet mine strike against the Koeberg 
Nuclear facility, in December 1982; and a car bomb explosion in Pretoria outside the 
South African Air Force (SAAF) headquarters in May 1983, which killed seventeen 
and injured over 200.
39
 The last of these was the first time the ANC had killed 
civilians during its struggle, marking a move away from simply targeting symbols 
and the infrastructure of the apartheid state. Although the death of civilians was 
against official ANC policy, it caused some international consternation (despite 
South Africa‟s repeated and indiscriminate killing of civilians across Southern 
Africa), forcing Tambo to reiterate that the movement did all it could to prevent this 
eventuality from occurring.
40
 The ANC‟s escalation of the armed struggle had at last 
brought the guerrilla war home to South Africa, with 467 incidents recorded in the 
period 1980 – 1986.41 Tom Lodge argued that the movement‟s guerrilla activities 
„succeeded in re-establishing the ANC as the predominant force in black politics‟.42  
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The sabotage activities were not only designed to dent the strength of the 
apartheid state, but also to publicise the ANC‟s capacity to turn its rhetoric of an 
armed seizure of power into reality. Senior NEC member Pallo Jordan argued that 
„armed propaganda‟ had two purposes: 
First of all, to register an armed presence and the capacity of the 
movement to respond to the regimes violence. And then also, apart 
from that, it was conceived of as being vital in terms of hitting 
strategic enemy instillations, not only for demonstrative of that but 
in fact to deliver crippling blows against the enemy. But over and 
above that, there was the need to build up the confidence of the 
army we had trained.
43
 
Sue Rabkin, a member of the ANC underground, supports Jordan‟s view that „armed 
propaganda‟ was „seen as a way of agitating, of doing political work, and [showing] 
we were there. And that, just on its own, was absolutely crucial because that‟s what 
our people needed to hear. It was a very correct decision. It said we are around and 
capable of blowing up Sasol and Koeberg and wherever‟. Furthermore Rabkin also 
thought that „armed propaganda‟ was a means of coalescing regional support and 
persuading leaders of the ANC‟s seriousness: „the OAU specifically… were 
impressed. I mean they had been getting pissed off with the ANC for years‟. 44 
Subsequently, the upturn in incidents of „armed propaganda‟ allowed the ANC to 
portray itself as a „credible‟ fighting force to its supporters. The upsurge in action 
also created a mystique around MK, with guerrillas killed in action venerated as 
heroes of the struggle.
45
 
However, as the decade wore on, incidents of „armed propaganda‟ became 
less frequent. Infiltration into South Africa became ever more difficult for MK 
guerrillas, in part because of the shifting nature of Southern African support towards 
the ANC. The decrease in the ANC‟s armed activity coincided with South Africa‟s 
increasing political and military pressure directed against its neighbours. Although 
the 1980s did witness an upsurge in internal township unrest, called for by the ANC 
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from exile via Radio Freedom and its propaganda pamphlets, the violence was not 
under the direct control of the movement.
 The apartheid regime‟s regional aggression 
and internal oppression had successfully prevented the ANC from establishing a 
permanent foothold in the country. Shubin illustrates the ANC‟s problems, arguing 
that following attacks, its guerrillas „had to vanish into thin air… [which] was not 
easy to do because there were no ANC bases inside the country‟. 46 Estimates of 
guerrilla survival rates differ, but they all demonstrate the high price paid by MK 
operatives carrying out attacks in South Africa. According to Ivan Pillay, the average 
rate of survival for a guerrilla fighter was around five months; a casualty rate which 
he conceded was unacceptably high.
47
 Garth Strachan depicted an even more 
depressing picture, asserting that from 1986 onwards, MK cadres operating out of 
Zimbabwe suffered nearly a „100 per cent casualty rate [defined as killed or arrested 
within twenty-four hours]‟. 48  Mac Maharaj was equally critical of the ANC‟s 
inability to escalate the struggle, depicting attempted infiltrations from Mozambique 
and Zimbabwe, between 1981 and 1983 as „military misadventure‟. 49  These 
difficulties can be partly attributed to the ANC‟s inability to fully establish the 
internal political dimension of the struggle beyond its „armed propaganda‟. Despite 
the setbacks, the attacks of the early 1980s had nevertheless demonstrated the ANC‟s 
ability to strike at the heart of the apartheid state, which had an enormously positive 
effect on the psyche of the movement and its international supporters. 
 
South Africa’s Destabilisation of Southern Africa 
In the late 1970s, the South African government under President P.W. Botha 
believed that the combined threat of communism and Black Nationalism was 
growing on its borders, which was depicted as a „Total Onslaught‟. The mounting 
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fear amongst South African officials about the scale of this „Total Onslaught‟ was 
reinforced by the election victory of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) 
and Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe in 1980. In order to prevent this onslaught of 
forces, the government devised a comprehensive „Total Strategy‟ which utilised all 
possible political, economic and military resources of the state to defend the nation.
50
 
The implementation of the „Total Strategy‟ as a key tenet of the apartheid regime‟s 
foreign policy initiated an intensely destructive period in Southern African history. 
Pretoria had initially envisaged the „Total Strategy‟ as being a mechanism to 
persuade Southern African states to form a „constellation of states‟ - an economic 
and political alliance of Southern African countries - encompassing South Africa, the 
„independent‟ Bantustans (the pseudo-self governing homelands within South Africa, 
which were set aside for separate African development),
51
 and countries such as 
Botswana and Swaziland.
52
 However, Pretoria‟s plan was scuppered first by ZANU‟s 
election victory in 1980, and then by the subsequent decision of the six so-called 
Frontline States of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe, which were joined by Lesotho, Swaziland, and Malawi, in forming the 
Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) in April 1980.
53
 
The purpose of SADCC was to break the region‟s economic dependence on South 
Africa, and provide a platform for greater cooperation and development.
54
 The 
formation of SADCC and the rejection of South Africa‟s overtures was regarded as 
an affront by Pretoria, doing little to diminish the perception of an impending 
Marxist onslaught.  
In this context, the ANC‟s campaign of „armed propaganda‟ in the early 
1980s, seen as a central element of the „Total Onslaught‟, sparked a vicious cycle of 
violent retaliation from South Africa against the movement and its hosts in Southern 
Africa. Under the premise of the „Total Strategy‟ state sovereignty in the region was 
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ignored by South Africa, which targeted with impunity any country that hosted the 
ANC. According to a 1989 report Pretoria had, by 1981, already violated the 
sovereignty of seven independent countries.
55
 Although the ANC‟s presence acted as 
the pretext for military aggression, destabilisation also enabled South Africa to 
manipulate and exploit the region‟s economic dependence on it, and thwart the aims 
and aspirations of SADCC.
56
 The first major strike directed against the ANC 
occurred in January 1981, when South African commandos targeted its residencies in 
Matola, near Maputo, killing twelve people.
57
 The ANC regarded this as the moment 
in which South Africa „declared war on Africa‟.58 South Africa followed up this raid 
by invading Lesotho in January 1983, when over 100 commandos and helicopter 
gunships attacked twelve ANC locations in and around the capital Maseru, killing 
forty-two people.
59
 Except for its ongoing military activities in Angola, the massacre 
in Lesotho was the biggest incursion by the SADF into another Southern African 
country.
60
 Further raids against the Frontline States and the ANC were conducted 
throughout the 1980s in a bid to thwart the „onslaught‟, such as an SADF commando 
raid into Botswana in 1985.
61
  
 However, it was not just overt military incursions by South Africa which had 
an effect on the ANC and Southern Africa in the 1980s. Pretoria also embarked on a 
series of kidnappings and assassinations across the region, such as the murders of Joe 
Gqabi in Harare in 1981 and Ruth First in Maputo in 1982.
62
 A major concern for the 
ANC was the fact that South African security officials were operating virtually 
unimpeded in Southern Africa.
63
 These operations were sometimes carried out in 
cooperation with regional governments, which were increasingly succumbing to 
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apartheid pressure; many employed their security forces against the ANC.
64
 For 
example, both Botswana and Swaziland by the early 1980s had begun to monitor, 
arrest and expel ANC activists from their territory, which drastically impeded the 
movement‟s operational capacity.65 After the Nkomati Accords were signed in 1984 
(see below), Mozambique expelled the ANC, which had a significantly negative 
impact on its struggle. South Africa contributed further to regional instability by 
funding and training two military movements against governments sheltering the 
ANC: the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) and UNITA. This is not the 
place to explore the impact of RENAMO and UNITA, but they significantly 
destabilised Angola and Mozambique, resulting in prolonged civil wars, immense 
infrastructural damage, and economic decline.
66
 A further example of Pretoria‟s 
impact on the internal affairs of Southern African countries was in Lesotho. The 
Prime Minister of Lesotho, Chief Jonathan, had become increasingly vocal in his 
support for the ANC. His outspokenness increasingly exasperated South Africa, 
prompting Pretoria to close the border in 1986. South Africa implemented a total 
economic blockade of the tiny mountain kingdom, which led to a military coup; as a 
consequence, the military Junta which deposed Jonathan also expelled the ANC from 
Lesotho.
67
   
 These counter-offensives by South Africa severely limited the ANC‟s room 
for manoeuvre in Southern Africa. Maharaj conceded that „the enemy devised a 
strategy where at that moment in our thinking, they forced us off track; they removed 
this central focus on our thinking which was primarily offensive; they forced us into 
a mode of retreat and discontinuity of structures‟.68 Ellis and Sechaba argued that the 
effective counter-revolutionary strategy devised by South Africa „added up to a 
                                               
64 There was however a distinction in Southern Africa between the states which were likely to 
cooperate with South Africa, against the ANC (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland), and those that 
were not (Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe).  
65 R. Jaster, „Evolution of a Regional Conflict in „war and diplomacy‟‟, in R. Jaster (ed.), Changing 
fortunes: war, diplomacy, and economics in Southern Africa (New York, 1992), p. 30; Shubin, 
Moscow, p. 231. 
66 For more information on RENAMO and UNITA see: F. Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa 
(Edinburgh, 1986); V. Brittain, The Death of Dignity: Angola’s Civil War (London, 1998); J. Cabrita, 
Mozambique: The tortuous road to democracy (Basingstoke, 2000); W. Minter, Apartheid’s Contras: 
an inquiry into the roots of war in Angola and Mozambique (London, 1994). 
67 Barber and Barratt, Foreign Policy, p. 318; Ellis and Sechaba, Comrades, pp. 165-168. 
68 AAM Archive, Bodleian Library of Commonwealth and African Studies, University of Oxford, 
MSS Afr. S. 2151 1/3 pp.335-535, „Third Interview with Mac Maharaj, Conducted by Howard Barrell, 
Johannesburg, November 30 1990‟, p. 456. 
67 
 
comprehensive defeat for Umkhonto we Sizwe and the strategy adopted by the 
ANC‟.69 
 
The ANC’s precarious position in Southern Africa 
 Although rhetorically Southern African leaders were firmly behind the ANC 
and united in their vocal opposition to apartheid, in practice their support for the 
movement was far more tenuous. As sustained destabilisation took its toll, African 
leaders had to make tough choices with regard to the ANC‟s status in their countries; 
those closest in proximity to South Africa having least choice in the matter. The 
result was a haphazard pattern of support across Southern Africa for the ANC; in 
1983, Robert Cabelly, a former US State Department for African Affairs employee, 
reported „that behind the united front of the frontline states, they were all very iffy 
about the ANC‟.70 
 Although a long term ally of the ANC, the relationship between the 
movement and Zambia was rather complex. Officially, the ANC and Zambia were 
extremely close, demonstrated by the fact that the movement had its main base of 
operations in Lusaka. The ANC had between 2,000 and 4,000 members in the 
country during the 1980s, which illustrates that Zambian officials were prepared to 
accept a large, overt presence.
71
 Kaunda‟s strict proviso that no military personnel 
were allowed to operate in the country was generally heeded by the ANC, although 
MK guerrillas were permitted to pass through Zambia on the way South. The ANC‟s 
position was strengthened further by the fact that Kaunda regularly lobbied 
internationally against apartheid in various multilateral forums. Yet, despite the very 
public anti-apartheid stance of Zambia, Kaunda maintained covert links with South 
Africa, with which he had kept unofficial relations with since the late 1960s.
72
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Kaunda had met with NP officials on several occasions since independence and 
secretly corresponded with Pretoria, reflecting the fact that it was imperative for 
Zambia to maintain trade links with the apartheid state.
73
 Kaunda was nevertheless 
regarded as a dependable ally of the ANC, ensuring that Lusaka became a vital and 
secure base of operations for the movement. According to Macmillan, as the 1980s 
wore on, Zambia had become a home from home for many within the ANC, 
reinforced by the increasing numbers of cadres who relocated to Lusaka after their 
removal from other Frontline States.
74
 
 There was also a close affinity between the ANC and the governments of 
Angola and Mozambique (due in part to the Khartoum Alliance), whose relationships 
with the movement had developed after both had gained their independence in 1975. 
In Angola, bases and offices had been established soon after independence, which 
provided the ANC an opportunity to receive military training from foreign instructors, 
and shelter its fighters in the relative security of the north of the country. Not much is 
known about official relations, as the current MPLA government is still reticent 
about opening up its archives, but they were clearly very good, as the following two 
examples will indicate. The close ANC-Angolan relations were demonstrated by 
joint operations in the civil war, with MK guerrillas tasked to fight alongside the 
Angolan army in its long running conflict with UNITA.
75
 The ANC leadership would 
have either offered its services to its host, or have been asked by the MPLA to 
contribute its fighters to the civil war effort, but however the decision came about, 
the ANC committed itself militarily to the MPLA‟s struggle. The decision to fight 
alongside the Angolan army was not popular amongst MK‟s rank and file, who had 
become increasingly frustrated by the continuous training, poor conditions in the 
camps, the abuse of leadership, as well as the lack of military action against South 
Africa.
76
 The ANC‟s decision to cooperate militarily with the MPLA triggered a 
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mutiny in 1984 amongst MK guerrillas.
77
 The second example, which stemmed from 
the MK mutiny is that, not for the first time, an allied government had used its 
soldiers to help quell a popular uprising within the ANC.
78
 The MPLA clearly 
collaborated with the ANC leadership and it was later reported that it had „played a 
very dishonest role [as]… they began to throttle this popular unrest… abort[ing] a 
drive to veer the ANC towards democracy‟.79 Despite the mutiny, the close alliance 
with the MPLA stood firm, demonstrated by the fact that MK cadres were still 
fighting in the war against UNITA in 1987.
80
 These examples of mutual assistance 
would not have occurred without a significant degree of cooperation between the 
MPLA dominated Angolan state and the ANC.  
 From 1975, Mozambique had developed into a highly important sanctuary 
and staging post for the ANC. Permitted to operate with relative freedom in the 
country, and benefiting from its geographical proximity to South Africa, the ANC 
used Mozambique as a platform from which to escalate its struggle. Mozambique 
became a vital infiltration route for its guerrillas, via Swaziland, into South Africa, 
and it is no coincidence that the ANC‟s freedom to operate there during the early 
1980s, corresponded with its most high-profile acts of „armed propaganda‟. The 
FRELIMO government was unable to offer much military or financial support to the 
ANC, but it turned a blind eye to some of the movement‟s activities which was 
immensely beneficial.
81
 According to Ann Grant, FRELIMO „provided [the ANC] 
with a safe haven, accommodation?they saw that very much as part of their own 
struggle‟.82 The ideological affiliation was close, with numerous expressions of their 
fraternal relationship publicised, and there was regular contact between the two 
leaders, for example, demonstrated by Mozambican President Samora Machel‟s 
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attendance of an ANC mass rally in Maputo alongside Tambo, in February 1981.
83
 
Rabkin recalled that „we [the ANC] loved FRELIMO and FRELIMO loved us‟.84 
However, as the 1980s wore on, Mozambique increasingly suffered at the hands of 
South Africa. Deon Geldenhuys asserted: 
in the case of Mozambique, I think the evidence is clear cut, that 
South Africa‟s actions at subverting the regime, of Samora Machel, 
were of such magnitude, that the costs of maintaining the 
relationship that Mozambique had with the ANC was simply 
becoming unbearable, simply in terms of the punishment South 
Africa was meeting out.
85
 
The outcome of this „punishment‟ was that in 1984, Mozambique and South Africa 
signed the Nkomati Accords, which will be discussed more fully in the next section. 
Although the ANC was aware of the negotiations, this was a serious setback to the 
ANC, as the Accords stipulated that the movement had to be expelled; its cadres 
were forced out of the country by the Mozambican military, and its structures were 
dismantled.
86
 Although the cause of this expulsion was primarily South Africa‟s 
devastating destabilisation, Rabkin believed that the ANC‟s own actions had 
contributed: „there was almost, I‟d say, an abuse of borders… there was no 
consideration at that stage… that this was other people‟s country… we blatantly 
disregarded [government requests]… We were very arrogant. And we paid the 
price‟.87  
 Further problems for the ANC developed in its relationship with newly 
independent Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe‟s relationship with the ANC was particularly 
ambivalent, in part due to the movement‟s historic alliance with the Zimbabwe 
African Peoples Union (ZAPU). Very few within the ANC, with the exception of 
Thabo Mbeki, had approved of Mugabe‟s election victory in 1980, which set the tone 
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for its future relations with independent Zimbabwe.
88
 The legacy of the Khartoum 
Alliance meant that Mugabe did not trust the ANC believing that, if there was a 
ZAPU uprising, the two would unite against his rule.
89
 Mugabe‟s fears were partially 
justified when ZANU and ZAPU came into direct conflict in 1982; arms caches were 
found at ZAPU properties, along with a number of MK commanders.
90
 As a result, 
relations all but collapsed between the ANC and ZANU. Mugabe ordered that the 
ANC‟s fledgling structures in Zimbabwe should begin to be dismantled, and the 
majority of its cadres removed.
91
 On several occasions the Zimbabwean state media 
openly criticised the ANC and its struggle, which did little to help relations.
92
 Yet 
rhetorically, ZANU remained a vocal opponent of the apartheid state; Mugabe still 
permitted the ANC to have an office in Harare, which was later targeted by a South 
African military raid in 1986.
93
 Although it tolerated a limited ANC presence, Mark 
Ashurst asserts that ZANU made life difficult for the movement, because of the 
lingering suspicions about where the ANC‟s loyalties lay. 94 Geldenhuys similarly 
argued that, „Zimbabwe had a fairly good understanding of where the proverbial line 
in the sand had been drawn… it had a fair amount of freedom of expression so to 
speak, lambasting South Africa… [but] stopped short of overtly supporting the 
ANC‟s military wing‟. 95  The prevention of any MK activity in Zimbabwe, a 
potentially crucial infiltration point into South Africa due to its lengthy shared border, 
was enforced by the Zimbabwean army and this non-antagonistic position towards 
South Africa ensured that Zimbabwe did not experience the same levels of 
destabilisation compared to the rest of Southern Africa.
96
  
 Swaziland had also served as a useful forward area for the ANC during the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, offering a safe haven for fleeing exiles, as well as 
providing an infiltration route into South Africa. The ANC‟s struggle was assisted by 
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its historic friendship with the Swazi royal family, which had been represented at the 
founding of the movement in 1912.
97
 Kasrils observed that „the ANC‟s Moses 
Mabhida often visited the King [Sobuza II] from Lusaka and Maputo to clarify our 
position and to influence Swazi foreign policy. Mabhida… was always well 
received‟. 98  As elucidated previously, Swaziland had become an increasingly 
important military location for the ANC as its guerrillas entered the country from the 
north, allowing it to escalate its „armed propaganda‟; Swaziland was labelled by 
South African Defence Minister Magnus Malan as part of a „second front‟ against the 
country.
99
 However, Swaziland‟s precarious economic position worsened as South 
Africa increased the pressure against the tiny kingdom. In 1982, in a precursor to the 
Nkomati Accords, Swaziland signed a secret deal with South Africa, which 
formalised a political and security arrangement.
100
 As an incentive to the Swazis, 
South Africa had offered a land exchange, promising to return to Swaziland the 
former parts of the Swazi kingdom, Kwanhgwane and Ingwauuma.
101
 This 
comprehensive deal stipulated that the ANC would not be permitted to use Swazi 
territory; South African security forces were however able to operate virtually 
unhindered in the country, for example kidnapping ANC activist Ebrahim Ebrahim 
in 1986.
102
 From 1982 onwards, the Swazi police (according to Kasrils), „zealously‟ 
enforced the deal, rounding up and expelling ANC cadres, including key members 
such as Bafana Duma and Stanley Mabizela.
103
 E.S Reddy believes that the ANC 
was infuriated by the deal but it had very few foreign policy options with which to 
achieve a change in Swazi policy.
104
 The lack of political influence over Swaziland is 
illustrated by a number of letters, memorandums and statements sent by the ANC to 
the government, but its pleas were ignored.
105
 One such memorandum, provides an 
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insight into how the ANC regarded itself as the government-in-waiting; although 
deferential to the Swazi government, the document declares that it would „have been 
an advantage both to Swaziland and ourselves, if the Government of Swaziland had 
sought the opinion of the ANC on the question under discussion before entering into 
negotiations with the Pretoria regime‟. 106  The memorandum did little to change 
Swaziland‟s stance, but it is an important indication of the ways in which the ANC 
interacted with regional governments, the strategies it employed to alter their actions 
towards the movement and South Africa, and its own self perceptions. At the Kabwe 
Conference in 1985, the ANC had claimed that it was not, nor had the capabilities to 
act as a government in exile, but did concede that „the nature of our struggle calls 
upon us to exercise in appropriate forms, some of the functions of an embryonic 
state‟.107 
Although the ANC was on cordial terms with all black-ruled Southern Africa 
nations, except Malawi, its official status in the region during the 1980s was 
precarious. The ANC‟s political aspirations were broadly supported by regional 
leaders, who provided it with their rhetorical backing the movement. However, 
destabilisation and South Africa‟s enforced pacts had taken its toll on the region, 
which significantly diminished the ANC‟s ability to operate in Southern Africa. The 
outcome was that the gains the ANC had made during the late 1970s and early 1980s 
were in danger of being reversed by Pretoria. The ANC discovered that once friendly 
governments were all too willing to dismantle its exile structures and expel its cadres. 
A limited number of cadres did remain in the Frontline States, but by the mid-1980s 
„the best forward areas [were] reeling: Maputo [was] virtually over; Swaziland [was] 
cut off‟.108 Roger Southall believes that „the ANC recognised the limitations which 
frontline states imposed on them, so there was a degree of pragmatism, but [they] 
were obviously disappointed… by some actions‟.109 E.S. Reddy agrees, arguing that 
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„the ANC understood the difficulties of the host countries and did not complain… it 
appreciated that frontline states made enormous sacrifices‟.110 While not in the scope 
of this thesis, this meant that during the 1980s the ANC was forced to rely heavily 
upon other sources of support and international assistance, such as the Soviet Union, 
the Eastern Bloc, the non-Aligned Movement (NAM), AAM, the UN, and 
Scandinavia to fulfil its foreign policy goals of isolating and ultimately overthrowing 
apartheid. 
 
The 1984 Nkomati Accord  
Following sustained direct economic, political and military destabilisation by 
South Africa, with the latter backing RENAMO in a devastating civil war, 
Mozambique was, by 1984, crippled economically and politically. According to 
Hanlon, „it had been clear for some time that Mozambique could not continue to 
sustain South African pummelling at this level‟.111 The direct consequence was that 
in March 1984, Samora Machel and P.W. Botha met to sign an „agreement on non-
aggression and good neighbourliness‟ between Mozambique and South Africa, 
known as the Nkomati Accord.
112
 The significance of the Accord was that the ANC 
was expelled from Mozambique (only ten cadres were allowed to remain in Maputo) 
in what the movement saw as a betrayal by FRELIMO. This sense of betrayal within 
the leadership perhaps stemmed in part from the fact that in the months before the 
Accord was signed, the ANC had wanted FRELIMO to adopt a more proactive 
stance towards Pretoria in support of its liberation struggle; this perhaps indicates a 
certain naivety and insensitivity on behalf of the ANC, as its very presence was the 
reason why Pretoria was aggressively targeting Mozambique.
113
 When the Nkomati 
Accord was officially announced there was a sense of shock within the ANC. Shubin 
rightly argued that the movement faced „a strategic retreat without any prospect of 
return. What upset them most was the absence of consultation between Frelimo and 
the ANC‟.114 Slovo summed up the effect of Nkomati on the ANC: „it disastrously 
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impeded the prospects that had existed at the beginning of 1984 to raise our urban 
and rural combat presence… it is no secret… that Mozambique had been crucial to 
our ongoing efforts‟.115  
The ANC‟s sense of betrayal was reinforced by the fact that FRELIMO 
publicly portrayed the Accord as a victory for the Mozambican people.
116
 Relations 
between the ANC and FRELIMO deteriorated quickly after Nkomati; the 
movement‟s leadership was furious about the way the deal had been secretly signed 
without its consultation. Hanlon argued that the ANC‟s reacted to the Accord „like a 
petulant, jilted lover‟.117 In the wake of the Mozambican and Swazi agreements with 
South Africa, the emerging reality was that the ANC‟s foreign policy in Southern 
Africa was unable to influence even some of its smallest nations. Although South 
Africa swiftly reneged on the terms of the Accord, the ANC‟s relations with 
Mozambique only began to improve after the death of Moses Mabhida in March 
1986, whose funeral renewed the ANC and FRELIMO‟s solidarity. FRELIMO held a 
full state funeral in Maputo, at which Machel spoke of „the indestructible fraternity 
of the South African and Mozambican peoples, of the profound identity of our 
peoples struggle‟. 118  It provided an opportunity for the leaders to meet and re-
establish their personal relationships, which represented a „symbolic 
reconciliation‟.119 Manghezi observed that the funeral involved the burial not only of 
a liberation hero, but also of the Nkomati Accord.
120
 Although the ability of the ANC 
to operate in Mozambique never quite returned to the pre-Nkomati situation, it was 
able to establish a limited presence in the country. 
 
The Kabwe Conference, 1985 
 In June 1985, the ANC held its Second National Consultative Conference in 
Kabwe, Zambia, the first such meeting since Morogoro sixteen years earlier. It 
enabled the most open debate the ANC had ever held, allowing its cadres to air 
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grievances and offer suggestions on all aspects of the struggle. The conference was 
preceded by an eighteen-month preparatory stage which involved all the ANC‟s 
structures; documents were circulated worldwide, and eighty-two submissions were 
tabled for final deliberation at the conference.
121
 This remarkably open and 
democratic process was something that had been strikingly absent from the ANC in 
exile, and the conference was designed to rectify this. The decision to convene in 
Zambia reflected concerns in the context of ongoing destabilisation in Southern 
Africa, and the ANC‟s tenuous position in the region. It did also reflect the ANC‟s 
enduring good relations with Kaunda, who allocated a battalion of the army to 
defend the conference centre from potential South African attacks.
122
 Sechaba 
expressed the ANC‟s „deeply felt appreciation of the role of Zambia, under the 
leadership of Kenneth Kaunda, is playing in our struggle for national and social 
emancipation‟.123  
 At the Kabwe Conference, 250 delegates, representing every branch of the 
ANC, discussed the submitted documents and reports, planned for the future, and 
elected a new National Executive Committee (NEC).
124
 During the conference, 
several key decisions were taken that would shape the struggle, including: the 
opening up of its membership to all racial groups; a reaffirmation of the Freedom 
Charter as an expression of the movement‟s ideals and aspirations; the dropping of 
the distinction between „hard‟ and „soft‟ targets; and the adoption of the slogan of a 
„peoples war‟ to achieve a seizure of power.125 All were important outcomes, but the 
predominant theme of the conference was preparing for a People‟s War and the 
revolutionary seizure of power.
126
 The ANC had of course been pursuing this 
objective for some time, but Kabwe ensured that it had the full endorsement of the 
movement‟s delegates. However, this emphasis and focus on the armed struggle was 
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arguably to have a negative effect on other aspects of the ANC‟s work, especially the 
crucial task of political mobilisation inside South Africa.    
 During the Kabwe Conference, the ANC took the important, yet previously 
unprecedented step of discussing what its foreign policy objectives were. The 
conference also discussed the „international situation‟; 127  however, of far more 
significance was the publication of the „Final Report of the Commission on Foreign 
Policy‟.128 What makes the „Report‟ most remarkable is that it was the first instance, 
since the vague outlines of the Freedom Charter in 1955, that the ANC had even 
attempted to formalise its foreign policy position.
129
 The „Report‟ affirmed the 
objective of seizing power by force, emphasising that „the ANC pursues the strategic 
goal of the seizure of political power by the revolutionary forces of our country‟.130 
The „Report‟ also set out three core objectives which the „ANC should continue to 
relentlessly pursue‟: 
1.  The total isolation of the white minority regime in South 
Africa, leading to the imposition of comprehensive and 
mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations. 
2. The recognition and support of the ANC as the sole and 
authentic representative of the overwhelming majority of the 
people of South Africa. 
3. The establishment of bilateral and diplomatic relations between 
the ANC and governments, as well as with the international 
democratic forces committed to the establishment of a united, 
non-racial and democratic South Africa.
131
 
In order to fulfil these three objectives, the document provided a list of goals which 
the ANC should pursue, including: exposing South African criminality; persuading 
the world to terminate international links with Pretoria; popularising the ANC; 
strengthening ties with African states, the OAU, Frontline States and „authentic 
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liberation movements‟; and consolidating support from both western and socialist 
nations.
132
 Although the ANC had to some extent been pursuing these objectives 
throughout its exile, the „Report‟ was the first instance the movement had actually 
articulated its approach to foreign policy. As the 1980s progressed, the ANC was 
successful in partially achieving these objectives as the isolation of South Africa 
tightened and the movement established itself as effectively the government-in-
waiting. The „Report‟ was an important start for the ANC in thinking consciously 
about its foreign policy.  
However, these objectives focused on the immediate future and there was 
little consideration given to a strategy for negotiations with Pretoria. Chapters Four 
and Five, which examine South Africa‟s transition from apartheid to democracy 
between 1990 and 1994, demonstrate that the „Final Report of the Commission on 
Foreign Policy‟ and the Freedom Charter formed the entire basis of the ANC‟s 
thinking on foreign policy, putting it at a distinct disadvantage in negotiations with 
the apartheid state. Howard Barrell scathingly criticised the Kabwe Conference, 
arguing that „at the most crucial moment in its history, in the midst of the most 
serious uprisings in South Africa in which its name was being widely proclaimed as 
leader of a revolution, the ANC had held a conference and concluded it with no 
generally agreed formulation of strategy‟.133 
 
The End of Exile 
 By 1985, white minority rule in South Africa faced mounting domestic and 
international pressure to dismantle apartheid. The South African government was 
confronted by the emergence of popular internal opposition led by new movements 
such as COSATU and the UDF; rising incidents of township rebellion, in part 
inspired by MK attacks and the ANC‟s call to make „South Africa ungovernable‟; 
rolling industrial action by militant unions; international boycotts and sanctions; and 
an ever worsening debt crisis.
134
 As the crisis deepened, it was widely hoped that 
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Botha would initiate sweeping reforms to the system of apartheid to ease the 
mounting problems.
135
 However, in his „Crossing the Rubicon‟ speech in August 
1985, Botha did the complete opposite, demonstrating his belligerence by castigating 
his critics at home and abroad.
136
 Following the speech, the value of the Rand 
collapsed and the international community, having widely condemned South Africa, 
subsequently applied punitive sanctions against Pretoria.
137
 It also sparked a renewed 
upsurge in international protest against apartheid, spearheaded by the AAM. The 
activities of both the ANC and AAM succeeded in pressurising multinational 
corporations, to cease links with South Africa. The mounting pressure and bad 
publicity against banks such as Chase Manhattan and Barclays forced them into 
rethinking their ties with South Africa. The result was that many recalled loans or 
refused to lend further to South Africa, deepening the isolation and economic crisis 
of the apartheid state.
138
 
 
The ANC, white South Africans, and the prospect of negotiations 
 Within South Africa there was a growing realisation, particularly in the white 
business community, that apartheid was bad for business. Botha‟s speech was the 
tipping point for this community, prompting fears that capitalism might be destroyed 
in South Africa.
139
 In September 1985, at Kaunda‟s personal lodge in Zambia, a 
delegation of high-profile white South African businessmen and journalists, led by 
Anglo-American chairman Gavin Relly, met with Tambo, Thabo Mbeki, and other 
ANC leaders.
140
 The meeting was not intended to act as a forum for negotiations, but 
rather to allow the two sides to become acquainted, to discuss the role of violence 
and the SACP in the ANC‟s struggle, and to assess its economic policies for South 
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Africa‟s future.141  Although there was no tangible outcome from the meeting, it 
marked the beginning of increased white contact with the ANC in exile. For the ANC 
to be recognised by such an influential section of the white South African community 
was a major achievement. Tambo later argued that although business leaders were 
mainly acting in their own self-interest, their influence could serve as a useful 
political lever in South Africa.
142
 However, the initial optimism surrounding these 
talks began to rapidly dwindle; Botha was able to reinforce his authority in South 
Africa, the white businessmen were publicly castigated, and a wave of particularly 
violent MK attacks in the country hardened white public opinion.
143
  
Relly‟s delegation nevertheless encouraged other whites to visit the ANC in 
exile. The next key figure to visit the ANC in Lusaka was Fredrik van Zyl Slabbert, 
the leader of the Progressive Federal Party (PFP), who was impressed by the 
movement and its vision for the future of South Africa; after the meeting he declared, 
„a path away from violence can be negotiated‟.144 The most high-profile meeting 
with white South Africans occurred in Senegal, in July 1987. Drawn from academic, 
business and religious circles, sixty-one predominantly Afrikaans-speaking white 
South Africans attended the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa 
(IDASA) conference held in Dakar to meet with the ANC.
145
 The delegates discussed 
the evolving situation in South Africa, the armed struggle, and the possibility of a 
negotiated settlement.
146
 Sechaba reported that the Dakar meeting had caused 
nervousness amongst senior South African government officials, and described it as 
an important „aspect of the struggle to isolate the apartheid regime‟.147 It was a major 
success for the ANC‟s international and domestic legitimacy, illustrating the growing 
sense that there could be no settlement without its involvement.    
  After several delegations of whites had met with the ANC in exile, the 
possibility of negotiations with Pretoria became increasingly imaginable. Some 
elements within the ANC leadership had accepted that the prospect of a negotiated 
settlement was ever more likely, although the movement was determined to enter any 
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talks from a position of strength. However, the ANC was not particularly clear on its 
stance towards negotiations, oscillating between propagandistic calls for the military 
seizure of power, while privately expressing a desire to enter into talks with the 
South African government. The ANC had spent its long period in exile working on 
how best to overthrow apartheid, and not what would replace it. The consequence 
was that the Freedom Charter was its only clear vision for the future. A 1987 ANC 
intelligence report, argued that the ANC needed to alter its approach, concluding that 
„we need to move beyond slogans and propaganda and be clear about the society we 
are trying to build and how we will do it‟.148 There were however, elements within 
the ANC, predominantly around Chris Hani, who remained wedded to their belief in 
the revolutionary seizure of power, and were stringently opposed to negotiations.
149
 
Such views were not surprising, given that the ANC had consistently proclaimed the 
necessity of the armed struggle to defeat apartheid. However, by the late 1980s, 
although such insurrectionary rhetoric continued, the ANC‟s hopes of militarily 
overthrowing the apartheid regime were vastly diminished, partly because of its 
relative loss of support in Southern Africa. Rumours abounded about the leadership 
„selling out‟; although discussions about negotiations were occurring secretly, the 
leadership had to try and publicly allay its supporter‟s fears.150 The only way that the 
ANC could „sell‟ negotiations to its cadres was by ignoring the unfolding reality, and 
emphasising that any negotiations that did occur were „attributable to pressure 
imposed on [Pretoria] by the movement, above all through its armed struggle‟.151 In 
September 1988, during a meeting at St Anthony‟s College Oxford, representatives 
from the Soviet Union indicated for the first time to ANC leaders that the movement 
would have to begin the process of negotiating with the NP. Gary Littlejohn recalls 
that the four ANC delegates he spoke with afterwards were „clearly shocked by the 
meeting, and I was later told that this was the general feeling within the ANC. It was 
a deep shock to have to negotiate‟. 152  At the Kabwe Conference the ANC had 
conceded the prospect of negotiating with Pretoria, but thought it unlikely: „this issue 
has arisen at this time exactly because of our strength inside the country, the level of 
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our struggle and the crisis confronting the Botha regime. The NEC is however 
convinced that this regime is not interested in a just solution of the South African 
question‟.153  
Despite attempts to appease its more militant supporters, the ANC leadership 
and the South African government had established a clandestine channel of 
communication, which from 1988, involved a series of talks at Mells Park in England. 
Mbeki, whose own „thoughts about [a negotiated] strategy had been up against the 
romantic juggernaut of „Planning for People‟s War‟‟, was the main driver of these 
discussions.
154
 These talks were the moment when leaders from both sides realised 
that there was sufficient common ground to make a political settlement possible. 
Meanwhile, Mandela (while still in prison) in 1985, decided without the knowledge 
of the ANC leadership, to begin meeting secretly with NP officials to discuss the 
future; these meetings continued until his release in 1990.
155
 These talks provided 
one of many building blocks to a peaceful transition to majority rule, demonstrating 
to the NP that they could do business with the ANC.  
 
The New York Accords, Namibian Independence and the effect on the ANC 
 The ANC‟s foreign policy outside of the region, primarily towards western 
states, had proved increasingly successful in the late 1980s. Regular meetings with 
senior politicians, international organisations and journalists, helped spread its 
message to a wider audience and further isolate South Africa. The ANC thereby 
ensured that it retained the attention of the international community, firmly 
establishing its position as the government-in-waiting. However, in a scenario which 
had become depressingly familiar for the ANC, new and unexpected series of 
international events, over which the movement had no control or influence, 
decisively shaped the end of its exile.  
In the early 1980s, the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, 
Chester Crocker, had developed a „linkage‟ policy to solve the on-going crisis in 
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Southern Africa. This policy tied South Africa‟s military withdrawal from Angola 
and Namibian independence, to Cuba‟s disengagement from the Angolan conflict.156 
The Crocker proposal provided the basis for talks between the governments of 
Angola, Cuba and South Africa in 1987. The negotiations culminated in the three 
sides signing the New York Accords in December 1988, which set a timetable for 
South African and Cuban troop withdrawals, and for Namibian independence.
157
 In 
November 1989, Namibia held „free and fair‟ democratic elections, which the South 
West Africa People‟s Organisation (SWAPO) won; the result paved the way for the 
nation‟s independence in March 1990.158  
These events had a significant impact on the ANC. One clause of the New 
York Accords stipulated that each signatory would prohibit the use of its territory for 
the perpetration of violence against others in Southern Africa; this meant that the 
MPLA was forced to cease its military assistance to the ANC.
159
 In January 1989, 
with the assistance of the Soviet Air Force, all ANC Angolan camps were vacated 
and MK cadres were relocated to Uganda, Tanzania, and Ethiopia.
160
 Although a 
limited number of operatives were sent to Zambia, the New York Accords struck a 
serious blow to the ANC‟s military capabilities, paralysing its activities in the region. 
The expulsion of MK from Angola also had a severe knock on effect for the ANC‟s 
foreign relations, particularly with Zambia. Thula Simpson identifies a series of 
incidents in which increasingly frustrated and ill-disciplined ANC and MK members 
had killed Zambian nationals, naturally infuriating the Zambian government.
161
 As 
on other previous occasions in Zambia and elsewhere, Kaunda deployed his security 
forces to help the ANC security department disarm its own fighters.
162
 Kaunda 
promptly gave the ANC an ultimatum to leave the country, permitting only a 
skeleton diplomatic mission to remain.
163
 The expulsion from Zambia meant that 
MK guerrillas were yet again located further away from South Africa. Simpson 
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argues that as a result „the infiltration of large numbers of guerrillas was no longer a 
feasible option… it was impossible under these circumstances for the ANC to 
intensify its armed struggle‟.164 
With the armed struggle drastically curtailed, the ANC began to urgently 
explore avenues for formal negotiations with Pretoria. The accelerating shift towards 
negotiations reflected the fact that the ANC was not in control of the unfolding 
events in South Africa. There was a very real danger that the movement could lose 
its influence over the proceedings. During the Kabwe Conference, the ANC 
leadership, in discussing the possibility of negotiating with the apartheid regime, 
stated that „we cannot be seen to be rejecting a negotiated settlement in principle‟, 
but it did however express the pre-condition that „no negotiations can take place or 
even be considered until all political prisoners are released‟.165 In the aftermath of the 
New York Accords, as the international climate drastically shifted, Tambo tasked the 
ANC to draft a position statement on negotiations which could be endorsed by the 
international community. The ANC‟s thinking on negotiations is summarised by the 
resultant „Discussion paper on the issue of negotiations: June 1989‟. This 
acknowledged that the changing geo-political climate was pushing the adversaries 
towards detente and settlement.
166
 It set out the ANC‟s preconditions for talks with 
South Africa, later known as the Harare Declaration, after it was endorsed by the 
OAU in August 1989.
167
 The Harare Declaration confirmed the ANC‟s willingness 
to embrace negotiations as a method of achieving change in South Africa. 
Importantly, the Harare Declaration appealed „to all people of goodwill throughout 
the world to support this Programme of Action as a necessary measure to secure the 
earliest liquidation of the apartheid system and the transformation of South 
Africa‟.168 The ANC‟s appeal was answered by the development of a worldwide 
consensus in support of the Harare Declaration. This was a major boost for the 
ANC‟s foreign policy and international credibility, as it was now regarded as a 
moderate and responsible engine of change.  
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While external forces were mounting against Pretoria, incremental internal 
change to apartheid was finally initiated, following F.W. De Klerk‟s accession to the 
South African Presidency in August 1989, following Botha‟s resignation. De Klerk 
signalled his willingness to begin implementing reforms, although these were 
initially limited, rather than fundamental changes. For example, in October 1989, he 
partially heeded the conditions of the Harare Declaration by unconditionally 
releasing eight political prisoners including Walter Sisulu.
169
 This release provided a 
clear signal that the NP was prepared to begin negotiations with the ANC in a bid to 
resolve the crisis; like the ANC however, De Klerk was keen to do so only from a 
position of strength.
170
 As discussed above, the success of the New York Accords 
had demonstrated an appetite for peaceful negotiations amongst the adversaries in the 
region. It was the seismic shift in international politics which finally persuaded the 
South Africans to begin the process of dismantling the system of apartheid.  
The successful implementation of the New York Accords by the superpowers, 
and the subsequent Namibian elections, demonstrated a new international desire for 
peace in Southern Africa, and the possibility for an effective transition in South 
Africa. Most importantly, the new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, announced in 
1986 his desire to solve regional conflicts via peaceful political settlement, in order 
to extricate the Soviet Union from its foreign adventures. This prompted the Soviet 
Union to adopt the policy of perestroika, signalling a new approach in its foreign 
policy, and its diminished interest in supporting national liberation movements.
171
 
The New York Accords demonstrated the rapid shift in Soviet thinking, as 
„Gorbachev had almost lost interest in the problems of liberation movements… and 
concentrated on contacts with the West‟.172 The subsequent collapse of communism 
meant that South Africa‟s external scapegoat, and ultimately its justification for 
maintaining apartheid, had been removed. In the wake of these developments, 
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Pretoria began to forge surprisingly close ties with the Soviet Union/Russian 
Federation; this would have been unthinkable a matter of months earlier, and was 
regarded as a betrayal of the struggle by the ANC.
173
 The rapid international changes 
and the demise of global communism naturally had a profound impact on the ANC. 
Not only did the ANC lose vital ideological and material support from the Eastern 
Bloc; it also found that as a consequence, its Southern African allies increasingly 
abandoned their previous adherence to a revolutionary path. As a further 
consequence, MK had ceased to be a genuine military threat, having been expelled 
from the Frontline States. Yet, despite the dramatic international changes De Klerk‟s 
decision to unban the ANC in February 1990 was by no means inevitable. It came as 
much as a surprise to many in the white establishment, as it was to the ANC.
174
 
As the decade came to a close, the ANC once again was in both a position of 
relative strength, but also of serious weakness. The ANC‟s foreign policy since 1980 
had made huge strides in promoting the goals of the movement, firmly establishing 
itself as an internationally recognised and respected movement. Its preconditions for 
a negotiated settlement, defined by the Harare Declaration, had been widely endorsed 
by the international community, paving the way for talks with the South African 
government to begin. Through its incessant international lobbying, the pressure 
against Pretoria had reached new heights by the late 1980s. The ANC had thus 
manoeuvred itself into a position where it was regarded as the government-in-waiting, 
without which no political settlement in South Africa could be reached. 
Simultaneously however, the ANC was confronted with several major crises. Its 
forces were located further away from South Africa than ever before; its cadres were 
not united in support of negotiations; and its relations with its Southern Africa allies 
were in jeopardy. Even more serious was the loss of support from the Soviet Bloc, 
putting the organisational capacity of the ANC at risk. Internally, the movement 
remained hampered by its inability to effectively organise politically and militarily 
within South Africa. Despite its close ideological and personal affiliation with 
domestic movements such as the UDF, the ANC was by no means in control of 
unfolding events. Indeed, in 1989, the ANC‟s return to South Africa was still in 
doubt. Although the movement‟s organisational problems were increasingly serious, 
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the ANC nevertheless maintained a public façade of power; for example, as late as 
January 1990, the ANC committed itself to greater internal mobilisation and 
proclaimed that „the armed struggle continues to be a critical and decisive component 
of our strategy… [and MK is] committed to the intensification of our armed 
offensive‟.175  
 
Conclusion 
During its thirty year exile the ANC had evolved beyond recognition from the 
movement that had first left South Africa in 1960. Yet, on the verge of its return to 
South Africa, many questions remained unanswered about the ANC in general and 
its foreign policy in particular. The context of the Cold War clearly overshadowed its 
relations with different liberation movements and newly independent countries, 
which were in turn shaped by South Africa‟s aggressive response to those nations 
harbouring the ANC. All of the Frontline States were clearly opposed to apartheid, 
but this did not necessarily translate into full or enthusiastic support for the ANC. 
The revolutionary zeal of the 1960s was rapidly replaced by more practical economic 
and political concerns. The emergence of the „Dialogue Group‟ in the early 1970s 
revealed the tensions and fissures in Southern African attitudes towards the ANC, 
which became more pronounced by the 1980s. The ANC had in thirty years failed to 
clarify its foreign policy, resulting in a lack of overall coherence for the movement. 
Its ideology was certainly influenced by the Soviet Union, which brought the ANC 
into close contact with the Eastern Bloc, and likeminded liberation movements. 
Without doubt these linkages were invaluable to the progress of the liberation 
struggle. However, the ANC was a broad church, encompassing many competing 
ideologies. On the one hand it relied heavily upon the communist bloc for its very 
survival, yet it strenuously appealed to the west for assistance. The divergence of 
opinion was starkly revealed during the shift towards negotiations, as the ANC was 
split between moderates led by Tambo and Mbeki, and the revolutionaries 
represented by Hani and Slovo. Although Tambo was the overall leader of the ANC, 
whose influence arguably kept the ANC united throughout exile, there were many 
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other important figures in the movement, pursuing ultimately different goals. For 
example, both Mandela and Mbeki, secretly and against the wishes of the majority of 
the ANC‟s cadres, initiated talks with the apartheid regime. This set an important 
precedent, as during their presidencies, both men frequently ignored the advice and 
reports of both their government advisors and the wishes of the ANC membership 
(see Chapters Six and Seven).      
By 1989-1990, the apartheid state was under intense pressure from the 
liberation struggle, the continuing domestic uprising, and the mounting economic 
and international forces mounted against it. In the rapidly changing international 
environment which marked this period, De Klerk seized the initiative in an attempt to 
claim the moral high ground and to prevent the ANC dominating proceedings (and 
its reasoning behind maintaining the armed struggle). In February 1990, De Klerk‟s 
made the momentous, yet unexpected decision to release Nelson Mandela from 
prison, and unban all the liberation movements. The announcement allowed the ANC 
to formally return to South Africa after thirty years in exile, setting in motion the 
transition to majority rule. It is the transition, and the evolution of the ANC‟s foreign 
policy as a legal political party which Chapter Four will now examine.   
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Chapter Four 
ANC Foreign Policy during South Africa’s Transition: The Search 
for Direction, 1990-1994 
  
 Before analysing foreign policy formulation during the transition, it must be 
noted that this and the following two chapters are all closely intertwined. In turn, 
they examine the complex process of foreign policy formulation during South 
Africa‟s transition, and its implementation during the initial two years of ANC-led 
democratic rule. Against the context of evolving from a liberation movement into a 
political party, enormous international geo-political changes, and unexpected 
domestic challenges, this chapter will examine how the ANC strove to formulate its 
foreign policy during South Africa‟s transition. Chapter Five investigates concurrent 
to the events detailed below, how the Transitional Executive Council (TEC) process 
shaped post-apartheid South African foreign policy, which was „captured‟ by the 
western-international community and the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). 
Chapter Six will then tie these themes together, illustrating how these competing 
forces converged during Mandela‟s presidency, resulting in what is often observed as 
a confused and contradictory period in South African foreign policy. 
The beginning of the 1990s witnessed seismic global changes, triggered by 
the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. In the aftermath of this historic event, 
the Soviet Union began to disintegrate and communism as a viable world ideology 
collapsed, bringing the Cold War to an abrupt end. The effects of the Cold War‟s 
sudden demise sent shockwaves around the world. The underpinnings of the bipolar, 
superpower-dominated, international community, which had been the status quo 
since the end of World War II, had been removed. The west deemed it a victory for 
liberal democracy and capitalism, and US President George Bush (Senior) heralded 
the „prospect of a new world order‟. 1  The USA aimed to export the liberal 
democratic political model and its associated ideals around the world, through the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), particularly focusing on former 
Marxist states.
2
 It also marked a shift in thinking about international relations with a 
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move away from the old ideological underpinnings of the Cold War, towards a 
greater focus on multiparty democracy, human rights, and multilateralism.
3
 
 In Southern Africa, the fall of communism and the end of the Cold War had 
an enormous effect, where the campaign against white minority rule in the region 
had been played out against the spectre of superpower rivalry. As described in 
Chapter Three, change was already underway in the region before 1990. The ANC 
had engaged in secret talks with the apartheid government from the mid-1980s, and 
pressure from the superpowers resulted in the negotiated withdrawal of Cuban troops 
from the Angolan conflict in December 1988, which helped pave the way for 
Namibian independence in 1990.
4
 However, the speed at which the Cold War ended, 
over taking these gradual steps towards peace, came as a surprise to the main 
protagonists in South Africa, whose own international outlooks were heavily 
influenced by Cold War ideology.
5
 The sudden dissipation of the rhetorical and 
material support for both the ANC and the apartheid state deeply affected the 
thinking and decision-making capabilities of the protagonists during the transition.         
 Against the backdrop of these swiftly evolving events, South African 
President F. W. De Klerk seized the political and diplomatic initiative. In his speech 
to the opening of the second session of the ninth Parliament on 2 February 1990, the 
new President unexpectedly announced that, „the prohibition of the African National 
Congress, the Pan Africanist Congress, the South African Communist Party and a 
number of subsidiary organisations is being rescinded‟.6 De Klerk‟s reforms heralded 
the beginning of a new era in South African politics. The white minority regime 
pledged to end apartheid, demonstrated a willingness to enter into negotiations with 
liberation movements such as the ANC, and attempted to re-engage with the 
international community to end its isolation. In fact, a sizeable proportion of this 
                                               
3 A. du Pisani, „Post-apartheid South Africa and the region in the 1990‟s‟, paper prepared for BISA 
Annual Conference, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, 17-19 December 1990, pp. 4-6. 
4 T. Lodge, Mandela: A Critical Life (Oxford, 2006), p. 158; N. Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom 
(London,1995), pp. 625-665; A. Sampson, Black and Gold: Tycoons, revolutionaries and apartheid 
(London, 1987), pp. 195-200; C. Saunders, „The Angolan/Namibian crisis of 1988 and its resolution‟, 
in S. Onslow (ed.), Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Liberation (Abingdon, 2009), 
pp. 234-235. 
5 Each side faced real difficulties in coming to terms with the enormous political changes during this 
period. The ANC struggled more than the NP, due to the loss of its main ideologically supporter; this 
was confounded by the challenges of having to adapt to becoming a legal political entity. The 
formulation of foreign policy against this backdrop was going to be an arduous process for the ANC.    
6 Mr De Klerk‟s speech at the opening of the South African Parliament, 2 February 1990, 
http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/1996/101348690.htm (18/11/09). 
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groundbreaking speech was dedicated to the matter of foreign relations. De Klerk 
displayed an impressive understanding of the momentous changes occurring, and 
saw in them an opportunity for South Africa, and especially the white minority, to 
take advantage.
7
 Even Mandela was taken aback by De Klerk‟s initiative, describing 
it „as a breathtaking moment, for in one sweeping action he had virtually normalised 
the situation in South Africa. Our world had changed overnight‟.8   
 The unbanning of the liberation movements opened up the political landscape 
in South Africa, and negotiations about ending apartheid ensued. During the 
transition period from 1990-1994, various stages in the negotiations can be identified. 
The Groote Schuur Minute in May 1990 started proceedings, where the ANC and the 
South African government made a „common commitment towards the resolution of 
the existing climate of violence and intimidation... as well as a commitment to 
stability and to a peaceful process of negotiations‟. 9  This was followed by the 
Pretoria Minute in August, where the two parties reaffirmed their commitment to the 
Groote Schuur Minute, and where most notably, the ANC pledged to suspend its 
armed struggle.
10
 The negotiation process then went through two incarnations of the 
Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), and later the Multiparty 
Negotiating Process (MPNP), resulting in the TEC being formed in November 1993 
which led the country through to the democratic elections of April 1994 (see Chapter 
Five). The detailed development of the negotiations will not be covered by this 
chapter, because there is already a substantial body of literature on the topic, and also 
because the constitutional process did not involve direct talks about foreign policy.
11
 
However, very little has been written about the development of foreign policy within 
the ANC (and for that matter within the NP) during the transitional period. Even 
                                               
7 Ibid., (18/11/09). 
8 Mandela, Long Walk, p. 666-667. 
9 „The Groote Shuur Minute‟, http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/governence-
projects/constitution/doc17-groote-schuur.htm (2/6/11).  
10 „The Pretoria Minute‟, http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/governence-projects/constitution/doc18-
pta-minute.htm (2/6/11). 
11 Examples include: P. Bond, Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa 
(London, 2000); H. Adam and K. Moodley, The Negotiated Revolution: Society and Politics in Post-
Apartheid South Africa (Johannesburg, 1993); S. Friedman and D. Atkinson (eds.), South African 
Review 7: The Small Miracle. South Africa’s negotiated settlement (Johannesburg, 1994); S. Friedman 
(ed.), The Long Journey: South Africa’s quest for a negotiated settlement (Johannesburg, 1993); H. 
Marais, South Africa: Limits to Change (London, 2001); J. Rantete and H. Giliomee, „Transition to 
Democracy through Transaction? Bilateral Negotiations between the ANC and NP in South Africa‟, 
African Affairs, 91 (1992), pp. 515-542; A. Sparks, Tomorrow is Another Country: The Inside Story of 
South Africa’s Negotiated Revolution (London, 1996). 
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what little there is focuses disproportionately on the period 1990-1992. This 
literature focuses on discussions about what the central tenets of the „new‟ South 
Africa‟s foreign policy would be, the country‟s potential attitudes towards the 
international community after the transition, deliberations over regional policy, and 
over future relations with various multilateral organisations such as the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) and the UN.
12
  
Before analysing the ANC‟s foreign policy during the transition, it should be 
emphasised that De Klerk and the NP were still firmly in control of government in 
South Africa after the unbanning of the liberation movements. They still controlled 
the formulation of foreign policy during the transition, as South Africa began the 
process of reintegrating itself with the international community. The ANC thereby 
found itself excluded from the main thrust of these deliberations until the latter stages 
of the transition period. The NP government‟s efforts were laid out by the 
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) Director General, Neil Van Heerden‟s „New 
Diplomacy‟; one of Van Heerden‟s key recommendations was for a greater focus on 
Southern Africa. This policy was partly put into practice through De Klerk‟s shuttle 
diplomacy across Africa, Europe and North America.
13
 This was a bid by the 
government to earn a degree of legitimacy for its reform efforts and an attempt to get 
international sanctions removed as a „reward‟, so that the South African economy 
could benefit from much needed investment and trade opportunities. The importance 
of trade to South Africa was stressed by academic Andre du Pisani in a conference 
paper in 1990, in which he declared that „the Department of Foreign Affairs‟ „new 
diplomacy‟ is informed by the understanding that the flag will follow the trade‟. Du 
Pisani went on to highlight the importance of Southern Africa to this new thinking.
14
 
Yet, even at the time, the „New Diplomacy‟ initiatives were criticised by some 
                                               
12 The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) became SADC in August 
1992, after the Heads of State and Government Summit in Windoek. Examples of the literature on 
foreign policy during the transition include: C. Coker, „„Experiencing‟ Southern Africa in the twenty-
first century‟, International Affairs, 67 (1991), pp. 281-292; G. Evans, „Myths and realities in South 
Africa‟s future foreign policy‟, International Affairs, 67 (1991), pp. 709-721; G. Evans, „South Africa 
in Remission: the Foreign Policy of an Altered State‟, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 34 
(1996), pp. 249-269; R. Evans, „The Growing Importance of Cross-Border Liaison‟, in T. Manning 
(ed.), Trends Transforming South Africa: Insights, Information and Ideas (Cape Town, 1991); C. 
Landsberg, „Directing from the stalls?: The international community and the South African 
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Southern Africa‟s Security‟, International Affairs, 67 (1991), pp. 697-708. 
13 Vale, „Security‟, pp. 699-704. 
14 Pisani, „South Africa and the region‟, p.10.  
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commentators for being reactive and merely reflecting „a change in style rather than 
substance‟.15 
 The „New Diplomacy‟ initiative was just one example of the various tactics 
employed by the DFA, De Klerk, and the NP government to start the process of pre-
determining South Africa‟s future foreign policy and halting the ANC‟s progress at 
home and abroad.
16
 These initiatives posed a threat to the ANC; it faced the very real 
possibility of post-apartheid South Africa‟s international relations being pre-
determined for them, leaving them with little room to manoeuvre. To make things 
worse, its main bargaining chip – sanctions – were being steadily eroded by a world 
far too rapidly embracing Pretoria for its liking. In light of this, the chapter will 
include an analysis of attempts by the NP government to distort and undermine the 
efforts of the ANC to establish its own independent perspectives on foreign policy.  
This chapter primarily aims to chart the evolution of the ANC‟s foreign 
policy during the transition period and to investigate what it envisaged South 
Africa‟s future relations with other nations would be like. It will analyse how the 
ANC‟s foreign policy developed, from its early pronouncements in various 
conference resolutions, through to the publication of its policy document „Foreign 
Policy in a new democratic South Africa‟, issued shortly before it took power in May 
1994 as head of a Government of National Unity (GNU). The development of the 
ANC‟s foreign policy will also be scrutinised in the context of rapidly changing 
international and domestic political events.        
 
Struggling to find its Feet in the New International Order: 1990-1992 
 In the immediate aftermath of De Klerk‟s landmark speech, the ANC was left 
in organisational and political disarray. The turmoil the ANC faced after February 
1990 resulted in the transition period being described as the „most difficult time in 
the history of the South African liberation movement‟. 17 Not only did it have to 
suddenly adjust from being a banned liberation movement to a legal political party, it 
had the arduous task of returning its exiled members from across the world to South 
                                               
15 Evans, „Future Foreign Policy‟, p. 712.  
16 Vale, „Security‟, pp. 704-706. 
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Africa, establishing an internal organisation within the country, negotiating a 
politically acceptable end to apartheid, whilst also combating the international 
diplomatic offensive being waged by the government, described above. Amongst 
these competing issues the question of international support and assistance to the 
negotiation process was a key priority during the initial stages of the transition. 
However, it was in the international arena, that the ANC faced fierce, yet 
unanticipated competition for support and legitimacy.  
 While in exile, the ANC‟s international diplomacy had achieved some 
considerable successes, especially during the 1980s (see Chapter Three). The 
movement was widely feted in international circles, had strong bilateral relations 
with some significant nations, including the Soviet Union and the countries of 
Scandinavia, regularly lobbied powerful multilateral organisations such as the UN 
and Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and was backed by the support network 
of the worldwide Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM). All of these had helped to bring 
about the political and economic isolation of South Africa. By 1990 the ANC had 
thirty four missions worldwide, of which fourteen were in Africa, which illustrates 
the ANC‟s global reach and influence.18  
 Despite this long running association with the international community the 
ANC still lacked a definite set of foreign policy positions. The prominent focus of 
the movement had been on the revolutionary capture of power through a People‟s 
War, rather than planning for what it was going to do when they had actually 
achieved it. James Barber believes that „the ANC had been bound together more by 
what it opposed than a clear picture of what it proposed; it had broad aspirations 
rather than detailed plans‟.19 In 1990, the main basis of its foreign policy remained 
the 1955 Freedom Charter and the „Report of the Commission on Foreign Policy‟ 
adopted at the Kabwe Conference in 1985 (see Chapter Three).
20
 These documents 
were far from a sufficient basis for the effective foreign policy of either a liberation 
movement or an aspiring party of government; they were merely a wish list of 
principles. For example, the Freedom Charter‟s international demands called for 
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19 J. Barber, South Africa in the Twentieth Century (Oxford, 1999), p. 278. 
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„peace and friendship‟ and for „independence and self government‟ in Africa, which 
evidently did not constitute a basis for foreign policy.
21
 Both documents contained 
noble ideals, but there was nothing definitive to guide the movement through the 
transitional period and into power in a future, democratic South Africa. The lack of a 
concrete vision for the future would be a severe problem for the ANC during the 
initial stages of the transition.  
In addition, another significant ANC document which had gained 
international recognition was created in 1989, in which the movement had set out its 
preconditions for negotiations with the NP. These conditions were adopted by the 
OAU Ad Hoc Committee on Southern Africa in August of that year, and became 
known as the Harare Declaration.
22
 They were subsequently endorsed by the UN 
General Assembly as a road-map for the peaceful resolution of the conflict. The 
ANC sought the full implementation of these principles before talks could begin and 
it urged the international community to ensure the South African government 
acceded to them.  
In order to press for the implementation of the objectives set out in the Harare 
Declaration, Mandela after his release from jail on 11 February 1990 began a hectic 
international schedule. By mid-1992, Mandela had made sixteen trips abroad and 
paid visits to forty-nine countries.
23
 These visits enabled the ANC to exert political 
pressure on the west and Africa; one ANC demand was for sanctions to be 
maintained against South Africa, in order to force the pace and direction of change in 
the country. However, the ANC was at a severe disadvantage in these efforts, as it 
had no overall guiding foreign policy framework which could inform and direct its 
international efforts. Peter Vale argues that, after being unbanned, the ANC‟s lack of 
a clear foreign policy direction meant that it initially struggled to adapt to the new 
international situation facing them. Furthermore, Vale believes these difficulties were 
accentuated by the fact that the movement‟s capacity for theoretical analysis 
drastically diminished when the Cold War came to an end.
24
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 The ANC‟s National Consultative Conference (NCC) in December 1990 was 
the first to be held in South Africa for thirty-one years, and it provided a vital 
occasion for the movement to reflect on the struggle and the work still to be done to 
overcome apartheid. The international community‟s role in South Africa‟s transition 
was high on the agenda. In the keynote address Mandela found time to thank 
Southern Africa for the support it had provided to the ANC‟s liberation struggle, 
declaring: „the Frontline States bled in equal measure so that we might meet in this 
manner today. Words cannot express our profound appreciation for the solidarity, 
succour and support we received and continue to receive from the sister nations of 
Africa‟.25 He went on to condemn the NP‟s belligerence during the initial stages of 
the negotiations and stressed the importance of the international community to the 
process; he stated that the „continuing pressure from the international community… 
remain[s] [a] key factor in compelling the government to honour the agreements 
reached. These must be maintained!‟.26 Furthermore, the ANC demanded continued 
international pressure in the form of sanctions against South Africa. The 1990 
conference resolved that the ANC should be „cognisant of the necessity to counteract 
the growing perception that De Klerk and his government should be rewarded for 
recent reforms…[and] we resolve the existing package [of sanctions] be maintained‟. 
It also agreed to appeal „to the EC, US Congress, EFTA and all other international 
bodies to postpone any consideration of the issue of sanctions against apartheid 
South Africa‟.27  
These demands for continued international sanctions were however not 
universally supported within the ANC. In preparation for the conference, senior ANC 
leader Thabo Mbeki had written a document arguing for the phased withdrawal of 
international sanctions, but the militant atmosphere at the conference meant it could 
not even be discussed.
28
 During his opening speech, President Oliver Tambo 
declared that „it is no longer enough for us to repeat the tired slogans. We should, 
therefore, carefully re-evaluate the advisability of insisting on the retention of 
                                               
25 Keynote address of Comrade Nelson R Mandela, Deputy President of the ANC, to the ANC 
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sanctions, given the new developments in the country and abroad‟.29 According to 
Mandela, Tambo‟s proposal was met with indignation amongst the delegates. The 
conference subsequently resolved that sanctions remained in place.
30
 In many ways 
the militant cadres were out of kilter with the rapidly changing international 
environment that was affecting the situation in South Africa. However, the ANC‟s 
cadres‟ position on sanctions is understandable. The enormous international changes 
which had shattered the status quo meant that there were real difficulties for many in 
coming to terms with what had occurred. As early as June 1990, six months before 
the ANC‟s conference, the EC (European Community) had already eased sanctions 
against Pretoria, and it was highly unlikely that they would have been re-
introduced.
31
 It led one commentator to argue later that „the ANC‟s arrogance, as 
much as its naiveté, blinded it to the fact that the scales were tipped heavily against 
it‟.32 After decades of speaking on behalf of the oppressed masses (while in reality an 
elite movement in exile) the ANC had managed to swiftly establish itself in South 
Africa as a broad based party of the people, uniting under its umbrella structure, a 
wide cross-section of the population.
33
 Due to this broad based nature, the ANC elite 
heeded the popular consensus of the conference, even if it went against the opinions 
of some of its leaders.  
Immediately after the conference, the ANC held a mass rally at Soccer City. 
Tambo‟s speech did not explicitly mention the delicate issue of sanctions, but 
reiterated the importance of the international community and Southern Africa to the 
ANC and the future of South African democracy. He concluded: 
One thing we should never forget and shall never forget is the role of 
the international community in our struggle. Countries far and apart 
will do everything to aid our struggle... But you should have seen the 
international response the last time Nelson toured the world, a journey 
he is yet to complete. Above all, we have enjoyed solid support from 
Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Angola, Botswana, 
Namibia and Nigeria. The failure of these countries in anything would 
have been our failure. They hold our ground, and we are grateful… 
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The international community have an equal duty, not to relax pressure 
until the apartheid crime against humanity has been ended.
34
 
This speech demonstrates how important the international community remained to 
the ANC‟s strategic thinking in late 1990. The leadership realised that its efforts to 
apply pressure on the South African government to reform in a manner acceptable to 
the ANC, still required international assistance. While there may not have been 
consensus on how best to harness this support, the ANC-leadership knew it was vital. 
Chris Landsberg agrees that the international community remained central to the 
ANC‟s strategy, arguing the leadership still „regarded foreign intervention as a key 
source of influence over an unresponsive and powerful white government‟. 35 
Tambo‟s speech also hints at a sense of disquiet within the ANC hierarchy; without 
active and decisive support from external sources, it feared that it might get left 
behind in the negotiations process.     
Meanwhile, the South African government had been increasingly successful 
in developing and renewing friendly links with Africa and the west. Both regions 
were eager to re-engage with South Africa to take advantage of the new economic 
opportunities available, and were therefore willing to accept at face value the NP‟s 
declared intentions to rapidly reform. The result was an easing of South Africa‟s 
isolation, which undermined many of the ANC‟s international strategies. Even while 
the NCC was in session, the EC lifted its ban on new investments in South Africa, 
although existing sanctions remained in place.
36
 Landsberg argues that „the nature of 
South Africa‟s diplomacy became captivating… the ANC was on the defensive, 
notably on its economic policy, sanctions, and the armed struggle‟.37 In 1989, an 
ANC document had explicitly warned that the movement „cannot afford to tail 
behind the regime and allow ourselves to fall into a defensive posture, with the 
regime maintaining the offensive‟.38 This was however, exactly what was happening. 
Scott Thomas believes that the ANC‟s diplomacy had been completely disorientated 
by the pace and nature of De Klerk‟s initiatives; the latter had successfully wooed the 
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international community with his reforms, as he continued to display an impressive 
awareness of the impact of the rapid changes occurring in global politics.
39
   
The effectiveness of sanctions as a weapon for the ANC continued to decline 
in subsequent months. In February 1991, Mandela, angrily threatened to „turn South 
Africa upside down‟ unless the EC maintained its sanctions programme.40 However, 
his rhetorical denouncements were to no avail, as the EC unanimously renounced 
sanctions in April 1991.
41
 The US followed suit; President Bush lifted sanctions 
against South Africa in July.
42
 These events show the extent to which the ANC had 
been unable to convince the west of its point of view and how successful De Klerk 
had been in championing his alternative vision. The shift to an over-riding emphasis 
on economic considerations in the „new‟ world order had caught the ANC off guard, 
leaving it outside the multilateral international consensus that had rapidly emerged. 
Janis Van der Westhuizen later argued that „the ANC seems to have been oblivious 
to the fact that the end of the Cold War did not so much herald the demise of the 
Soviet Union as it symbolised the triumph of neoliberalism. The ANC‟s continued 
advocacy of sanctions… raised eyebrows‟.43       
By July 1991, when the ANC‟s 48th National Conference took place, the 
movement‟s influence over international policy towards South Africa was severely 
limited; little progress had been made in the negotiations and rumblings of discontent 
were emerging amongst the ANC‟s rank and file about the pace and direction of 
change. It forced Tambo to stress the need to maintain unity amongst the cadres in 
order to defeat apartheid. At the conference, the international situation was once 
again discussed. In the seven months since the NCC, the rhetorical demands of the 
ANC‟s leadership regarding international support had apparently changed little. 
There were however signs that political attitudes were beginning to change within 
the leadership. 
There are many similarities between the ANC‟s NCC in 1990 and its 48th 
National Conference. In his opening address, Tambo declared that „as in the past, our 
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leadership should be exercised both here and abroad. This becomes even more 
important given the changing face of the international community. We must 
therefore refocus international attention on the need for continued support‟.44 This 
point was elaborated by Mandela, who stated: „the continued support of the 
international community remains vital for the victory of our cause. We also need 
further to strengthen our links with the rest of the world‟.45 Furthermore, Mandela 
demanded that the ANC „should find ways and means by which to arrest the process 
of the erosion of sanctions… [so] we do not lose this weapon‟.46 Although the ANC 
was evidently still seeking to preserve its external support, it was still wedded to the 
retention of sanctions as a mechanism for political change. The leadership clearly 
realised the importance of international assistance to the negotiations, but had little 
idea of how best to proceed in engaging external actors in the process. There was at 
this point, no clear direction or understanding of how best to implement its foreign 
policy objectives. The machinery of the NP government retained a distinct advantage 
over the ANC, which was still adapting to life as a legal political entity. There were 
real structural difficulties for the ANC in the initial stages of the transition, with 
foreign policy matters not fully discussed because there were more pressing concerns 
for the movement to consider. 
The 1991 conference did however provide a forum in which the ANC could 
begin formulating a plan of action on foreign policy. Mandela pointed out that 
„elaboration of policy cannot itself go on forever. We must begin to arrive at firm 
conclusions about what we would do with the country once we become the 
governing party‟. Furthermore, he argued „it would be important that we discuss the 
question of the possible role of the international community‟. 47  Following the 
conference deliberations, a set of „resolutions on foreign policy‟ were adopted. These 
resolutions reaffirmed and built upon the ANC‟s existing foreign policy statements: 
the Freedom Charter, the Kabwe Document, and the Harare Declaration.  
The resolutions of the 48
th
 National Conference was the first ANC foreign 
policy document that recognised the fundamental global changes that had occurred, 
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and the effect of these on the movement. The resolutions on foreign policy set out 
five areas of concern. The first section was sanctions and the need to utilise them as a 
form of pressure. The ANC recognised that it needed to discuss with its external 
allies how best to utilise sanctions in the changed environment, while insisting that 
„the international community should be urged to listen to the view of the democratic 
forces and not seek to reward the apartheid regime‟.48 The second and third areas 
covered the mobilisation of international anti-apartheid forces and the need for 
financial and material assistance. It highlighted the importance of the AAM, not only 
in providing moral and material assistance to the ANC, but also in continuing to 
pressurise the international community to fulfil its obligations towards South Africa. 
The conference resolved that „the world anti-apartheid movement should prepare 
adequately for an important post-apartheid role‟, underlining the expectations and 
optimism the movement had regarding the extent of future external assistance.
49
 The 
significance of regional and international cooperation were also identified; 
resolutions set out how the ANC hoped to actively promote human rights, democracy, 
African solidarity, and as the future government of South Africa its desire to gain 
admission into various multilateral organisations such as the OAU.
50
 The final 
section of the resolutions called for the National Executive Committee (NEC) to 
ensure wider democratic participation in foreign policy discussions amongst the 
movement‟s members and that sub-committees should be established to help guide 
these discussions.
51
  
As the resolutions indicate, the ANC had begun to take the first tentative 
steps towards developing an overt framework for its foreign policy. Existing 
demands such as sanctions and international assistance had been elaborated upon, 
while dominant international discourses of the time, such as human rights and 
weapon controls, were incorporated into the document.  
Whilst this process was unfolding, a diplomatic battle between the ANC and 
NP was occurring over relations with other African states. Throughout its exile, the 
ANC had relied heavily on African support in order to wage its struggle, and it 
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assumed that these relationships would endure. However, after 1990 its longstanding 
allies began to draw away from the movement. As noted in Chapter Three, the ANC 
had already been on the retreat in Southern Africa in the 1980s, as successive 
Frontline States were forced by South African pressure to expel its cadres and 
relations soured. To make matters worse, the ANC was shocked by the election 
defeat of its long standing ally and benefactor, Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda, 
whose United National Independence Party (UNIP) lost to the Movement for 
Multiparty Democracy (MMD) in November 1991 in the country‟s first multi-party 
elections since 1968.
52
 An ideological stalwart of the movement had been 
democratically voted out of office, and the ANC‟s ties with the Zambian state were 
effectively severed. It was a sign of wider political change on the continent; between 
1990 and mid-1991, for the first time in post-colonial African history, three 
presidents lost power through democratic elections.
53
 Vale believes that the ANC‟s 
relations with other African allies in the early 1990s were not always as happy as 
publicly stated, and points to Angola and Mozambique as examples.
54
 Journalist and 
historian R.W. Johnson agrees, claiming that the influence of FRELIMO and the 
MPLA „diminishes once 1990 takes place, but the ANC does [still] acknowledge a 
very large debt to them‟.55    
 The strained relations between the ANC and continental powers during this 
period were exacerbated by the efforts of the NP government to develop closer ties 
with other Africa states. During apartheid, South Africa had repeatedly attempted to 
lure the continent into its embrace through a series of initiatives such as the Dialogue 
programme of the early 1970s and its plans for a constellation of states in Southern 
Africa (see Chapters Two and Three).
56
 After 1990, the NP began to renew and 
intensify these efforts, illustrated by De Klerk‟s visits across the continent. As 
discussed previously, Africa‟s importance had been encapsulated in South Africa‟s 
„New Diplomacy‟, which led Roger Pfister to argue that Africa was „of seminal 
relevance‟ to South African initiatives.57 In fact, from 1990, De Klerk‟s government 
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had worked tirelessly to undermine the ANC‟s alliances with the continent, and he 
made several official visits to establish relations with a number of African leaders. 
For example in June 1991, De Klerk made an historic visit to Kenya to meet 
President Daniel arap Moi. They discussed greater economic collaboration, and De 
Klerk declared that there was a „new wind of change blowing across Africa‟.58 The 
creation of formal economic ties with Africa was a pressing concern for South 
Africa, yet more so for the rest of the continent. When its trade links with the 
continent were published in December 1991, it revealed that South Africa had 
business links with „nearly every country on the continent‟ despite the sanctions 
campaign against Pretoria and that its exports to the continent had grown by 40% in 
1989 and another 22% in 1990.
59
 Thomas subsequently argued that „African nations 
motivated by self interest and increasing economic difficulties, were already ignoring 
ANC appeals‟.60 Such public revelations came as a major setback for the ANC. It 
demonstrated that African efforts to end apartheid and achieve a favourable 
settlement for the black majority in South Africa had diminished in favour of 
economic self-interest. It was however, hardly surprising that African states would 
put their economies before international solidarity due to their perilous financial 
standing; it must be remembered that many had attempted to isolate apartheid South 
Africa at great financial loss to themselves, so after 1990 they rushed to take 
advantage of the new possibilities opening up.   
A further setback to the ANC occurred in April 1992 when De Klerk visited 
Nigeria. Nigeria, one of Africa‟s largest and most politically significant countries, 
had been publicly hostile to apartheid South Africa, but this meeting began a new 
chapter in bilateral relations and so „was a tremendous breakthrough for Pretoria‟s 
Africa strategy‟.61 In fact, Nigerian President Ibrahim Babangida, the then chairman 
of the OAU, welcomed De Klerk with open arms, declaring: „we are delighted that 
we have at last found someone in South Africa with whom we can do business‟.62 
Patti Waldmeir remarked that the Nigerian visit marked „South Africa's final 
reconciliation with the rest of Africa, from which it has been so long estranged. No 
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African door can remain closed to Mr de Klerk, now that Nigeria has welcomed him 
back‟.63 Pfister agrees that the meeting „sent the message to other African states that 
diplomatic contact with Pretoria was now acceptable‟.64 
 The Nigeria visited infuriated the ANC, as the agreement between the two 
states, further limited the movement‟s policy options internationally; especially as 
the ANC‟s core-support base was being rapidly eroded. Although African states did 
still support the movement, they were just more critical in their approach to the 
ANC. Mandela publicly criticised Babangida, but was rebuked by the Nigerians, 
being told „that they would “not be dictated to by anyone‟s business but our own”‟.65 
At this point it appeared that De Klerk had achieved the progress he desired with 
Africa, and reduced the ANC‟s influence internationally. Despite establishing new 
foreign policy guidelines, and mounting a concerted effort to counteract Pretoria‟s 
diplomatic offensive, little had been achieved. In fact, the ANC felt that its hard won 
international recognition and diplomatic successes achieved during exile was being 
rapidly undermined.        
 A turning point however occurred in June 1992, when a domestic incident 
sparked international furore, marking the beginning of the end for De Klerk‟s 
successful diplomatic offensive. The Boipatong Massacre left over forty people dead 
after Inkatha members assisted by South African security forces attacked township 
dwellers, an event „which set a new standard of South African atrocity‟.66 De Klerk 
was blamed for official complicity in the massacre.
67
 The massacre prompted the 
ANC to walk out of the CODESA negotiations in protest and begin a campaign „of 
rolling mass action‟ to pressurise De Klerk. 68  Internationally, this proved to be, 
according to Pfister, a turning point for its foreign policy, as it proved the „ideal 
opportunity for the ANC to reactivate the diplomatic support of the international 
community‟.69 The international community was unwilling to allow South Africa to 
descend into a spiral of violence, but nor was it willing to accept the continued 
domination by whites of the levers of political power. Steven Freidman argues that 
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„the sense of crisis [Boipatong] engendered… triggered international involvement in 
the transition‟.70 It resulted in greater international intervention and pressure being 
applied to bring both sides to the negotiating table.   
The new urgency in multilateral engagement became clear when, in August 
1992, the UN Security Council unanimously approved a resolution to send 
international observers to oversee the negotiations in South Africa. This was 
augmented by the Commonwealth, which also agreed to send an observer team.
71
 
The UN mission was a hailed as a victory by the ANC, „which had always been 
enthusiastic about an active international role‟ in the transition. 72  These actions 
demonstrated to both sides that the international community was closely watching 
the transition process and was willing to play its part in the negotiations, to achieve a 
democratic outcome. Although international opinion alone did not change the 
situation in South Africa, it certainly contributed to creating a political climate more 
conducive to negotiations.
73
  
Negotiations (see Chapter Five) resumed in September 1992, when a „Record 
of Understanding‟ was signed between the ANC and NP, which Waldmeir described 
as a „triumph of negotiation over conflict‟.74 According to Mandela, the „agreement 
set the mould for all negotiations that followed … we were now aligned on the basic 
framework that would take the country into a democratic future‟.75 This resumption 
of negotiations, which were by no means predictable at this stage, allowed the ANC 
to begin the serious process of shaping its future foreign policy. While foreign policy 
deliberations were still not uppermost in ANC thinking in the following years, there 
was a clearer realisation that a formal position must be agreed upon to guide the 
movement in office once the elections had occurred. 
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Formalising a Foreign Policy Perspective: 1993-1994 
 While the transition was predominantly focused on the negotiations to end 
apartheid and bring democracy to South Africa, behind the scenes the ANC was 
trying to address a number of other issues, including its foreign policy. As already 
established, the ANC only began to really consider scenarios for a state-based 
foreign policy during its 48
th
 National Conference. However, once substantive 
negotiations with the NP resumed in September 1992, the opportunity for the ANC 
to start the process of policy formulation arose. In these latter stages of the transition 
the ANC began to develop a greater sense of the direction and substance of its 
policies and this found concrete expression in a number of documents. One such 
document, „Foreign Policy in a new Democratic South Africa‟ was published in the 
run-up to the elections in April 1994 and was the culmination of this preparatory 
work. It provided a guide to a new, moralistic, international vision for South Africa 
under the ANC. 
 Work on this process was conducted by the ANC Foreign Policy Working 
Group, which had begun meeting a year after the movement‟s return to South Africa. 
Members of this group included, amongst others Peter Vale, Rob Davies, Gary van 
Staden, Alan Hirsch, the brothers Aziz and Essop Pahad, Thabo Mbeki, Welile 
Nhlapo, Sankie Mthembu and Stanley Mabizela.
76
 Although Mbeki was a member of 
this group, he was not a regular attendee of its meetings, but when he did attend, the 
attitude of its other ANC members was deferential towards his opinions on foreign 
policy (the theme of deference within the movement and the increased centralisation 
of ANC foreign policy thinking that this occurrence reflected will be returned to in 
due course).
77
 The Foreign Policy Working Group met on several occasions to 
discuss the future South African foreign policy and to draft a working policy 
document for the ANC. An early indication of the direction of the ANC Working 
Groups‟s deliberations after Boipatong can be found in the draft of a document 
entitled, „A new foreign policy for South Africa: a discussion document‟. 78  The 
document, primarily written by Vale, elaborates upon the proposals outlined in the 
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„Resolutions on Foreign Policy‟ agreed at the 48th National Conference. The drastic 
global changes and the resultant evolving forms of state interaction were described as 
being a positive step forward for the international community; the document does 
however point to the „intense uncertainty‟ worldwide, and warned of the resultant 
potential dangers such as the prospect of western triumphalism.
79
 The document 
suggested that the ANC could exploit this new era in international relations, 
especially focusing on human rights; it expressed the belief „that South Africa should 
become a beacon for, a champion of, the international crusade for the values 
associated with this noble goal‟.80 This marked the beginning of a short lived period 
when the central focus of the ANC‟s foreign policy approach was human rights and 
its promotion. The document also set out the principles which would guide ANC 
foreign policy in the future: a preoccupation with human rights; a belief in global 
solidarity; that justice and democracy should be the basis of its international relations; 
a desire for international peace; and the centrality of Africa.
81
  
 The draft document elaborates on each principle in turn. For example, a 
commitment was made to working closely within multilateral organisations like the 
UN and SADC to achieve goals such as disarmament, human rights and economic 
development. The unique nature of the ANC‟s liberation struggle, which had resulted 
in interactions with countries from across the globe, was treated as a major advantage 
for the „new‟ South Africa because as the world stood at „this new international 
crossroads‟ the movement‟s past experiences allowed it to fully „understand how to 
manage international relations… where worlds may clash‟. 82  This vision 
demonstrated the ANC‟s confidence in South Africa‟s ability to become a fully 
fledged and active member of the international community; having overcome 
injustice and inequality via a negotiated transition, it would act as an example to the 
wider world.  
The document‟s focus on Africa is informed by its earlier public pledges and 
is heavily emphasised because „our destiny is intertwined with theirs; our peoples 
belong with each other‟.83 This theme was one that the Working Group was keen to 
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emphasise, and nine pages of the document are devoted to the question of future 
interactions with the continent. The main aim was to prevent Africa‟s growing 
international marginalisation, and to strive for equitable, mutually beneficial relations, 
and greater regional integration.
84
 This principle was designed to repay Africa for its 
assistance and suffering during the liberation struggle, as well as an attempt to 
appease fears of South Africa‟s continued domination of the continent (see Chapters 
Six and Seven for this in practice). Vale now recalls there was a consensus amongst 
members of the Working Group to stress the importance of Southern Africa, because 
„there was a large sense of optimism that we could transform Southern Africa, in a 
kind of positive way… [and to act as] retribution that we had to pay these people 
back for everything they‟d done for us‟.85   
There was, however, an element of self-interest in these proposals. The ANC 
as the future governing party was keen to promote stable, democratic nations in 
Africa, which it believed would then develop economically. If it was achieved, South 
African businesses would be able to take advantage of this opportunity by increasing 
its trade links with the continent. Furthermore, it would help make Southern Africa 
an attractive location for global investment flows. This would in turn boost the 
economy of South Africa, and enable the ANC to quicken the pace of domestic 
development and change. The draft discussion document was modified several times 
before being published in a substantively identical form in October 1993 as „Foreign 
Policy in a new democratic South Africa: A discussion paper‟. 86  The document 
clearly indicates how the ANC‟s thinking on foreign policy had evolved since 1991. 
The core message was one of democracy, human rights and the primacy of Africa. 
This was the most explicit statement of foreign policy intent the ANC had ever 
produced.
87
  
The discussion paper offers a powerful indication of the influences on the 
ANC and the policies which it hoped to pursue once in government. „Foreign Policy 
in a new democratic South Africa‟ is very much a product of its time. Primarily, it 
reflects the ANC‟s vision of the world from the perspective of its own perceived 
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moral struggle for democracy; and the broad consensus of the early 1990s that the 
global community would unite to bring about democracy, prosperity and human 
rights for all.
88
 The document is rather celebratory in nature, as it rejoices in the end 
of the Cold War and the emerging, new world vision. It is clear that the ANC 
Working Committee had indeed embraced certain aspects of this new international 
thinking. This group, once in power, wanted an ANC-led South Africa to play a 
significant role in the new multilateral world and it was optimistic about the ways in 
which the international community could assist the country. Thabo Mbeki insisted 
that the world had a special responsibility to the country that „entails the obligation 
of the international community to assist the people of South Africa to effect the 
transformation‟.89 
 „Foreign Policy in a new Democratic South Africa‟ was the most definitive 
statement of intent on foreign policy produced by the ANC during the transition, but 
it was overshadowed by an article in the prestigious journal Foreign Affairs. 
Published in late 1993 under the name of Nelson Mandela, the article „South Africa‟s 
Future Foreign Policy‟ set out in detail what the country‟s foreign relations under an 
ANC government would entail.
90
 The article mainly summarised the document 
„Foreign Policy in a new democratic South Africa‟ in a form more accessible to a 
wider international audience. The main points made in the article were the widely 
publicised six pillars of the ANC‟s foreign policy: human rights; the promotion of 
democracy; justice and respect for international law; primacy of peace initiatives 
through non-violent means; the importance of Africa; and economic development 
through regional and economic cooperation.
91
 The article reaffirmed the focus on 
„unity and closer cooperation‟ with Africa, and declared that a „democratic South 
Africa will… resist any pressure or temptation to pursue its own interests at the 
expense of the sub-continent‟. 92 The article also brought the decision to make human 
rights a central tenet of future foreign policy to a much greater audience. „Mandela‟ 
argued that a human rights based approach to South Africa‟s future foreign policy, 
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„will be the light that guides our foreign affairs‟. 93  Despite the idealistic 
underpinnings of the article, it expresses more pragmatic tendencies in referring to 
economic priorities. The need for foreign investment to alleviate inequalities and 
improve education, skills and opportunities is stressed in the article, but there was 
also an astute awareness that foreign intervention would not be a quick solution to 
South Africa‟s economic woes.94    
The article has been widely identified as the benchmark for what South 
Africa‟s new, moral foreign policy would constitute, as well as displaying the 
personal beliefs of Mandela. However, this article was not actually written by Nelson 
Mandela. In fact the ANC had very little input into it. The Foreign Affairs article was 
written mainly by Peter Vale, who constructed its intellectual argument, while 
various experts (Gary van Staden, Alan Hirsch and Rob Davies) contributed to it.
95
 
The ANC leadership did have a role in editing and approving the final outcome of 
the piece; this willingness is indicated by its decision to allow Mandela‟s name to be 
publicly associated with the principles it espoused. Interestingly, there was originally 
a section about Burma (officially known as Myanmar) which would have given 
concrete emphasis to the democratic and human rights sections of the article, but it 
was removed from the final published version. Vale recalls that senior ANC member 
„Kader Asmal read the paper and exorcised bits of it. Particularly, exorcised the bit 
about Burma that was in it, and he took out the reference to Aung San Suu Kyi‟.96 
Perhaps, even in the process of endorsing the primacy of human rights to its foreign 
policy, some ANC leaders realised that it would not be possible to implement this 
policy in every case; in this instance it chose to avoid publicly criticising the 
Burmese Junta before taking power. Given what occurred to South Africa‟s 
promotion of human rights after 1994, it is a plausible explanation, and a sign of 
things to come.  
In fact, two members of the ANC Foreign Policy Working Group have 
expressed their doubts about there ever being a widespread consensus on human 
rights within the ANC‟s leadership. Alan Hirsch argues that „there was tension 
                                               
93 Ibid., p.88.  
94 Ibid., pp. 93-95. 
95 Interview with Professor Peter Vale, University of Rhodes, 31 August 2009; Email correspondence 
with Alan Hirsch, 18 June 2011. 
96 Telephone interview with Professor Peter Vale, 5 March 2010. 
111 
 
between those who preferred human rights to be the fundamental basis of foreign 
policy (most of the participants) and those who believed that this was not realistic... 
As I recall, the main opponents to the “unrealistic” view were Thabo Mbeki and 
myself‟.97 Furthermore, Vale recalls:  
I never thought that there was a commitment on the human rights. I 
always thought that there was a real worry by some people, let‟s call 
them the group around Thabo [Mbeki], that the new human rights 
thing was quite dangerous. And that‟s why it reverted very quickly to a 
national interest centred approach. In fact, when I think about it now, 
the human rights dimension was carried by very few of us. But we 
were extremely influential because we were writing the document.
98
 
This brings into doubt the extent to which the ANC leadership was committed 
to its well publicised pursuit of a human rights inspired foreign policy after 
1994, and is one supported by Mark Gevisser. He documented Mbeki‟s 
doubts about the pursuit of human rights, believing that Mbeki thought that 
„while such high-minded principles might befit a liberation movement, they 
were entirely impractical for the government of an emerging power, 
struggling to re-enter the global economy‟.99 Gevisser‟s, Hirsch‟s and Vale‟s 
sentiments are illuminating, perhaps offering an explanation for the causes of 
some of post-apartheid South Africa‟s more contradictory policies. This 
assessment indicates that Mbeki amongst others had serious misgivings about 
the new public direction the ANC was pursuing in its foreign policy, even as 
it was being written. It begs the question, why would the ANC leadership 
commit itself to the centrality of human rights in its foreign policy if it did not 
genuinely believe in pursuing it?  
There are several potential explanations for this. One is that the ANC 
had historically declared the primacy of human rights in the Freedom Charter, 
and throughout its exile had emphasised the moral nature of its struggle 
against apartheid. As the Freedom Charter had been the enduring vision for 
the movement during exile it may have been that its leaders believed that they 
could not abandon this principle in the run-up to the first democratic elections, 
especially because of the popularity of such sentiments. It must be kept in 
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mind that in the early 1990s human rights discourse was in the ascendency, 
both internationally and domestically. For example, in the South African 
constitution, which the ANC had a key role in creating, human rights are 
given a prominent position.
100
 It would have been contradictory of the ANC if 
it had pursued a policy of human rights at home, but ignored it in its foreign 
policy.  
During its exile and reaffirmed during the transition, the ANC had 
emphasised that the people of South Africa would have a say in the governing 
of a democratic country, a principle enshrined in the Freedom Charter. By 
including in the task of foreign policy creation a group of South African 
experts, in collaboration with the movement, it allowed the ANC to fulfil, in 
part, this longstanding objective. It did however mean that the ANC 
leadership was not entirely in control of the process of policy formulation. As 
Hirsch and Vale point out, only a few voices within the Foreign Policy 
Working Group promoted this principle, but because those who supported it 
were writing the document, the ANC‟s leaders (particularly Mbeki) had little 
influence over the policy being adopted. This is surprising as Hirsch recalls 
that „the most influential participant was Thabo Mbeki, but I am not sure that 
he always held sway‟. 101  The result was that the human rights aspect of 
foreign policy was in many respects, imposed upon the wider movement. 
Although some of the movement‟s leaders may not have fully agreed with the 
agenda, they could not easily be seen to oppose the prevailing sentiment.  
Yet, the acceptance of human rights as part of its broader foreign 
policy can also be seen as the ANC leadership exploiting the western 
international community. They were fully aware that its commitment to such 
a noble ideal would bring valuable plaudits to the movement and the „new‟ 
South Africa. It is also worth keeping in mind that Mbeki was a wily and 
experienced international politician who had met with western diplomats on a 
number of occasions as the „acceptable face‟ of the ANC during the 1980s. 
Merle Lipton believes that Mbeki may well have agreed to adopt the human 
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rights aspects for political reasons, but in the long-run he never actually 
intended to maintain such policies once in power.
102
 Adam Habib later 
argued, when referring to Mbeki‟s presidency, that his „administration betrays 
characteristics of both appeasement and subversive engagement‟.103 As will 
be developed in the following chapters, such tendencies within the ANC 
leadership became increasingly apparent. What can be observed from this 
episode is that, while the ANC leadership may not have been fully supportive 
of the notion of human rights as a central element of its foreign policy, it was 
willing to submit itself to the consensus view, and take a bold step in this new 
direction.   
This process does however raise important questions about the true 
nature of the ANC in exile, its democratic credentials, and the extent to which 
human rights was fully endorsed within the movement. What is clear is that 
Thabo Mbeki (who played a prominent role in the ANC‟s international 
relations from the 1980s, through to end of his presidency) and his confidants 
were not necessarily in favour of human rights as a leading principle. This 
was to have serious implications for the foreign policy of the ANC after 1994. 
On the eve of the elections, there was already an emerging tension in the 
ANC‟s foreign policy between pragmatism and idealism. Although it was 
willing to publicly pursue this moral stance internationally, the ANC 
leadership also had expressed a need for a pragmatic approach to foreign 
policy. The contradictions which emerged in the ANC-led government‟s 
foreign policy after 1994 were already evident by the end of the transition.          
As „South Africa‟s Future Foreign Policy‟ was being drafted and published, 
South Africa had moved rapidly towards a democratic future. In November 1993, the 
interim South African constitution was approved by delegates to the multiparty 
conference.
104
 As part of the transition, the TEC was established in December, to 
ensure the effective administration of South Africa until the elections; it effectively 
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governed the country from December 1993 until April 1994.
105
 As part of the TEC, 
six sub councils were created to help oversee various state structures, one of which 
was the TEC Sub Council on Foreign Affairs (SCFA). The SCFA played a vital, but 
little studied or understood role in shaping the future foreign policy of the new South 
Africa. The activities, findings, and recommendations of the SCFA will be fully 
explored in Chapter Five, which will also illustrate how the sub council influenced 
the ANC‟s own foreign policy perspectives, and played a pivotal role in shaping 
post-apartheid South Africa‟s initial foreign policy.  
 
Conclusion 
The TEC provided the mechanism for a peaceful transition from apartheid to 
democracy, and the process involved the ANC working closely with various political 
groups in the SCFA. However, there were concerns about the extent of the continuity 
between the „old‟ and the „new‟ in South Africa that occurred because of the 
transition process. Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley argued that the unique 
changes in the international community, the economic leverage of whites, and the 
reconciliatory approach of the ANC, meant that „few ruling groups have ever 
wriggled themselves out of a deadly predicament more elegantly‟. 106  For some 
observers, the association and apparent acceptance of the final recommendations of 
the SCFA by the new ANC government, was criticised for being too closely 
connected and reflective of the old illegitimate order. Graham Evans argued that the 
ANC‟s new approach was „virtually indistinguishable from the overall philosophy 
underpinning van Heerden‟s New Diplomacy‟.107 This was in part because the ANC 
had worked so closely with the DFA, especially during the TEC period. Evans 
concluded „by the time that the new South Africa was established, the ANC‟s 
Department of International Affairs, at the highest level at least, was working in 
harness with the DFA. There was therefore no discernable break with the immediate 
past‟.108 Evans‟s assessment is correct in many respects. Both the ANC and the NP‟s 
previous foreign policy perspectives were profoundly shaped by the international 
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circumstances in the post-Cold War era, and each was forced to react rapidly to the 
changed environment they found themselves in. Steven Friedman insisted it was 
„influence and pressure from abroad which began the negotiation process; throughout 
it, the protagonists continued to bargain with one eye on the foreign audience‟.109 
Chapter Five will thus explore more fully the extent to which the old order, in close 
cooperation with the international community, „captured‟ the „new‟ South Africa‟s 
foreign policy. The revelation that Mandela did not write or contribute to the Foreign 
Affairs article to which the ANC put his name, and that other foreign policy 
documents had been largely created outside of the ANC‟s leadership control, raises a 
number of important questions. Do these public announcements really represent the 
„true‟ nature of ANC foreign policy and did the ANC leadership (let alone its 
membership) ever „own‟ its foreign policy?  
In fact, one of the most remarkable aspects of the transition is the extent to 
which the ANC successfully adapted to the immense global changes. After its initial 
problems in coming to terms with the situation that faced them in 1990, the ANC‟s 
foreign policy gradually evolved throughout the transition. By April 1994, certain 
aspects of the ANC‟s foreign policy may have mirrored the NP‟s initiatives, but 
these were eminently pragmatic options reflecting the movement‟s understanding 
and perceptions of South Africa‟s interest. It would perhaps have been foolhardy for 
the ANC to have pursued anything radically different from that of the international 
mainstream. Yet, the transition witnessed the ANC making some bold and distinctive 
assertions in its foreign policy. Most notable was its focus on human rights, which 
became the central tenet of its foreign policy. No matter what may have occurred to 
this policy after taking power and what might be seen in hindsight as its naivety, this 
was a noble ideal for the movement to pursue, and one which few others would have 
dared to embrace. By embarking on this policy the ANC showed that it was willing 
to lead South Africa into a new era under the guiding light of a moralistic foreign 
policy. The challenge the ANC faced was how best to implement its new foreign 
policy ideals in an unforgiving world.          
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Chapter Five 
The Sub Council on Foreign Affairs (SCFA) of the Transitional 
Executive Council (TEC): The effects on the ANC’s post-apartheid 
South African Foreign Policy 
 
As part of South Africa‟s transition to majority rule, the formation of the 
Transitional Executive Council (TEC) was the clearest signal of intent by the various 
parties involved that a negotiated end to apartheid could finally be reached. Months 
of negotiations between the apartheid government and the different political parties 
culminated in the TEC being established. Enacted in law by State President F.W. De 
Klerk on the 27 October 1993, the Transitional Executive Council Act was passed 
„with a view to promoting the preparation for and transition to a democratic order in 
South Africa‟.1 The cross-party TEC, made up of nineteen of the political parties 
involved in the negotiation process (with the notable exceptions of the Freedom 
Alliance and the PAC), was tasked to lead South Africa during the last few months 
before the April 1994 elections. The TEC‟s main focus was on South Africa‟s 
domestic transition to democracy. It nonetheless had a vital role (but one neglected 
by researchers) in the future direction of South Africa‟s foreign policy. This chapter 
will explore how the TEC, and more importantly the activities of its Sub Council on 
Foreign Affairs (SCFA), played a decisive but historically marginalised part in 
shaping the country‟s international relations in the context of the „new world order‟ 
of the early 1990s, which in many crucial ways negated and undermined the ANC‟s 
post-apartheid vision for South Africa‟s foreign policy.  
Chapter Four highlighted that a vast literature had been generated on South 
Africa‟s transition. A number of key topics have been well researched, such as the 
intrigues within the negotiation process, the violence which ravaged many parts of 
the country, and the clashes of ideas between the NP and the ANC. However, the 
same cannot be said of the TEC, and even more so of the activities of its composite 
sub councils. Despite playing a significant role during the latter stages of the 
transition, the TEC and the SCFA have been largely neglected in the historiography. 
Steven Friedman‟s two edited collections on the negotiated settlement are rare 
                                               
1 Act No. 151 of 1993: Transitional Executive Council Act, 27th October 1993, 
http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=88467 (17/6/2010). 
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exceptions, yet even within these, the coverage of the TEC and SCFA are not central 
topics.
2
 The TEC is rarely mentioned in the literature, more often than not being 
completely ignored and there is currently only one publication which examines the 
role of the SCFA.
3
 The following examples briefly illustrate the extent of this neglect. 
Patrick Bond, in the book Elite Transition, gives only passing mention of the TEC, 
with the only reference being a direct quote from a newspaper article.
4
 In Anatomy of 
a Miracle, Patti Waldmier, who is sceptical about the supposed „miracle‟ transition, 
describes the creation of the TEC in a few paragraphs, detailing merely how this new 
stage in the transition affected the political power of De Klerk.
5
 Hein Marais refers to 
the TEC only once in his main narrative, as well as in several footnotes which 
contain scant additional information.
6
 Numerous other studies of the period neglect 
the TEC or provide very little coverage of what it entailed.
7
  
There are a number of possible explanations why the story of the SCFA has 
been overlooked or omitted from the historiography. First, it is important to recall the 
importance of South Africa‟s transition, both domestically and internationally. The 
term „miraculous‟ has been frequently used to describe this momentous event in 
South African history, an indication of the various interpretations of the transition. 
As the negotiations unfolded and the elections loomed, the attention of the media and 
the academic world was on the dramatic domestic political transformation. The 
Financial Times described the events as „one of the most extraordinary political 
transformations of the twentieth century‟.8 Whilst it is evident that many important 
people, including politicians, civil servants, journalists, and academics in South 
Africa and abroad were aware of the SCFA and its activities during the transition, in 
the excitement of the election period and with the inauguration of the new 
                                               
2 S. Friedman and D. Atkinson (eds.), South African Review 7: The Small Miracle. South Africa’s 
negotiated settlement (Johannesburg, 1994); S. Friedman (ed.), The Long Journey: South Africa’s 
quest for a negotiated settlement (Johannesburg, 1993).  
3 M. Graham, ‘Coming in from the cold: The Transitional Executive Council and South Africa’s 
reintegration into the international community’, Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 
49 (2011), pp. 359-379. 
4 P. Bond, Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa (London, 2000), p. 179. 
5 P. Waldmeir, Anatomy of a Miracle: The end of apartheid and the birth of the new South Africa 
(New Brunswick, 1998), pp. 212-13. 
6 H. Marais, South Africa: Limits to Change (London, 2001), p. 104.  
7 For example: C. Landsberg, G. Pere, and A. van Nieuwkerk (eds.), Mission Imperfect: Redirecting 
South Africa’s Foreign Policy (Johannesburg, 1995); C. Landsberg, The Quiet Diplomacy of 
Liberation: International politics and South Africa's transition (Johannesburg, 2004); R. Spitz and M. 
Chaskalson, The Politics of Transition: A Hidden History of South Africa’s Negotiated Settlement 
(Oxford, 2000).  
8 Financial Times (FT), 18 July 1994. 
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government, it would appear that most of the important work of the sub council went 
unnoticed and has since been forgotten. Secondly, because the TEC lasted for only 
five months, its short lifespan may have been equated to an apparent lack of 
importance. Finally, the South African Foreign Affairs Archive in Pretoria has a 
twenty-year embargo on declassifying documentation on the SCFA. This provides an 
obstacle preventing research into the government‟s activities during the transition.  
Nevertheless, what makes this glaring omission in the historiography even 
more surprising is that the SCFA had profound ramifications for South African 
foreign policy after April 1994. The previous chapter argues that during the four 
years of South Africa‟s transition, the ANC had never been in full control of the 
formulation of its foreign policy. It was argued that this lack of ownership had 
potentially serious implications for the subsequent ANC-led post-apartheid 
government‟s foreign policy. However, another, and potentially more decisive factor 
that significantly affected the new government‟s foreign policy was the activities of 
the SCFA. While being extremely important, it is in many ways an untold story. This 
chapter utilises newly available documentation of the SCFA housed at the South 
African Historical Archive at the University of Witwatersrand, the personal papers of 
a DFA civil servant, as well as interviews, to explore the ways in which the SCFA 
played a significant role in transforming, influencing and directing the foreign policy 
of the post-apartheid government.    
 
The Multiparty Negotiation Process and the Transitional Executive Council 
Before a thorough analysis of the SCFA can be undertaken, it is necessary to 
provide some context to the formation of the TEC and its sub councils. South 
Africa‟s transition went through a number of evolutionary phases before the April 
1994 elections. In December 1991, the negotiation process in South Africa had been 
embodied by the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA). However, 
by May 1992, CODESA had begun to break down, in part due to the intransigence of 
the various political parties, and also because of their widely differing visions for the 
future of South Africa. The Boipatong Massacre on 17 June 1992, „precipitated the 
irreversible collapse of the Codesa talks‟ bringing South Africa‟s transitionary talks 
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to a halt.
9
 However, both the NP and the ANC faced domestic, and more importantly, 
international pressures to resume negotiations. In August 1992, bilateral talks 
resumed between the two parties, represented by Roelf Meyer, Minister of 
Constitutional Development and Cyril Ramaphosa, Secretary General of the African 
National Congress. The meetings entailed discussions with a view to remove 
obstacles towards the resumption of negotiations; these talks culminated in the 
„Record of Understanding‟ being signed on the 26 September 1992.10 There were 
several vital aspects to the „Record of Understanding‟. Primarily, it provided a 
binding agreement for a constitution to be drafted and adopted, and secondly, 
established that a transitional interim government (along with various accompanying 
structures), would be created to oversee the transition.
11
 This agreement between the 
NP and the ANC, was Richard Spitz rightly argues, „a turning point in political 
negotiations. It set broad terms for the negotiated transition from which subsequent 
talks never departed‟.12    
After the „Record of Understanding‟ was signed, subsequent negotiations 
resulted in the formation of the Multiparty Negotiating Process (MPNP) to facilitate 
the essential discussions towards the transition. Bringing together the previously 
bitterly opposed parties, the MPNP demonstrated that a compromise could finally be 
reached to bring about a democratic solution for South Africa. On 5-6 March 1993, a 
multiparty planning conference took place at the World Trade Centre, in Kempton 
Park, where the parties were tasked with setting a date for the resumption of formal 
negotiations.
13
 Appreciating the need for swift and decisive action to overcome the 
impasse, the delegates agreed that the MPNP would first convene on the 1 April 
1993.
14
 Between April and November 1993, delegates to the MPNP regularly met to 
debate and finalise issues which ranged from plans for the South African constitution 
to arrangements for the future elections. The MPNP was supported in its task by 
                                               
9 Spitz and Chaskalson, Transition, pp. 27-28.  
10 „Record of Understanding‟, Meeting between the State President of the Republic of South Africa 
and the President of the African National Congress Held at the World Trade Centre on the 26 
September 1992, http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=4206&t=Transition%20to%20Democracy 
(6/7/2010). 
11 Ibid.  
12 Spitz and Chaskalson, Transition, p. 30. 
13 D. Atkinson, „Brokering a miracle?: The multiparty negotiating forum‟, in S. Friedman and D. 
Atkinson (eds.), South African Review 7: The Small Miracle. South Africa’s negotiated settlement 
(Johannesburg, 1994), pp. 21-23. 
14 Spitz and Chaskalson, Transition, pp. 34-36. 
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various Technical Committees and Commissions, which as Spitz argues „was a 
fundamental departure from the structuring of the Codesa process: its importance 
cannot be overstated‟.15 A key lesson learnt from CODESA was that large gatherings 
of politically opposed parties would never be able to reach agreements, or even 
compromise. Therefore, the process was organised in such a way that the MPNP 
comprised a number of small working groups that would regularly meet to discuss 
specifically assigned issues, making it easier to make decisions.
16
 This is crucial as 
the model of establishing smaller working groups provides the entire basis and 
justification for the formation of the TEC and the SCFA. These recommendations 
were subsequently presented to the Negotiating Committee of the MPNP for further 
debate, and then later to the plenary for ratification. One such committee was the 
Technical Committee on the Transitional Executive Council, and it was ultimately 
through its deliberations that the TEC was created.  
The „First Report of the Technical Committee on the Transitional Executive 
Council of the MPNP‟ dated the 13 May 1993, set out the reasoning for a 
Transitional Executive Council for South Africa. It suggested that there was a need 
for transparency, legitimacy and stability in order to foster free and fair elections and 
inspire international confidence in the electoral process.
17
 The MPNP fully 
appreciated the role the international community would play during the transition, 
and thus its recommendations attempted in part to appease its fears and instil it with 
confidence in the process. The Technical Committee proposed that as part of the 
TEC there should be several sub councils, each of which was „to be a small and 
effective working group‟ that would engage with issues on a daily basis.18 Another 
key recommendation tabled was that „the Transitional Executive Council shall be 
constituted with executive powers to facilitate, in conjunction with existing 
legislative and executive structures, the transition to a democratic order‟, with the 
primary aim of levelling the political playing field between all the parties involved in 
the MPNP before April 1994.
19
 The report also identified several questions that 
required further investigation, predominantly regarding the power that the TEC could 
                                               
15 Ibid., p. 48.  
16 Atkinson, „Miracle‟, p. 24.  
17 First Report of the Technical Committee on the Transitional Executive Council 13 May 1993, 
http://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02039/04lv02046/05lv02097/06lv02100.
htm (2/7/2010). 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
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wield.
20
 These matters were left to be discussed in greater depth during the course of 
the negotiations. The report did not provide significant detail concerning the exact 
nature of what the TEC or the sub councils would entail, as these would be worked 
out in due course. However, even at this early stage in the proceedings, it 
demonstrates that the negotiators regarded the creation of sub councils as a vital 
mechanism to ensure a peaceful and successful transition.  
Between May and October 1993, members of the MPNP met to resolve the 
questions posed in the First Report of the Technical Committee and to add further 
detail to the tentative points raised. In doing so, they laid the groundwork for what 
would later become the TEC. These recommendations subsequently became law, 
enshrined in the TEC Act signed by De Klerk in October 1993. The forty-two page 
TEC Act outlined the purposes, role and objectives of the TEC, and more 
importantly for this chapter, its sub councils.
21
  
  
The formation and significance of the Transitional Executive Council 
The TEC had no precedent in history and was an innovative means of 
attempting to solve the situation in South Africa. The TEC was even more 
remarkable in the way in which it successfully bound the political parties towards the 
common goal of a peaceful and democratic transition. The transitional body was 
composed of the TEC, a Management Committee, and eight sub councils which 
reported their findings back to the TEC. Each of the political parties that had adhered 
to the MPNP principles were allowed two representatives on the TEC in order to 
prevent the process being dominated by the NP or the ANC.
22
 The Management 
Committee was composed of by members from the TEC, who would meet before the 
general TEC meeting to set the agenda and review the activities of the sub councils.  
However, the uniqueness of the TEC was reinforced by the fact that it was 
served by eight sub councils, which mirrored the departments of an elected 
government. The sub councils that constituted the TEC were: Regional and Local 
                                               
20 Ibid. 
21 Act No. 151 of 1993: Transitional Executive Council Act, 27th October 1993, 
http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=88467 (17/6/2010). 
22 South African History Archive (hereafter SAHA), William Cullen Library, University of 
Witwatersrand, John Barratt Collection, AL3081, A1.7.14. 
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Government and Traditional Authorities; Law and Order; Stability and Security; 
Defence; Finance; Foreign Affairs; the Status of Women; and Intelligence.
23
 Each 
sub council consisted of six or eight members nominated by their respective parties, 
ranging from apartheid era politicians to African liberation activists; the breadth of 
representation aimed to address the racial and political divisions in South Africa. In 
order to maintain this balance, no party was allowed to have more than one member 
on each sub council.
24
 Informed by the experience of the MPNP, these small sub 
councils were regarded as the best way of reaching a consensus. Also, because they 
closely mirrored the governmental departments, the sub councils were able to liaise 
closely with relevant civil servants to access their expertise and opinions. For the 
story of the SCFA and post-apartheid South African foreign policy, the close 
cooperation with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) was to prove crucial to its 
outcome. 
During its lifespan, the TEC and the sub councils were bestowed with 
significant legislative powers which impacted on the activities of the government, its 
civil servants and Departments. First, there was a supervisory role assigned to the 
TEC to „ensure that no Government or administration exercises any of its powers in 
such a way as to advantage or prejudice any political party‟.25 This article provided 
the TEC with the ability to implement and enforce the stated goal of levelling the 
political playing field before the elections. More importantly the TEC had been 
granted the authority to override and block government activity. The TEC Act stated:     
Each Government and administration shall keep the Council 
informed of and shall provide it with copies of all of its proposed 
legislation, including regulations, by-laws and other subordinate 
legislation, which have a bearing on the objects of the Council. If 
the Council or the subcouncil concerned has reason to believe that 
any proposed legislation of any Government or administration is 
likely to have an adverse effect on the attainment of the objects of 
the Council, it may, after affording the Government or 
administration concerned an opportunity to make representations to 
the Council or the subcouncil concerned, and subject to the other 
provisions of this Act, direct that Government or administration in 
writing not to proceed with the legislation concerned, and that 
                                               
23 TEC Act 1993, http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=88467 (17/6/10). 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
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Government or administration shall, subject to section 23, comply 
with such direction.
26
 
 
The clause meant that, even though the NP was still technically in control of the 
bureaucratic machinery of South Africa, its decision-making was subject to the 
endorsement of the TEC. Any government Department that wanted to accomplish a 
specific task would have to seek the approval of either the TEC or the appropriate 
sub council before it could be implemented.
27
 A former senior civil servant in the 
DFA, former diplomat, and liaison officer to the SCFA, Tom Wheeler recalled that 
„it was very important to get their [SCFA] endorsement for anything that the 
Department wanted to do… the government continued, subject to endorsement‟.28 
Indeed, in certain circumstances, the activities, influence, and power of government 
could effectively be overridden by the TEC and its sub councils. According to Ivor 
Sarakinsky, the SCFA was able to prevent the NP from „projecting its interests 
abroad as those of the country‟.29 The Star newspaper, in its analysis of the TEC and 
its role during the transition, noted at the time that „on paper, the TEC, and sub-
councils do, therefore, have powers that could be significant and will be binding‟.30 
This ability to prevent unfavourable legislation being passed was a powerful tool for 
the TEC, and it was one which the civil service clearly recognised. While the exact 
nature of the TEC and its powers was contested by some of the political parties 
involved, it essentially became South Africa‟s de facto government during the last 
five months before the elections in April 1994. 
 In spite of certain aspects of the TEC‟s authority being questioned, there were 
minimal protests from the NP, as it had willingly ceded its authority as South 
Africa‟s government to the TEC. This was crucial in ensuring that the transition 
proceeded smoothly. It demonstrated the goodwill of the governing party to the other 
political parties involved in the negotiations. The powers of the TEC had a 
                                               
26 Ibid. 
27 For example, if the DFA wanted to send a delegation to an international conference, they would 
first have to seek the approval of the SCFA. Some examples of the DFA‟s requests to send conference 
delegations include: the Symposium on Conflict Management in Africa in Cairo; the World Health 
Organisation Conference; and the 30th International Conference of Military Medicine: SAHA, John 
Barratt Collection, AL3081, A1.6.54, A1.7.23, and A1.7.25. 
28 Interview with Tom Wheeler, Johannesburg, 31 March 2010. 
29 I. Sarakinsky, „Rehearsing joint rule: The Transitional Executive Council‟, in S. Friedman and D. 
Atkinson (eds.), South Africa Review 7: The Small Miracle. South Africa’s negotiated settlement 
(Johannesburg, 1994), p. 78.   
30 The Star, 10 September 1993. 
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significant bearing on the course of the SCFA and on South Africa‟s future foreign 
policy (see below). An important caveat is that the SCFA did not have a mandate to 
formulate foreign policy itself; it was only a bridge to future policy formulation by 
the Government of National Unity (GNU).
31
 Nevertheless the SCFA was highly 
influential; whilst the DFA fully appreciated the influence it could wield over its 
activities, it was forced to work closely with the sub council in order to advance its 
own agenda. To influence the decision-making of the SCFA, the DFA did its utmost 
to control, direct and shape the activities of the sub council and therefore South 
Africa‟s future foreign policy. This chapter will elaborate on this aspect of the SCFA 
in greater depth.   
 
The Sub Council on Foreign Affairs 
The role of the SCFA as set out in the TEC Act was to attain the broadest 
possible consensus on matters affecting South African international interests. To do 
so, the sub council was tasked with discussing and securing appropriate agreements 
with the international community that would benefit the future government, and 
provide it with the information necessary to act as a basis for its foreign policy. The 
SCFA‟s activities were to culminate in May 1994 with a set of proposals, 
recommendations, and agreements for the new government. In doing so, the SCFA‟s 
activities were supposed to enable the new government to „hit the ground running‟. 
The mandate of the SCFA set out in the TEC Act was as follows: 
 
The Council shall, for the purpose of attaining its objects, through 
its Subcouncil on Foreign Affairs, in regard to foreign policy liaise, 
monitor, make recommendations and, where it is considered 
necessary, assist with a view to- 
 
(a) achieving progressively the broadest possible consensus on 
matters affecting South Africa's international interests, particularly 
its long-term interests; 
(b) securing appropriate agreements with the international 
community regarding the contribution that community could make 
to the peaceful transition to democracy in South Africa; 
(c) in consultation with the Subcouncil on Finance, securing such 
international assistance as the Subcouncil considers necessary in 
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order to address the socio-economic needs of the people as a whole 
and not to serve the interests of one or other political party; 
(d) ensuring that any foreign policy initiative benefits the country 
as a whole and not one or other political party; and 
(e) promoting such international relations, including trade, finance, 
culture and sport relations, as in the opinion of the Subcouncil will 
benefit the country as a whole.
32
 
 
The emphasis on ensuring that foreign policy benefited South Africa, not individuals 
or political parties, reflected the fact that, even at this late stage in the transition, 
there was still widespread concern that one of the political parties would seek to 
manipulate the TEC in its own interests. As this chapter will suggest, the process was 
indeed subverted; this however was not achieved by a political party, but instead a 
government department, namely the DFA. The mandate also specifically identified 
the financial relations that the sub council could promote, via its activities. With the 
western international community‟s primary focus on economic relations, pursuing 
such links was to become a vital aspect of the SCFA‟s work.  
The individual members who were nominated to the SCFA were John Barratt 
(Democratic Party), Aziz Pahad (ANC), Leon Wessels (National Party), Stella 
Sigcau (Cape Traditional Leaders), Godfrey Hetisani (Ximoko Progressive Party), 
and Ossie Gannie (National People‟s Party).33 All were political representatives of 
their respective parties except Barratt; despite being nominated by the Democratic 
Party, Barratt was not actually a member of it. Instead, Barratt, the National Director 
of the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), was appointed as a 
foreign affairs expert, whilst the others, had been selected for party political reasons 
(although, both Pahad and Wessels did also have significant foreign policy 
experience).
34
 The sub council agreed to meet at regular intervals, both in South 
Africa and abroad, with the chairmanship of meetings rotating amongst the six 
members on an alphabetical basis in order to avoid accusations of political or racial 
bias. All its decisions had to be reached through voting by its members, with each 
resolution requiring a two-thirds majority to be approved.
35
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33 SAHA, John Barratt Collection, AL3081, A2.4. 
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The first meeting of the SCFA took place in Cape Town on 22 December 
1993, which was attended by all six members. The sub council invited to this 
meeting the South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha, the DFA‟s Director General 
Rusty Evans and its three deputy Director Generals Jeremy Shearer, Derek Auret, 
and Albert Van Niekerk.
36
 This roll call of high ranking DFA attendees indicates 
how seriously the Department took the activities of the SCFA. The discussions were 
held in a „positive and relaxed atmosphere‟ in which those present outlined the task 
of the SCFA.
37
 The meeting also gave the DFA its first opportunity to clarify how 
the relationship between the Department, the TEC and the SCFA would work in 
practice.
38
   
Foreign Minister Botha addressed the assembled members during a working 
lunch, where he expanded on many of the themes that were outlined in the TEC Act. 
Botha insisted that the country‟s „international relations should be apolitical and that 
we should have a non-partisan foreign policy‟, adding that „in the field of foreign 
relations we should not allow internal political differences to weaken the 
solidarity‟.39 Botha instructed the sub council to subsume its political differences so 
as to benefit the whole country and not those of one party, so they should try as much 
as possible to relegate „their party political aspirations to the background‟. 40 The 
SCFA members were able to achieve this with considerable ease. As Wheeler 
suggests, the TEC process allowed DFA officials and the members of the sub council, 
who came from diverse political and social backgrounds, to engage with one another 
on both a professional and social level. It meant that, in Wheeler‟s words, „they 
weren‟t sort of a strange bunch of people who were… a threat to us‟.41 This enabled 
the DFA and SCFA to make significant progress with the task in hand.  
 The strength of this emerging relationship was powerfully demonstrated in 
Singapore during one of the SCFA‟s many foreign visits, on which it was 
accompanied by DFA officials. During the visit, all the delegates embarked on a 
                                               
36 SAHA, John Barratt Collection, AL3081, A1.6.5. 
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cruise around Singapore harbour, which ended in a shared evening of karaoke.
42
 A 
published report of the visit, which detailed the events of the evening‟s entertainment, 
claimed that those present, had through the power of song, „set about nation[s] 
building‟. 43  This event reveals the growing personal ties that were being forged 
during the short period of the SCFA‟s existence, and indicates how the members of 
the sub council and the DFA had indeed been able to put aside their political 
differences. The close working relationship developed into a social relationship, and 
in due course they became „drinking partners‟.44 Having previously approached each 
other with political caution, in a few months of close work and extensive travelling 
together, they discovered significant common ground between them. According to 
Wheeler, this particularly paid off in the case of Aziz Pahad, who was appointed as 
Deputy Minister of the Department after the elections.
45
 The sub council provided an 
important way in which the old and new administrations began the process of 
integration. It meant that on his appointment, Pahad already knew many of the 
people serving him (such as the Director General Rusty Evans), and the internal 
workings of the DFA. Pahad‟s role in the SCFA enabled him to begin work with full 
working knowledge of the issues at hand, due to the part he had played in 
formulating the recommendations for South Africa‟s foreign policy. 
As already noted from the opening meeting, senior DFA officials took a keen 
and pro-active interest in the activities of the SCFA. Moreover, the report of the 
meeting describes the DFA‟s presentation to the SCFA. The presentation by the 
Director General, Evans, set out the DFA‟s initiatives during the transition, before 
the TEC had come into existence. Furthermore, the DFA had already put a liaison 
officer in place to provide information to the sub council; Evans also offered the 
SCFA free use of its offices and conference facilities in the Union Building.
46
 The 
DFA had the facilities, knowledge, contacts and experience to initiate the members 
of the SCFA into the world of foreign relations. By providing such extensive 
assistance, the DFA was fulfilling the mandate of the TEC and adhering to the 
recommendations of Pik Botha. In fact, Wheeler believed that „it was an interactive 
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43 Ibid. 
44 Interview with Tom Wheeler, Johannesburg, 31 March 2010. 
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process… There was no hostility mutually between us; we worked very well with 
them... And so it was useful to the old government until the change came, to have 
this body that would legitimise what they were doing‟.47  
Although the DFA was compelled to act in accordance with the TEC, the 
Department did its utmost to influence the findings of the SCFA. The DFA‟s 
implementation of foreign policy since 1990 had gone through various phases, with 
the main focus being breaking South Africa‟s isolation and reintegrating the country 
back into the international community (see Chapter Four). In many respects, the NP 
and the DFA in tandem had been successful in improving South Africa‟s 
international standing, especially through its wholehearted embrace of fashionable 
neo-liberal ideals. Deon Geldenhuys recalls Pik Botha arguing at this time that „as far 
as foreign policy is concerned, South Africa, or at least the out-going government, 
more or less handed the world on a platter to the ANC, with so many links, formal 
links… established‟.48  
What made the SCFA potentially powerful was that it could nullify the policy 
formulations of both the ANC and the NP. The SCFA‟s final foreign policy 
recommendations were supposed to benefit the whole nation and not one political 
entity. As a cross-party body, the sub council was empowered to reach agreements 
with other countries and multilateral organisations. It would then be virtually 
impossible for the incoming GNU to rescind these agreements without severely 
damaging South Africa‟s international reputation. With only a matter of months until 
the elections, the ANC as a movement was still largely committed to its relatively 
„radical‟ international outlook. However, the DFA was loath to see its efforts at 
reintegration with the western dominated international community destroyed by what 
it regarded as inexperienced politicians. Having recognised the authority of the sub 
council to shape the future direction of South African foreign policy, the DFA did its 
utmost to monitor and influence its activities, in accordance with its own 
international perspectives. The following section explores how the DFA went about 
achieving this goal. 
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The Department of Foreign Affairs and its influence over the SCFA 
 In order to fulfil the mandate set out by the TEC, the SCFA reviewed the 
options available for South Africa‟s future foreign policy direction. However, there 
were major challenges in meeting this objective. Primarily, the sheer scale of the task 
was staggering. The SCFA had to pass judgement on a wide range of issues, 
including regional political concerns in every corner of the globe, trade agreements, 
and South Africa‟s reintegration into multilateral organisations like SADC or the 
Commonwealth.
49
 The second problem was one of time. The SCFA had only five 
months to complete its review and put in place recommendations for the GNU. A 
further difficulty was the extent of foreign policy experience within the SCFA 
membership. In the sub council, Barratt, Wessels and Pahad all had previous working 
knowledge of foreign affairs: Barratt was the national director of SAIIA; Wessels 
had been South Africa‟s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs; and Pahad served in the 
ANC‟s Department of International Affairs during exile. Whilst these three were 
extremely knowledgeable on foreign policy issues, the same could not be said of the 
others. In order that these three did not dominate proceedings, the other members of 
the SCFA required substantial assistance in rapidly raising their proficiency in 
international relations to an adequate standard, especially within such a tight deadline. 
In light of this, the SCFA faced a daunting undertaking. 
 The issues raised above were not insurmountable, but could have seriously 
impinged on the impact and quality of the SCFA‟s work. The DFA positioned itself 
as the solution to these problems. The DFA had all the tools necessary to formulate 
and conduct foreign policy, and was therefore in the ideal position to assist the SCFA 
in its work. Through a range of means, including organising conferences and foreign 
visits, providing links to the international community, and supplying reports and 
findings, the DFA provided substantial support to the SCFA. In fact, the DFA 
organised many aspects of the SCFA‟s activities during its lifespan, providing it with 
an extraordinary degree of control over the whole process. The remainder of this 
chapter will explore the various activities of the SCFA, providing an illustration of 
how the DFA could and did influence its outcomes and, ultimately, South Africa‟s 
new post-apartheid foreign policy. 
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The DFA had successfully secured the right to observe the activities of the 
sub council. Its Director General Rusty Evans ensured from the very start of the 
process that at every working meeting of the SCFA at least one member of DFA staff 
would be present to observe its deliberations.
50
 The exact role of these civil servants 
in the SCFA‟s meetings remains unclear, but it can be safely assumed that the minute 
details of the SCFA‟s discussions were relayed back to the senior officials of the 
DFA. The active participation of the DFA in the SCFA‟s work did not go unnoticed 
by the TEC. In a memorandum dated 5 March 1994, the TEC‟s Management 
Committee took the sub council to task about this relationship stating: „we also note 
that the Department of Foreign Affairs attends all the meetings of the Sub-council. 
We are of the view that this is against the spirit of the Act [Transitional Executive 
Council Act]. We are therefore of the view that the Department should attend the 
meeting only when summoned‟. 51 The memorandum signalled that the TEC was 
concerned about the role and conduct of the DFA in the work of the SCFA. However, 
it is striking that the TEC was unable to stop the DFA‟s continued participation in the 
activities of the sub council. The protest from the Management Committee appears to 
have been ignored, as the minutes of all the SCFA‟s subsequent meetings until the 
election show that the DFA continued to be present.
52
 What the memorandum does 
aptly demonstrate is that there were (justifiable) concerns about the sub council‟s 
independence and the DFA‟s interference.   
 One way in which the DFA influenced the thinking of the SCFA was 
through the flow and provision of information. The SCFA members would regularly 
request information and advice from the DFA on a wide spectrum of foreign policy 
matters as a means of assisting them in reaching conclusions. The DFA was eager to 
oblige, and did so in a variety of formats, particularly reports and documents.
53
 Due 
to the immense scope of foreign policy, the SCFA could not have been expected to 
acquire extensive insights into the various strands that constitute international affairs. 
To overcome this, the specific desks of the DFA would commission reports from 
appropriate civil servants and ambassadors, detailing the problems, options and their 
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recommendations for South Africa‟s foreign policy. This process is illustrated by an 
in-depth report entitled „The Directorate: Africa Multilateral‟.54 The dossier, created 
by the African and Middle East Desk of the DFA, analyses what South Africa‟s 
foreign policy towards the continent should entail after 1994. In doing so, it 
categorises every African nation in order of importance, describing the nature and 
substance of current relations, potential future relations, the significance of that 
country to South Africa and a recommended approach.
55
 The main focus of this 
report is Southern Africa, as at that time both the ANC and NP‟s foreign policy 
statements emphasised the importance of the region to South Africa after the 
elections. As a means of familiarisation with the intricacies of South Africa‟s foreign 
relations with the continent, and more importantly its neighbours, this report was of 
immense potential value to the SCFA. The reports and documents created by the 
DFA covering an array of issues were clearly a useful tool for the members of the 
sub council as they neatly synthesised often complex issues, providing them with 
important details and policy options.  
However, despite the obvious benefits of the DFA‟s provision of information, 
there was equally a potential drawback. As the DFA created the documentation, it 
was clearly in control of the flow and content of information sent to the sub council. 
This is not to claim that the SCFA‟s members did not have access to other sources of 
information concerning foreign policy, but that provided by the DFA was probably 
the most influential component. Wheeler describes the various DFA reports as 
having been „drafted by the desks, the appropriate desks in the Department, perhaps 
at the request of the TEC, or perhaps to guide the way the TEC thought‟.56 The final 
part of the quote reveals exactly what the DFA was trying to achieve. The creation 
and use of reports by the DFA enabled civil servants to highlight the areas of concern 
that they deemed as most important to South Africa, and diminish the significance of 
other options. By creating these reports such as the one above, they could supply the 
„appropriate‟ information as a means of influencing the sub council. As detailed in 
the TEC Act, the sub councils were supposed to be an independent body, free from 
the old government structures, to enable them to establish a new approach for the 
future. However, it is clear that this process was being manipulated by the civil 
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servants of the DFA, to guide the SCFA in a direction more akin to their own 
international outlook. 
As noted, the SCFA embarked upon a series of overseas trips to meet with 
various individuals and organisations. To provide the sub council with the greatest 
opportunity to broaden its foreign policy perspectives, its members were subject to a 
gruelling schedule of meetings, presentations and visits during the five months of its 
existence, as countries, politicians and organisations from across the world 
enthusiastically sought to be seen playing their part in South Africa‟s miraculous 
transition.
57
 During three separate trips, the SCFA, accompanied by civil servants 
from the DFA were sent to: 1) New York, Washington and London, 4 - 12 February; 
2) Nairobi and Addis Ababa, 18-22 February; and 3) Paris, Brussels, The Hague, 
Geneva, Singapore, Kula Lumpur, Seoul and Tokyo, 16 March – 2 April.58 All the 
SCFA‟s visits were meticulously organised by the DFA, which had set up meetings 
with South African ambassadors, high ranking politicians from some of the world‟s 
most powerful nations, and representatives of multilateral organisations. The 
international visits had several purposes, which to varying degrees, and in different 
ways, benefited the DFA, the sub council, and the wider international community. 
More importantly for South Africa, the meetings abroad provided the opportunity to 
inform a broad spectrum of global leaders about the evolving situation in the country, 
and how the international community‟s continued support could enhance the positive 
steps that had already been made. By providing assurances in person about the 
progress that had been made, such meetings also instilled confidence in these 
important stakeholders.  
While the international visits played a vital role during the five months of the 
SCFA, the idea for them originated from rather more pragmatic intentions. As soon 
as the formation of the TEC had been announced, the DFA‟s Director General, Evans, 
arranged a high level meeting of his senior officials. It transpires that he was less 
than enthusiastic about the prospect of the SCFA dictating the future course of South 
Africa‟s foreign policy. Wheeler recalls that as soon as the implementation of the sub 
councils was announced, Evans brought the DFA‟s Chief Directors together to 
discuss the situation: 
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we are now stuck with this TEC business, and we need to keep 
them out of our hair, I think what we should do is take them on a 
tour of the world... It was to keep them out of our way, so we could 
get on with our business. It was a misreading of how things were 
going to develop, but that was… how he [Evans] saw it.59    
Despite this initial disquiet amongst the Department‟s senior officials, the tours 
proved very beneficial to them, and arguably for the SCFA. As well as being an 
opportunity for meeting the international community, the overseas visits gave the sub 
council an insight into the day-to-day workings of the DFA. During the three visits, 
the SCFA met South Africa‟s ambassadors in different countries and organisations,  
as well as participating in planning conferences. For example, during the SCFA‟s 
visit to New York in February 1994, its members met with the Ambassador VRW 
Steward, while in the same month they participated in a Foreign Affairs Planning 
Conference in Nairobi.
60
 The SCFA‟s meetings with the DFA‟s overseas staff 
usually took the form of short presentations from the Chief Directors of the 
appropriate desks on specific topics, followed by round table discussions to facilitate 
decision making.
61
 Such occasions ensured that the SCFA was fully briefed „on 
current and important issues‟ that were of significance to South Africa by people 
actively engaged in pursing foreign policy objectives.
62
    
At some of the DFA-arranged meetings and conferences, the ANC‟s External 
Heads of Missions were invited, giving them the opportunity to meet with DFA 
officials and ambassadors, allowing the civil servants to offer ANC representatives 
their perspectives on foreign policy concerns. The SCFA documents state that the 
Planning Conference held in Nairobi „was the first opportunity ever for the ANC 
Representatives to jointly meet with their counterparts in South Africa‟.63 Likewise 
the tours of Europe and Asia provided similar opportunities for the SCFA, ANC and 
DFA operatives to work together at planning conferences.
64
 These played a crucial 
role in the assimilation process. By bringing the different parties together, it provided 
another opportunity for the representatives to put aside their differences, and discuss 
the future direction of South Africa‟s foreign policy.  
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However, there still appeared to be a degree of apprehension about the 
overseas meetings within the DFA, specifically regarding the prospect of the ANC‟s 
involvement. In several internal DFA documents dated early 1994, concerns are 
expressed about the ANC‟s role, because „the ANC will, subject to developments, be 
prominently represented on the SCFR [the document incorrectly refers to the SCFA 
as the Sub Council on Foreign Relations] mission. This raises questions regarding 
whether the ANC/and or PAC representatives are to be acknowledged or 
accommodated in any way, including socially, before or during the mission‟s visit‟.65 
A few days later, DFA officials in New York requested „guidance, as noted in 
previous communications, on the handling of the ANC representation in New York, 
both prior to and during the visit‟.66 These extracts suggest that there were some 
DFA officials who had not yet come to terms with the imminent election of the ANC. 
Even at such a late stage in the transition, members of the old apartheid era 
bureaucracy were apparently resistant to change and distrustful of the aspirations of 
the liberation movements, questioning their right to full participation in international 
negotiations. However, what is apparent from these documents is that these obstacles 
were overcome, allowing the ANC to play a full and constructive role in the various 
planning conferences and individual meetings.
67
    
Another important aspect of the overseas visits is that they gave the DFA an 
opportunity to introduce the South African delegation to the wider international 
community. During the course of the three foreign tours the SCFA met a wide range 
of people and international organisations including the UN Secretary General, the EC, 
the OAU, the World Health Organisation, and various national presidents and foreign 
ministers.
68
 The SCFA, and to a lesser extent the ANC, were thereby given the 
chance to have personal discussions with some of the world‟s most senior and 
influential politicians, whose personal views could shape the relationship between 
their nation or organisation and South Africa. One example of such a high-level 
meeting was during the SCFA‟s visit to New York, where they met with the UN 
Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali to discuss South Africa‟s future relations 
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with the organisation.
69
 Another was during the European leg of the tour, when the 
SCFA held discussions with Dr Ergon Klepsch, the President of the European 
Parliament.
70
 These two instances indicate the importance of South Africa‟s 
transition to the international community, but also the DFA‟s administration of 
meetings for the sub council with these powerful figures. 
As a result of these meetings the SCFA was given unprecedented access to 
key figures, enabling them to question, discuss and learn about the benefits of 
conducting a foreign policy that interacted in an advantageous fashion with 
multilateral organisations such as the UN. It was also an opportunity to establish 
closer working relations which would be invaluable to South Africa after the 
elections. For international representatives, it provided the chance to meet the SCFA 
for the first time. It allowed them to inform the sub council about their roles and 
activities, and how they expected South Africa to contribute to the 
organisation/international community once re-admission had been granted. For 
example, UN officials in New York, during a working lunch, informed the SCFA 
that „the foreign policy of the Government of National Unity will be closely 
monitored by the world‟.71 This extract is just one of several concerns expressed to 
the SCFA concerning South Africa‟s future foreign policy direction.   
The control the DFA had over these processes meant that it was in the 
position to dictate the itinerary of the sub council. The Department had the ability to 
select the people and organisations it wanted the SCFA to meet. This control over the 
SCFA‟s schedule ensured that the DFA had effectively filtered the options available 
to the sub council, selecting only those it deemed as „appropriate‟. Relations with 
major nations and organisations would be vital to South Africa‟s future, because 
without their political and economic support the new government would face severe 
limitations on its foreign policy options. The DFA therefore felt it necessary to 
expose the SCFA‟s members to the opinions of the global community who would 
then emphasise the importance of adhering to the international mainstream. During 
the international visits, the DFA exposed the SCFA to the global economic and 
political powers (with the exceptions of Kenya, Ethiopia and the OAU) all of which 
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held similar neo-liberal views. This meant the SCFA were party to a very one-sided 
international outlook, which did not offer a balanced analysis of the options open for 
South Africa. Socialist and left-wing political views had of course lost much of their 
potency in the mindset of international elites since 1990, and the SCFA were not 
entertained with such notions during the tours. The international visits were a method 
by which the SCFA could be cautioned in person by the world‟s leading political 
powers, not to initiate a foreign policy for South Africa that would oppose the 
international mainstream. 
The extent of the DFA‟s control can also be seen by analysing the 
composition and length of the various legs of the SCFA‟s international tour. The vast 
majority of the three visits were spent in the USA, Europe, and Asia. To briefly 
illustrate this point: the SCFA was provided with the opportunity to meet various 
branches of the UN, the US State Department, EU member states, and 
representatives of the Japanese, Korean, and Malaysian governments. These 
destinations were, according to the SCFA, in a document to the TEC‟s Management 
Committee, regarded as „of paramount importance… [and] will contribute to the 
revival of the South African economy more significantly than any other grouping‟.72 
The decision to meet these stakeholders was entirely pragmatic, as the results of the 
discussions would have been of the greatest benefit to South Africa. However, in 
order to maximise the benefits it may receive from such contacts, South Africa 
would be required to conform to a specific set of international criteria. By such 
meetings the DFA sought to ensure that this message was conveyed to the SCFA by 
the global elites. Yet, the document also provides an apt illustration of how the 
SCFA had been influenced by the DFA‟s efforts, as the language and content is very 
much attuned to the principles of the global status quo.    
During the three trips only five days were spent in Africa.
73
 The main 
purpose of the SCFA‟s visit to Africa „was to promote current and future effective 
management of South Africa‟s relations with Africa…, by analysing tends, 
indentifying objectives, opportunities and coordinating policy with regard to 
normalising relations‟.74 During the visit, the delegation met with Kenyan President 
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Daniel arap Moi, Ethiopian President Meles Zenawi, and also the Secretary General 
of the OAU Dr Salim Salim.
75
 These provided a much needed opportunity to discuss 
issues of South African-Africa relations with some of the continent‟s most influential 
people. However, the scant time dedicated to this visit is somewhat surprising, as the 
DFA, NP and the ANC in their foreign policy announcements had all stressed the 
paramount importance of Africa to South African interests. Despite such rhetoric 
claiming the continent‟s significance to South Africa‟s future, Africa was largely 
ignored by the SCFA‟s activities. This may have been due to the DFA‟s lack of 
organisational presence on the continent after years of isolation, a lack of time in the 
tight schedule of the TEC, but it might equally suggest that Africa was deemed not to 
have the necessary capacity to assist post-apartheid South Africa. The continent‟s 
lack of economic development power meant that the SCFA focused upon the major 
trading nations, which could aid the democratic transition in the country and provide 
much required investment after the elections. By focusing the majority of the 
SCFA‟s work towards western nations was arguably to the detriment of Africa. After 
1994, the new ANC-led government did make efforts to work more closely with the 
continent, especially Southern Africa, but these policies were not assisted by the 
work of the SCFA. In fact, when compared to the expectations of Southern African 
nations concerning Pretoria‟s role in the region, its neglect by the SCFA seems 
startling.
76
 A question then that must be raised in light of the rhetoric, is how 
important was Africa really seen to be for South Africa?                
As previously discussed, the international community had taken considerable 
interest in South Africa‟s transition to democracy for a host of both altruistic and 
pragmatic reasons. As described in Chapter Four, during the transition, the ANC had 
begun to form its own set of foreign policy positions, outlining the way it wanted 
South Africa to interact with the world, which were not necessarily in keeping with 
the then dominant international consensus. With the SCFA poised to have the 
decisive say on the outcome of the country‟s foreign policy, the international 
community applied pressure to ensure that the sub council (and thus post-apartheid 
South Africa) conformed to the mainstream international thinking. Chris Landsberg 
points out „that there is little doubt that world opinion – and the need to 
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accommodate it – formed a constant backdrop to the thinking of domestic 
negotiators‟,77 while James Barber insisted that during the transition „attempts [were 
made] to shape the end result‟. 78  Furthermore, David Ginsburg argued that „we 
should not underestimate the extent to which the South African transition was shaped 
precisely by the fact that it gathered momentum just when alternative visions of 
democracy were becoming discredited by experiences in the Eastern bloc… Nothing 
could have played more into the hands of those Western powers anxious to shape the 
outcome of the transition‟.79 In this context the signals emanating from the leaders of 
the international community were to have a significant impact on the SCFA. 
Arguably, one of the clearest examples of such a warning occurred during a 
meeting between the Deputy Director General of the DFA and the Ambassador of the 
Russian Federation E.P. Goussarov on 11 April 1994, only a matter of weeks before 
the election. In the confidential memorandum sent to the SCFA detailing the 
discussions, there is an explicit warning to South Africa to maintain the status quo in 
its foreign relations:  
[the ambassador] added that it was essential for South Africa to 
demonstrate to the world that it could be relied upon as a solid 
partner, not only now but in the future. Continuity of foreign policy, 
in substance if not in style, was the very cornerstone of interstate 
relations. He could not emphasise too clearly the importance the 
world would attach to an unambiguous demonstration of reliability 
and continuity.
80
 
As the record of an official meeting between the two nations, the content of the 
document is unequivocal in its message to South Africa, with its stress on „continuity‟ 
and „substance‟. In effect the Russian Federation was informing South Africa that it 
could change the way in which it presented foreign policy to the world, but that the 
content should not change. For the DFA, this was unambiguous support for the 
approach it had been pursuing since 1990 from a major international nation, and a 
powerful member of the UN Security Council. What makes such a conservative 
message even more striking is that the Russian Federation, previously as the former 
Soviet Union, had been a key supporter of the ANC during exile. The transformation 
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in the Soviet Union‟s approach towards South Africa has been explored by Vladimir 
Shubin, who described the effects of this dramatic shift in policy for the ANC and 
South Africa.
81
 In a very short period of time, Russia had moved from the champion 
of global communism to a champion of free market capitalism. For the members of 
the SCFA and the ANC, Russia provided a plain and simple message. If South Africa 
failed to adhere to the dominant international thinking of the time, then the global 
community would not provide the assistance the country desperately craved to 
address the legacy of apartheid.  
This warning from the Russian Federation was not an isolated incident. In 
fact, there was a concerted effort to influence post-apartheid South African foreign 
policy. A similar warning emerges in another memorandum to the SCFA which 
analyses South African and Greek relations. In October 1993, the Greek socialist 
PASOK party won a landslide electoral victory; the DFA document expresses a 
sense of horror of a new socialist government taking power, „which sent shockwaves 
through Europe‟.82 The memorandum emphasises that „the general feeling within the 
EC community was clearly not in favour of Greece… [which] according to all 
expectations, would follow a… foreign policy, that would not be acceptable to the 
country‟s other European partners‟. 83  The surprise from Europe is tangible as 
socialism was supposed to have ended as a viable option in 1990. The memorandum 
holds no punches, and the emphasis is clearly on the anticipation that Greece would 
pursue a foreign policy which would deviate from the rest of Europe. Even though 
the report refers to events in Europe, it provided a none to subtle warning to the 
SCFA. It was another warning to the SCFA that a foreign policy that deviated from 
the international status quo would not be tolerated by the major trading nations of the 
world. These examples demonstrate that in certain instances, steps were indeed taken 
which „enabled foreign governments to influence the… negotiating process 
directly‟.84 The SCFA had been sent clear signals. There must be no major shift in 
South Africa‟s foreign policy which might damage relations with the west, but more 
importantly, investment opportunities. It was rather effective blackmail.   
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An intriguing feature of the sub council is that such recommendations appear 
to have been accepted with minimal fuss by all of the political parties involved. A 
report noted that „it had seemed self-evident beforehand that… there would be vast 
areas of disagreement about a future foreign policy orientation for South Africa. 
There was nothing of the kind. Instead, common goals emerged, a common reality 
was perceived and agreement was reached on methods of achieving the desired goals. 
Ideological differences appeared to be almost completely absent‟.85 What is most 
striking is the ANC‟s position during the SCFA. Just before the onset of the SCFA, 
the ANC had been finalising its own foreign policy positions and, under the name of 
Nelson Mandela, had published a well documented article setting out the party‟s 
objectives (see Chapter Four). The ANC‟s representative on the SCFA was Aziz 
Pahad who had been part of its Department of International Affairs in exile, and was 
a high ranking and well respected member of the movement‟s National Executive 
Committee (NEC). Although the ANC only had one member on the SCFA, in line 
with the mandate of the TEC, one would have expected the party to have attempted, 
through Pahad, to try and influence the sub council into pursuing foreign policy 
recommendations closer to its own ideals. This does not however seem to have 
occurred; indeed quite the opposite happened. Wheeler, when interviewed, was 
unsure of the extent to which Pahad and the ANC leadership collaborated about 
SCFA issues, but believes that „if Aziz Pahad took messages back to Shell House 
[the ANC headquarters] in the process, well that was a benefit‟. 86 James Barber 
believed that through the extensive negotiations with the NP there was „an increasing 
convergence of views… The change came gradually, perhaps unconsciously, as with 
increasing contact and the search for support the ANC absorbed more Western views 
and outlooks‟.87 Both points may be accurate, but they leave several crucial questions 
unanswered. Was it beneficial for the DFA to have Pahad on the SCFA because he 
could act as an effective and reliable conduit for transferring its ideas and policy 
positions on foreign policy directly to the ANC leadership? Did Pahad assent to the 
SCFA‟s findings because he personally agreed with them or thought they were the 
right course of action? As there appears to have been no noticeable dissent, did the 
ANC actually agree with the DFA‟s international outlook, which was influencing the 
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SCFA, even though it was out of sync with that of the movement‟s supporters and its 
declared positions? Or had the ANC begun to pragmatically abandon its own newly 
formulated foreign policy positions even before the end of the transition?  
The acceptance of the SCFA‟s findings was in all likelihood a pragmatic 
decision by the ANC. As discussed in Chapter Four, the ANC leadership had adhered 
to the human rights discourse imposed upon it, despite having serious misgivings 
about the policy. Therefore, in the case of the SCFA, the probability is that Thabo 
Mbeki, a close confident of Aziz Pahad, instructed him to conform to the SCFA‟s 
recommendations; these would be implemented in the initial years of the GNU to 
win the support of the international community, but like its stance on human rights, 
the ANC‟s leaders had little intention of maintaining them in the long-run (see 
Chapters Six and Seven).  
 
Conclusion 
When the GNU was inaugurated on the 10 May 1994, the work of the TEC 
Sub Council on Foreign Affairs came to an end. In five months the sub council had 
held twenty-one meetings covering a range of issues such as membership of the 
Commonwealth, South Africa‟s development status and the transfer of Walvis Bay to 
Namibia, it had met thirteen foreign visiting delegations to South Africa; and while 
on official visits abroad, had held meetings with senior international diplomats, as 
well as participating in four regional planning conferences.
88
 The meetings, 
agreements and copious recommendations by the SCFA enabled the new government 
to begin an informed process of reintegrating South Africa back into the international 
community.
89
 This act of re-engagement has to be viewed as one of the key successes 
of the ANC‟s foreign policy after 1994 (see Chapters Six and Seven). In the 
following months and years it became a member of almost every important 
international organisation open to South Africa, ranging from the Commonwealth to 
the Non-Aligned Movement. South Africa‟s attempts to reassert itself on the world 
stage began with readmission into the OAU in May 1994. This process would not 
                                               
88 SAHA, John Barratt Collection, AL3081, A1.3.15. 
89 SAHA, John Barratt Collection, AL3081, A1.3.11. 
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have occurred so smoothly or quickly without the tireless activities and 
recommendations of the Sub Council on Foreign Affairs.  
However, this chapter, and Chapter Four, have questioned the extent to which 
the ANC led GNU‟s foreign policy immediately after the elections can be regarded 
as truly its own. During the lifespan of the SCFA the available evidence points 
towards the over-arching influence of the DFA. In 1993, Rusty Evans had argued 
that South Africa could not be out of step with the international thinking of major 
western nations, and subsequently would be forced to operate within strict 
parameters, determined for them.
90
 The DFA, whose own perspectives on foreign 
policy were very much in keeping with that of the international community, and with 
its endorsement, did its upmost to direct and shape the thinking, and thus the final 
recommendations of the SCFA. This process could be described as one of 
„domesticating‟ the former liberation movements. 91  Indeed, Wheeler corroborates 
this idea, when he argued that although senior figures in the ANC had represented 
the movement abroad, they had no government experience, and thus had to be 
„acculturated into a different way of doing business‟. 92  The DFA and the 
international community pursued prevalent shared norms in foreign affairs, and were 
unwilling to allow South Africa to deviate from this set path. They were particularly 
concerned that a post-apartheid South Africa, led by former liberation activists, 
would act in a similar fashion to dissident countries such as Cuba or Libya in 
multilateral forums. The SCFA process provided the perfect opportunity to 
demonstrate the great benefits that conformity would bring to the country, but also a 
means of warning South African political elites about the dangers of pursuing a 
radical foreign policy. If South Africa acted like Cuba, then the vast groundswell of 
popular international support for its transition would swiftly dissipate. The SCFA 
acted as a way of schooling the former liberation movements in the established 
means and practices of international diplomacy and imbuing it with the normative 
ideals of the time. It could be put in even stronger terms. For the DFA and the 
international community, the SCFA process was a way of disciplining the country‟s 
political elite into a specific approach to foreign policy. What can be witnessed from 
                                               
90 R. Evans, „South African Foreign Policy and the New World Order‟, Institute of Strategic Studies 
(ISS) Paper 4 (1993). 
91 Thanks to Professor Peter Vale for this point, telephone discussion, 5 March 2010. 
92 Interview with Tom Wheeler, Johannesburg, 31 March 2010. 
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the SCFA is how the „new‟ South African foreign policy was partly captured by 
elements of the old regime and those of the international community.   
 It is crucial to emphasise that the sub council did not actually make policy. It 
was however, instrumental in laying the foundations for post-apartheid South African 
foreign policy. The findings presented to the TEC would ultimately be used to 
inform the new government‟s foreign policy. The importance of the SCFA to South 
Africa‟s foreign relations was highlighted retrospectively in the DFA‟s 1996 Green 
Paper, entitled „South African Foreign Policy: Discussion Document‟ which stated 
that „the Subcouncil therefore became actively and effectively involved in the 
conduct of South Africa's international relations, as regards not only policy matters 
but also the creation of the new Department of Foreign Affairs, budgetary matters, 
senior personnel appointments, the opening of new missions abroad and other 
management matters of medium or long term importance‟.93 During the first few 
years of ANC rule in South Africa, the GNU accepted the vast majority of the 
SCFA‟s recommendations, with its foreign policy following many of the key tenets it 
had proposed.
94
  
Not only had the post-apartheid government‟s foreign policy positions been 
created outside of the ANC‟s direct control, but so too had those of the „new‟ South 
Africa it would be leading, through the SCFA‟s work in re-engaging with the 
international community. As the incoming leaders of a new government, the ANC‟s 
foreign policy for South Africa had been heavily influenced by the SCFA. It must be 
stressed that the international community‟s concern for South Africa was not simply 
one of benevolence, but was based on self-interest. Foreign state actors tend not to 
intervene unless they can see a benefit to themselves. The SCFA provided an 
opportunity to „capture‟ South African foreign policy, even if the results did not 
correspond with the aspirations of the ANC and the majority of the population. In 
light of these revelations, it is therefore worth considering whether the positions 
adopted by the new government were really reflective of its own international agenda, 
or those of the officials of the DFA.  
                                               
93 South African Foreign Policy: Discussion Document, DFA, 
http://www.info.gov.za/greenpapers/1996/foraf1.htm#3.2 (1/7/2010). 
94 SAHA, John Barratt Collection, AL3081, A1.3.10. 
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The evidence presented in this chapter provides some explanation as to why 
South Africa pursued some of its foreign policy initiatives after May 1994. They may 
also explain why South Africa‟s foreign policy has been criticised for lacking 
direction under the ANC, because the nation‟s international position had already 
been largely determined by the SCFA. The ANC-led government found itself 
implementing a foreign policy which was not truly its own, and one which it could 
not immediately refine or reject for fear of alienating important international backers. 
Only when Mbeki began to assert control over foreign policy in the following years, 
particularly after the NP left the GNU in 1996, did South Africa‟s international 
positions begin to move away from those formulated by the SCFA.      
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Chapter Six 
Idealism versus Realism? The contested nature of South African 
Foreign Policy under Nelson Mandela, 1994-1996 
1
 
One of the most challenging questions confronting commentators on post-
apartheid South Africa has been identifying the composition and meaning of the 
nation‟s foreign policy. The ANC came to power in May 1994 with an ambitious set 
of foreign policy principles, which would provide a framework for the country‟s 
interactions with the international community. However, critics were soon 
questioning the nature and direction that foreign policy was taking under the ANC-
led Government of National Unity (GNU). South Africa‟s foreign policy has been 
variously described as being poorly planned, inconsistently implemented, and 
unrealistically idealistic.
2
 The cartoon above by South African satirist Zapiro, neatly 
encapsulates the confusion surrounding the country‟s international perspective in the 
                                               
1 Zapiro, „Great Unsolved Mysteries‟, (copyright obtained: 950614mg) www.zapiro.com, Copyright 
© Zapiro. 
2 Examples include: A. Habib and N. Selinyane, „South Africa‟s Foreign Policy and a Realistic Vision 
of an African Century‟, in E. Sidiropoulos (ed.), Apartheid past, renaissance future: South Africa's 
foreign policy 1994-2004 (Johannesburg, 2004); G. Mills, „South Africa‟s Foreign Policy: From 
isolation to respectability‟, in D. Simon (eds.), South Africa in Southern Africa (Oxford, 1998); J. 
Spence, „South Africa: an African exception or just another country?‟, Conflict, Security & 
Development, 7 (2007), pp. 341-347; J. Spence, 'The New South African Foreign Policy: Incentives 
and Constraints', in F. Toase and E. Yorke (eds.), The New South Africa: Prospects for Domestic and 
International Security (Basingstoke, 1998).  
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mid-1990s. The cartoon depicts the puzzled looking ANC Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Alfred Nzo, carrying a briefcase emblazoned with „Nzzzzo‟, (the malicious, 
but not entirely inaccurate, nickname given to him because of his habit of falling 
asleep in meetings) and a question mark above his head with the title „South African 
Foreign Policy‟.3 This question indeed posed many problems for members of the 
ANC, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the international community and 
South African observers – what exactly was the „new‟ South Africa‟s foreign policy? 
This and the following chapter will analyse this question by exploring the evolution 
of South African foreign policy under Mandela‟s presidency, with particular 
reference to its policies towards the African continent.  
Although the following chapters will not directly discuss the ANC‟s domestic 
economic policies, it is important to recognise that these had undoubted implications 
for foreign policy. The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), and 
later the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, were important 
aspects of South Africa‟s interactions with the west, which aimed (amongst other 
things) to make the country more attractive to international business.
4
 These 
economic policies also affected South Africa‟s interactions with the rest of Africa. 
After 1994, South African business expanded rapidly northwards, and while this 
proved beneficial to the nation‟s economy, such investments were not always 
welcomed.
5
 The implications of business expansion in Africa on Pretoria‟s foreign 
policy will be addressed in Chapter Seven.  
                                               
3 Information about Nzo sleeping in meetings provided during an interview with former ANC MP 
Andrew Feinstein, London, 1 July 2009.  
4 RDP was first initiated in 1994, and GEAR was introduced in 1996. The RDP‟s primary goal was to 
tackle poverty and invest in the country‟s shortfall in service. Using a mix of socialist and neo-liberal 
tendencies, RDP incorporated massive infrastructure spending, trade liberalisation, reducing 
government debt, and lowering taxes to alleviate the problems. GEAR on the other hand, 
demonstrated the ANC-led South Africa‟s commitment to free trade and privatisation. It was seen by 
Finance Minister Trevor Manuel as a means of encouraging foreign investment, which was hoped, 
would aid massive job creation and increase GDP by 6% year.    
5 A prime example was when South African brewing company SABMiller (the second largest brewer 
in the world) was forced to cease operations in Kenya due to poor returns and local hostility, Daily 
Nation (Kenya), 28 July 2010. For academic studies on South African business expansion see: J. 
Daniel, V. Naidoo, and S. Naidu, 'SA expansion into Africa. Can the Leopard change its spots?', South 
African Labour Bulletin, 27 (2003), pp. 14-16; J. Daniel, V Naidoo, and S. Naidu, „The South 
Africans have arrived: Post-apartheid corporate expansion into Africa‟, in J. Daniel, A. Habib, and R. 
Southall (eds.), State of the Nation: South Africa 2003-2004 (Cape Town, 2004), pp. 368-390; J. 
Daniel, J. Lutchman, and A. Comninos, 'South Africa in Africa: trends and forecasts in a changing 
African political economy', in S. Buhlungu (eds.), State of the Nation: South Africa 2007 (Cape Town, 
2007), pp. 508-532. 
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More generally, the implementation of these economic policies is regarded by 
some as uncritical acceptance of western neo-liberal policies; Mark Gevisser goes so 
far as to suggest that the „implementation of GEAR was a „culmination‟ of the 
systematic pursuit of the ANC leaders by Western Diplomats and big business, and 
[represented] the liberation movement‟s „moral surrender‟‟. 6  This surrender was 
arguably also witnessed in some aspects of foreign policy. This could be seen during 
the lifespan of the Sub Council on Foreign Affairs (SCFA) (see Chapter Five), which 
demonstrated how some ANC leaders were influenced into adopting a conservative, 
western-inspired path. Throughout Mandela‟s presidency, the ANC continued to pay 
close attention to western demands, something which exposed divisions within the 
wider movement. Its comparatively liberal economic policies undoubtedly played an 
important role in South African foreign policy, as the country sought western 
endorsement for its efforts. However, because of the scope of these chapter‟s on 
Mandela‟s presidency, and the fact an already substantial literature exists on the 
economic policies of post-apartheid South Africa, they will be not be examined in 
depth.
7
     
Before analysing South Africa‟s foreign policy under Mandela, an 
observation must be made about the tendency by historians of all periods to designate 
the foreign policy of a nation to that of its leader. Some examples relevant to this 
study which illustrate this practice include James Barber‟s Mandela’s World and 
Tom Lodge‟s Mandela: A Critical Life.8 This practice tends to neatly categorise 
often complex periods of time, thereby providing an overarching framework for a 
study. For histories of Emperors and Kings, this can often be a suitable way of 
describing their periods of rule, as such figures were largely in absolute control of 
power and decision-making. However, for a modern state, it is evidently incorrect to 
attribute a national foreign policy solely to one person, primarily because of the 
                                               
6 M. Gevisser, Thabo Mbeki: The Dream Deferred (Johannesburg, 2007), p. 693. 
7 Examples include: H. Adam, F. van Zyl Slabbert, and K. Moodley, Comrades in Business, Post- 
Liberation Politics in South Africa (South Africa, 1998); P. Bond and M. Khosa, An RDP Policy Audit 
(Pretoria, 1999); P. Bond, Talk Left Walk Right South Africa’s Frustrated Global Reforms (Scottsville, 
2004); J. Saul, „Liberal Democracy vs. Popular Democracy in Southern Africa‟, Review of African 
Political Economy, 24 (1997), pp. 219-236; J. Saul, The Next Liberation Struggle, Capitalism, 
Socialism and Democracy in Southern Africa (Toronto, 2005); I. Taylor, Stuck in Middle Gear: South 
Africa’s post-apartheid Foreign Relations (Westport, 2001); J. Weeks, Stuck in low 
GEAR?Macroeconomic policy in South Africa, 1995-1998 (London, 1999).  
8 J. Barber, Mandela’s World: the international dimension of South Africa's political revolution 1990-
99 (Oxford, 2004); T. Lodge, Mandela: a critical life (Oxford, 2006). 
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multitude of actors involved in its formulation and pursuit. It would be clearly wrong 
to assert that State President Mandela was not in control of international affairs 
because he was „the most powerful actor in foreign policy‟, and ultimately final 
responsibility lies with the holder of this position. It must nevertheless be stressed 
that „the State President is not part of every decision made around foreign policy‟. 9 
Indeed Maxi van Aardt has argued that it „was notoriously difficult to identify who 
makes foreign policy‟ in South Africa, arguing that „international relations are 
conducted in a vastly more complicated arena than that suggested by the unitary 
actor figure‟.10 South African foreign policy decision-making processes were and are 
shaped by the inputs and opinions of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the civil 
servants of the DFA, other government departments such as Trade and Industry, the 
opinions of multilateral partners, academics, and civil society actors.
11
 This was 
certainly the situation after the 1994 elections, as a multitude of people were initially 
involved in the foreign policy process. However, during the course of Mandela‟s 
presidency, foreign policy-making was indeed increasingly centralised within a small 
elite and dominated by the personality of the president. This is a theme that will be 
explored further in Chapter Seven.  
Nelson Mandela‟s inauguration as South African President on 10 May 1994, 
as head of an ANC-led GNU, was a moment of international significance. Against 
the backdrop of widespread global expectation, South Africa had successfully 
ensured that the transition to multiparty democracy had been peacefully completed. 
The success of this process could be gauged by the fact that Heads of States from 
across the world arrived en masse to be part of this historic occasion. Against this 
background, South Africa‟s achievement was rightly lauded. Nonetheless, precisely 
because of the manner in which South Africa had effected change, there were very 
high expectations both at home and abroad, about what it might now achieve as an 
actor on the international stage. An indication of these expectations about South 
Africa‟s role comes from two high-ranking American politicians. The former US 
Ambassador to South Africa Princeton Lyman wrote an article in 1996 titled „South 
Africa‟s Promise‟; and President Clinton‟s Secretary of State, Warren Christopher 
                                               
9 R. Suttner, „A brief review of South African Foreign Policy since April 1994‟, Umrabulo, 1 (1996).   
10 M. Van Aardt, „A Foreign Policy to Die For: South Africa‟s response to the Nigerian Crisis‟, Africa 
Insight, 26 (1996), p. 110. 
11 Ibid., p. 110. 
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declared „I see very few countries with greater potential to shape the twenty first 
century than the new South Africa‟.12 It was a mantle that South Africa‟s new leaders 
were eager to live up to, but one which also placed a considerable burden on the 
fledgling democracy. 
The process of creating a foreign policy had been far from simple. As 
explained in Chapter Four, the ANC‟s official foreign policy positions in the early 
1990s were developed largely by academics and liberal advisors, who had 
formulated a universalistic, moralistic, and human rights-inspired vision. However, 
this vision was partly vitiated by the concurrent activities of the SCFA, which 
through its mandate had in fact dictated many of the terms of engagement for 
subsequent relations with the international community before Mandela had even 
taken office.
13
 These contradictory twin tracks to policy formulation during the 
transition meant that, on coming to power, the ANC-led government was already 
confronted by a number of constraints. These constraints would ultimately play a 
significant role in shaping foreign policy during Mandela‟s presidency.  
For example, by the time of the elections, the SCFA had laid the groundwork 
for a number of treaties and policy positions which the ANC-led government could 
not realistically have reneged on, for fear of losing international credibility. Through 
the SCFA process (see Chapter Five), the DFA and the western-dominated 
international community had attempted to domesticate the ANC into the world of 
global politics, imbuing it with many of the hegemonic norms of the time, such as 
neo-liberalism. The SCFA had facilitated the capturing of the „new‟ by the 
entrenched interests of the dominant international order, as well as remnants of the 
out-going apartheid regime. Leading DFA officials and the international community 
had, during the final days of the transition, influenced a small group of ANC leaders 
into adopting the SCFA‟s recommendations. In doing so, the western world appeared 
to have ensured that South Africa would uphold the international status quo by 
pursuing a largely liberal foreign policy. The western powers were therefore 
prepared to place a great deal of faith in the new ANC-led government, believing that 
South Africa would engage with the wider world according to its principles.  
                                               
12 P. Lyman, „South Africa‟s Promise‟, Foreign Policy, 102 (1996), pp. 105-119; W. Christopher, 
cited in Barber, Mandela’s World, p. 85.  
13 South African History Archive (hereafter SAHA), William Cullen Library, University of 
Witwatersrand, John Barratt Collection, AL3081, A1.3.11. 
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This was significant because the ANC had been, and remained, a far from 
monolithic organisation. Even in exile, the ANC had been a „broad church‟, 
encompassing various ideological perspectives ranging from Marxism to bourgeois 
nationalism. However, the transition primarily involved a relatively narrow process 
of negotiations between the leaders of ANC and the NP, whose deliberations 
formulated changes in all areas of government policy. The end of the CODESA 
process had resulted in the formation of the MPNP which streamlined negotiations 
into smaller working groups and sub councils, arguably making agreement possible. 
However, this simultaneously removed the vast majority of people from both sides, 
leaving many disillusioned that their ideals had been undermined. The „miracle‟ of 
the transition can therefore be best described as an elite pact.
14
 However, due to the 
way the ANC was organised, this small elite (which itself was not unified) was 
unable to contain all of the contradictory elements that resided within the party. Thus, 
the western world, which believed it had secured South Africa‟s membership of a 
liberal orthodoxy, would often be surprised by some of the actions of Mandela‟s 
government, which were sometimes contrary to its expectations. In the words of 
Tony Leon, the leader of the opposition from 1999, South African „policy lurched 
between high-minded principle and the lowest common dominator of Third World 
struggle solidarity‟.15 The failure to match the expectations, either of the western 
world or its own supporters, was to have a damaging effect upon how South Africa‟s 
foreign policy was viewed.   
The external constraints imposed on the ANC were compounded by the 
party‟s own ideals, which included a commitment to remain friendly with all nations, 
to reward allies from its period in exile, and to pursue a moralistic, human rights-
based foreign policy. These points alone immediately demonstrate the evident 
contradictions in the ANC‟s foreign policy perspectives; publicly acclaiming the 
centrality of human rights, while maintaining links with liberation allies now 
presiding over authoritarian governments would inevitably create opposing pressures. 
                                               
14 The idea of an „elite pact‟, capturing the „new‟ South Africa‟s foreign policy for its own benefit, 
constitutes a specific manifestation and demonstration of the characteristics of a transition process. 
Such a notion was first formulated by Samuel Huntington, who argued that transitions were based on 
the choices, perceptions and actions of elites involved in the process. This was adapted by Patrick 
Bond, who has referred to South Africa‟s transition as an „elite pact‟. See: P. Bond, Elite Transition: 
From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa (London, 2000), pp. 55-56; S. Huntington, 
„Democracy‟s Third Wave‟, Journal of Democracy, 2 (1991), pp. 12-34. 
15 T. Leon, On the Contrary: Leading the Opposition in a Democratic South Africa (Cape Town, 
2008), p. 272. 
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Some policies could therefore not be reconciled with others, and these contradictions 
would subsequently contribute to emergent problems in the new South Africa‟s 
foreign policy. These contradictions will be explored in the course of this chapter. 
 
Foreign Policy in the months after the elections   
  The new government wasted no time in implementing many of the foreign 
policy recommendations set out in the final report of the SCFA.
16
 The SCFA had 
concluded, in a report summarising its activities, that the country would need a 
flexible but principled approach to foreign policy, arguing that „the world has a 
perception of South Africa and expectations of what it can offer. It is therefore 
incumbent upon the democratic South Africa to define a policy that will inter alia 
respond partly to the challenge‟.17 Central to the sub council‟s recommendations was 
that South Africa apply for membership of various multilateral forums as quickly as 
possible, so the country could begin to actively participate in international issues.
18
 
The new government turned its attentions to this immediately. The first major foreign 
policy decision was an application to join the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
on 20 May 1994, which was formally accepted by its Secretary General Dr Salim 
Salim three days later.
19
 After the raising of the South African flag at the OAU 
headquarters in Addis Ababa on „Africa Day‟, the country became an officially 
recognised member.
20
 This swift foreign policy initiative both symbolically and 
practically laid down a statement of intent. At the OAU Heads of State meeting in 
June 1994, Mandela announced: „we have entered this eminent African organisation 
and rejoined the African community of nations inspired by the desire to join hands 
with all the countries of our continent as equal partners‟.21 Deputy Foreign Minister 
Pahad described the decision to join the OAU as one which demonstrated South 
                                               
16 SAHA, John Barratt Collection, AL3081, A1.3.11. 
17 SAHA, John Barratt Collection, AL3081, A1.3.15. 
18 SAHA, John Barratt Collection, AL3081, A1.3.11. 
19 „OAU officially informs Government of acceptance‟, Johannesburg SAPA, 23 May 1994. 
20 „Building democracy, securing economic development, advancing social justice and peace‟, 
remarks by Mr Alfred Nzo, Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the Council of the Socialist International, 
Cape Town, 10 July, 1995. 
21 Statement by President Nelson Mandela at the OAU Heads of State and Government, Tunis, 13 
June 1994. 
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Africa‟s commitment to the continent and as an opportunity to „contribute to the role 
that Africa can play in world politics‟.22  
South Africa followed this up by applying for membership of other 
multilateral organisations. By early August, South Africa had in quick succession 
joined the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Group of 77 (an intergovernmental 
caucus of developing nations at the UN), retaken its seat at the UN and rejoined the 
Commonwealth.
23
 These decisions, most of which had been recommended by the 
SCFA, were important early steps for the ANC. Not only did they make practical 
sense for South Africa, they also provided an opportunity for the ANC to reaffirm its 
commitment to work closely and positively with the international community. The 
decision to join such organisations symbolised an important break with the past. No 
longer would South Africa be an isolated pariah state, instead it aimed to have a 
significant and constructive global impact. Within a few months of democratic rule, 
South Africa was well on its way to becoming a fully fledged, dedicated, and active 
member of the international community.       
During the first months of democratic rule, South African leaders regularly 
took the opportunity to emphasise the importance of the international community to 
the country, and the role that South Africa wished to play. On 24 May 1994, during 
his speech at the opening of Parliament, Mandela asserted the importance of the 
international community to South Africa, declaring that the nation‟s people were 
now „citizens of the world‟.24 Mandela informed parliament about the key principles 
which would guide South Africa‟s future foreign policy, emphasising his 
government‟s commitment to human rights and its willingness to contribute to the 
peace processes then underway in Angola, Mozambique and Rwanda.
25
 These 
themes would be replicated in numerous other speeches at various international 
forums, in which ANC leaders committed the country to a role of service and duty to 
the world, whilst stressing the centrality of Africa to its thinking.  
                                               
22 „Deputy Minister Pahad on Foreign Policy Priorities‟, Johannesburg SABC TV 1 Network, 29 May 
1994. 
23 Speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Alfred Nzo, Foreign Affairs Budget Vote, 
Parliament, 8 August, 1994. 
24 „Mandela Addresses Parliament‟, Johannesburg SABC CCV Television Network, 24 May 1994. 
25 Ibid. 
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Foreign Minister Nzo set out his own vision to parliament in August 1994. 
He again thanked the world for the part it had played in the transition, stressing that 
„South Africa is indebted to the international community‟. 26  As previously, Nzo 
repeatedly expressed gratitude for global efforts to help South Africa overcome its 
problems. However, this continual expression of gratitude was in some respects a 
rewriting of the historical record. Whilst millions of ordinary people across the globe 
had indeed campaigned against apartheid, western governments did not generally 
assist the ANC‟s struggle and in fact, arguably helped to extend the lifespan of the 
apartheid regime.
27
 The policy of actively forgetting the realities of the past and 
thanking the international community for its supposed assistance was a clever 
political manoeuvre by the ANC. Ann Grant, a former British High Commissioner to 
South Africa, argued that „Mandela‟s big trick of course was to exaggerate the extent 
to which people in the west had supported the anti-apartheid struggle, and that was a 
very good tactic‟.28 By including the world in its „miracle‟ transition, the ANC hoped 
that the resultant goodwill would translate into concrete economic assistance, and 
enable South Africa to exploit the opportunities afforded to it by the international 
community.    
Nzo‟s speech also covered the themes of human rights, economic 
development, and African co-operation, which were all regarded as being of central 
importance to the country‟s future. In tune with the recommendations of the SCFA, 
Nzo committed South Africa to close cooperation with international organisations, 
stressing consultation and consensual decision-making.
29
 This he hoped would be 
exemplified by the country‟s relations with Southern Africa, in which „South Africa 
will not prescribe the nature or form of regional co-operation but will consult with 
our neighbours as equal partners‟.30 The importance of cooperation and consensus 
was constantly stressed by South African leaders in their foreign policy statements. 
                                               
26 Speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Alfred Nzo, Foreign Affairs Budget Vote, 
Parliament, 8 August, 1994. 
27 For western assistance of apartheid see: R. Harshe, „Africa: Trends in U.S. Imperialism‟, Social 
Scientist, 12 (1984), p. 29; P. Vale, „Pivot, Puppet or Periphery: The Cold War and South Africa‟, The 
Cold War as Global Conflict International Centre for Advanced Studies, New York University, 
Unpublished Working Paper #9 (Sept., 2003), p. 11. 
28 Telephone interview with Ann Grant, Consul and Head of Chancery at the British Embassy in 
Maputo, Mozambique from 1981-84 and former British High Commissioner to South Africa, 2000-
2005, 7 December 2009. 
29 Speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Alfred Nzo, Foreign Affairs Budget Vote, 
Parliament, 8 August, 1994. 
30 Ibid. 
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While the ANC believed consensus-building was the best course of action, it was an 
approach which would ultimately lead to criticisms of the country for not being 
sufficiently decisive, especially during Mbeki‟s presidency and his responses to 
Zimbabwe.  
 The ANC was eager to be seen repaying the support of Southern Africa for 
the suffering it had endured at the hands of the apartheid regime (see Chapter‟s Two 
and Three). Senior ANC official, the then Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry 
Kader Asmal, expressed the widely held view „that post-apartheid South Africa 
would owe its regional neighbours compensation for the devastation it had 
wreaked‟.31 John Daniel likewise insisted that „South Africa‟s debt to the region is an 
overpowering one‟, and Deon Geldenhuys agrees that focusing upon Southern Africa 
„has been one of the basic tenets of South African foreign policy‟.32 Mandela spent 
much of his presidency visiting various African states to pay his respects; as late as 
May 1997 he visited Zimbabwe, describing the trip as an „opportunity to thank the 
people of Zimbabwe for their role in South Africa‟s liberation struggle‟.33 The ANC-
led government was eager for the nation to start afresh, and rewrite its interactions 
with the continent. The SCFA had placed great emphasis on the importance of Africa, 
arguing that as a major continental power, South Africa could play a positive role by 
engaging constructively and innovatively.
34
 The ANC-led government heeded these 
recommendations, paying close attention to Africa, placing great efforts on becoming 
a constructive and cooperative neighbour, based on cooperation and making „the 
normalisation of relations with Africa… a priority of the new government‟.35 Nzo 
stressed „that South Africa‟s first priority, also in the multilateral field, is the 
Southern African sub-region, followed closely by the rest of the African continent‟.36 
Ministers were acutely aware that without stability and democracy in Africa, South 
African development could be severely hindered, because „central to our thinking is 
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that we in the Republic of South Africa cannot be an island of prosperity, surrounded 
by a sea of poverty and deprivation‟.37  
 However, these apparently positive signals from South Africa inspired a mix 
of fear and expectation amongst its Southern Africa neighbours. The ANC feared 
South Africa being perceived as a regional hegemon, seeking to dominate its 
neighbours, and the leadership regularly tried to ease such fears. Wary of the past 
violence of the country‟s actions in Southern Africa, the ANC was acutely aware of 
the limitations this imposed. Mandela stressed: „we are largely inhibited by the 
legacy of apartheid… we need to think very carefully as to what we do because 
however justified… we may be accused of merely carrying on the policy of a 
government which we sharply criticised‟.38 In Tunis, Mandela asserted: „it will never 
happen again that our country should seek to dominate another through force of arms, 
economic might or subversion‟; the objective was instead for „the creation of a South 
Africa that would be a good neighbour and an equal partner with all the countries of 
our continent, one which would use its abilities and potentials to help advance the 
common struggle‟. 39  South Africa‟s accession to Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) membership reinforced the country‟s engagement with the 
region. Nzo tried to dispel lingering suspicions regarding South African intentions, 
arguing that „it would be a pity if co-operation and progress were to fall victim to 
unfound fears of South African domination. Such fears are not a good formula for 
growth… [we are] one player amongst many. We harbour no desire to be the 
dominant partner. We entertain no illusion of becoming the regional benefactor – 
because such capacity we do not possess‟.40 Such statements illustrate that the „new‟ 
South Africa was acutely aware of the need to tread carefully in its dealings with the 
region. The ANC leadership was conscious of its regional responsibilities, but 
equally cautious of the adverse reactions this might provoke.   
The provision of assistance to Southern Africa was a thorny issue for the new 
South African government. Following years of destruction at the hands of apartheid, 
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some African states expected South Africa to be Africa‟s miracle maker, alleviating 
many of the problems the continent had experienced. On the other hand, the west 
(applying a version of pivotal state theory)
41
 hoped Pretoria, as the continental 
powerhouse, would adopt the mantel of regional policeman, acting to solve many of 
Africa‟s conflicts.42 South African officials moved swiftly to dampen international 
expectations. Rusty Evans, Director General of the DFA declared: „of course they 
(African countries) have expectations… of course, in their misery, they look at South 
Africa as something that might suddenly bring relief of sorts. At the same time there 
is a sense of realism. The South African delegation has been warning against 
expecting too much‟.43 Only a month after the elections it was made clear that direct 
financial compensation requested by the Frontline States for their assistance during 
the liberation struggle would not be forthcoming. Instead South Africa „would enter 
joint projects aimed at developing the region‟.44 Furthermore, the ANC was eager to 
solve its own poor relations with many Southern African governments, which by the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, had soured considerably. The ANC-led government 
thereby initially approached Southern Africa cautiously, willing to assist the region‟s 
development, but without an overly interventionist approach. However, this 
combination of fear and expectation was one which the ANC failed to overcome, 
during Mandela‟s presidency, ultimately inhibiting South African policy-making.  
 In these early stages, South Africa‟s foreign policy towards Africa remained 
largely rhetorical. The nation was still finding its feet internationally, urgent 
domestic problems needed to be addressed, and the DFA lacked the capacity to deal 
effectively with the demands placed upon it. However, to avoid criticisms of not 
being proactive, Pretoria did take some early tentative steps of constructive 
engagement with Southern Africa, particularly focusing on peace initiatives. One of 
the first problems the new government faced was the escalating tensions in the 
mountain kingdom of Lesotho. The Lesotho military was in a state of near revolt in 
1994, resulting in the assassination of the Deputy Prime Minister and sparking a 
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constitutional crisis.
45
 South Africa became an active part of a multilateral 
commission, which investigated the Lesotho Defence Force and made 
recommendations to ease the tensions.
46
 In consort with Botswana and Zimbabwe, 
South Africa attended and hosted meetings and summits and, after some tense 
negotiations, an agreement was brokered in September 1994.
47
 The mediation efforts 
were regarded as a victory for democracy and stability in the region. The crisis 
allowed South Africa to practically implement its rhetoric of promoting stability and 
democracy through peaceful negotiations. Similar South African peace initiatives 
occurred in Angola and Mozambique in these formative months, with varying 
degrees of success.
48
  
One of the new government‟s more eye catching acts in demonstrating its 
commitment to the region occurred in December 1994, when South Africa cancelled 
Namibia‟s R800 million debts.49 Discussions about such a proposal had been under 
consideration since the April elections. In a meeting with the Namibian President 
Sam Nujoma at Upington airport, Mandela announced, „SWAPO and the ANC have 
been allies in the struggle for decades. We do not think that it is morally correct for 
us to call upon the SWAPO government to pay a debt of this nature‟. 50  The 
announcement came as a welcome reprieve for Namibia, a country crippled by 
economic underdevelopment.
51
 The exercise provided the ANC the perfect 
opportunity to publicise and fulfil its stated obligations to the region, repaying an 
historic debt to one of its allies.  
   
‘A Foreign Policy Perspective in a Democratic South Africa’: The ANC’s sets out its 
post-election vision 
Throughout the latter stages of the transition, the formulation of a new 
foreign policy had been addressed by both the ANC and the SCFA. The outcome of 
these deliberations did not actually provide a formal foreign policy for the new South 
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Africa, but merely a set of recommendations, and overarching principles on which it 
could be based. These amounted to what could be criticised as an idealistic wish list 
of how it was hoped South Africa would interact with the wider world. This meant 
that for the first seven months of ANC-led rule, foreign policy was largely conducted 
at the behest of its leaders, or on the basis of the ground work laid by the SCFA. The 
first formal, post-election document produced by the ANC concerning foreign policy 
was „Foreign Policy Perspective in a Democratic South Africa‟.52 However, except 
for the addition of an introduction describing the post-Cold War international 
climate‟s effect on South Africa, the document was virtually identical to the October 
1993 publication „Foreign Policy in a new democratic South Africa: A discussion 
paper‟ (see Chapter Four). 53  The publication of „Foreign Policy Perspective‟ 
nevertheless provided an opportunity for the ANC to reiterate its core principles 
governing foreign policy interactions; echoing the Freedom Charter, it emphatically 
declared that „foreign policy belongs to South Africa‟s people‟.54 This bold statement 
did not however reflect the reality, which was that foreign policy-making in South 
Africa continued to be confined to a small number of people (see Chapter Seven).  
The document emphasised seven core principles which were to guide South 
African foreign policy. These had been previously publicised several times, most 
prominently in the ghost-written Mandela article in the blue ribbon journal Foreign 
Affairs (although the article only lists six principles; the final point on the list below 
is the addition), the October 1993 discussion paper (see Chapter Four), and in various 
speeches by ANC leaders. The principles were: 
- A belief in, and preoccupation with, Human Rights which 
extends beyond the political, embracing the economic, social 
and environmental;  
- A belief that just and lasting solutions to the problems of 
human kind can only come through the promotion of 
Democracy, worldwide;  
- A belief that Justice and International Law should guide the 
relations between nations;  
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- A belief that international peace is the goal to which all nations 
should strive. Where this breaks down, internationally- agreed 
peaceful mechanisms to solve conflicts should be resorted to;  
 
- A belief that our foreign policy should reflect the interests of 
the continent of Africa;  
 
- A belief that South Africa's economic development depends on 
growing regional and international economic cooperation in an 
independent world; 
 
- A belief that our foreign relations must mirror our deep 
commitment to the consolidation of a democratic South 
Africa.
55
  
 The message which the ANC reiterated seven months after taking power thereby 
focused on the issues of human rights, peace, economic growth, democracy, and the 
primacy of the African continent. The two principles of human rights and the African 
continent will be discussed in greater depth.  
Human rights had become the cornerstone of the ANC‟s post-apartheid 
foreign policy and, despite some misgivings within the leadership, it was an issue 
which Mandela and other party leaders regularly stressed to the international 
community. This was in the words of the „Foreign Policy Perspective in a 
Democratic South Africa‟ document, because, „the world dare not relinquish the 
commitment to Human Rights… Our Struggle to end apartheid was a global one and 
we believe that a change has enhanced the necessity for a worldwide Human Rights 
campaign. South Africa should and must play a central role in this campaign‟.56 The 
ANC pledged that the human rights abuses inflicted by the apartheid regime would 
never be repeated. The ANC rejected claims that human rights pledges would be 
only symbolic: „in our efforts to canonise human rights in our international relations, 
we regard them as far more than this‟.57 Setting South Africa on such a bold path was 
a courageous statement of intent by the ANC. Based on its own experiences, the 
party saw the pursuit of human rights as an ideal basis for its foreign policy in the 
„new world order‟.  
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However, the document also arguably demonstrates the ANC‟s naivety 
concerning foreign policy, despite the best efforts of the SCFA to domesticate it. It 
asserted that „we shall not be selective, nor, indeed be afraid to raise human rights 
violations with countries where our own and other interests might be negatively 
affected. South Africa‟s experience, we believe, shows how damaging policy can be 
when issues of principle are sacrificed to economic and political expediency‟.58 This 
was certainly a noble position and, if South Africa had stuck to this principle then the 
country would have truly been an agent for change in international relations. Indeed, 
South Africa was probably the only country that could have realistically pursued 
such a goal in the 1990s, because after the successful transition, the country and its 
president were held in such high esteem by the global community that they might 
have been able to enact such a policy. However, the inconsistent implementation of 
this policy and indeed its inherent problems meant that this clear statement of intent 
would later come to haunt the ANC. Although the pursuit of a human rights inspired 
foreign policy caused a number of dilemmas for the ANC-led government, its 
predicament was not unique in international relations. For example, US President 
Jimmy Carter in the 1970s and British Prime Minister Tony Blair in the late 1990s, 
had both committed their respective governments to moral and human rights based 
foreign policies.
59
 Ultimately, despite their best intentions, both powerful leaders 
struggled to live up to their lofty principles, illustrating the difficulties of 
implementing such ideals to foreign policy.   
The second major focus of „Foreign Policy Perspective in a Democratic South 
Africa‟ was the African continent, and more specifically Southern Africa. It was at 
the forefront of ANC‟s efforts because „a democratic South Africa‟s future is 
inextricably intertwined with that of Africa‟, and furthermore, because „the region 
sustained us during our struggle… Southern Africa is, therefore, a pillar upon which 
South Africa‟s foreign policy rests‟. 60  The document declares: „we dedicate our 
foreign policy to helping to ensure that Africa‟s peoples are not forgotten or ignored 
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by humankind‟.61 By creating a balanced, more cooperative approach to trade and 
development on the continent, and working in multilateral forums such as the OAU 
to pursue the goals of peace, stability and democracy, the premise was that Pretoria 
would enhance regional and continental unity. It was a principle which was informed 
by both the findings and recommendations of the SCFA, and the experiences of the 
ANC in exile. The ANC wanted to reward the continent for supporting its liberation 
struggle, and to prove that its government was different from the apartheid regime. 
The SCFA had also suggested that without peace and stability in Africa, the desired 
aim of economic development could not be fulfilled in the manner which South 
Africa required for its own envisaged domestic transformation. The emphasis on 
Africa thus made perfect sense for the ANC, influenced by both altruistic and 
material motivations.   
 The major part of the „Foreign Policy Perspective‟ document had been 
drafted during the transition, at a time when the pressures and realities of power on 
the ANC had not yet tested whether its stated foreign policy principles were feasible 
in practice. It is perhaps surprising that the ANC had not modified the document after 
seven months in power, as it might be expected that its initial forays would have 
provided greater insights into the realities of the international community and the 
practicalities of its foreign policy. However, the ANC certainly believed these were 
appropriate options, and that there was widespread support for its initiatives. In the 
new introduction to the document, the claim was made that „our policies and 
programmes have, by and large, been accepted by the international community as 
realistic and the endeavour to transform South Africa into a truly free, prosperous 
and non-racial society has been acclaimed… The world is literally bending 
backwards to make us a success story‟.62  
With no more overt foreign policy document in place after the elections, 
„Foreign Policy Perspective in a Democratic South Africa‟ was to act as the 
framework for the ANC‟s first tentative steps into foreign policy. But, „Foreign 
Policy Perspective‟ could not be described as a foreign policy in the truest sense of 
the term. Although it helped cement South Africa‟s entrance into international 
activities, and offered an indication of the objectives it wished to pursue, it did not 
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provide definitive guidance for the nation‟s foreign policy. For example, „Foreign 
Policy Perspective in a Democratic South Africa‟ did not at any point define what 
South Africa‟s national interests were. As foreign policy is normally considered an 
extension of domestic priorities, it is usually necessary to identify what the national 
interests of the country are, but this is something the document failed to do. Secondly, 
there is no indication of how Pretoria would be able to achieve or even implement 
the highly ambitious goals it had set for themselves. This meant that South Africa 
still did not have a definitive foreign policy by the end of 1994 to guide its 
interactions with the rest of the world. This was to prove important, when as always 
occurs, unpredictable foreign policy problems presented themselves.     
  
South Africa and the Nigerian Crisis 
 The first major foreign policy issue that post-apartheid South Africa faced 
was its confrontation with the military dictatorship of Nigerian President Sani 
Abacha. In 1993, Abacha had assumed power by dissolving democratic institutions, 
ousting civilian rulers, and replacing them with military personnel, while clamping 
down on domestic dissent.
63
 Nigeria therefore provided the first real test case for 
South Africa‟s well publicised democratic, human rights and African-focused foreign 
policy. It was a particular interesting country on which to pin South Africa‟s foreign 
policy principles, for several reasons. Nigeria is an extremely powerful country and 
one which many African states regard as a natural leader; it had been an active 
supporter of the ANC during the liberation struggle, providing training and financial 
assistance; and was the largest contributor to the OAU, providing a third of its 
income.
64
 With its massive oil reserves, Nigeria was a major economic power on the 
continent, and a country with which South Africa would have realistically expected 
to have established close links. However, as the „Foreign Policy Perspective‟ 
document clearly stated, South Africa „would not be selective‟ when dealing with 
human rights abuses and acts which violated democracy. For the declaration to have 
any meaning Pretoria was forced to act. The actions of South Africa, the Nigerian 
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government and the international community between 1994 and 1996 resulted in a 
breakdown of relations, commonly referred to as the Nigerian crisis.  
The South African government initially adopted a „quiet diplomatic‟ stance 
towards Nigeria, encouraging Abacha to reform his style of government, release 
political opponents and pave the way for democratic elections.
65
 However, Abacha 
was an autocratic and inexperienced leader who did not conform to international 
norms, and in fact openly defied them.
66
 Secondly, the issues the South African 
government confronted in Nigeria, human rights abuses and demands for democracy, 
are not traditional foreign policy concerns.
67
 A central dilemma was that South 
Africa did not have the instruments in place to force Nigeria, a sovereign state, to 
comply with its demands. Nigeria was sufficiently economically powerful to resist 
any South African sanctions or coercion, and Pretoria could not realistically have 
engaged Nigeria militarily, both because of distance, and its promotion of non-
interventionist ways of addressing foreign policy problems. Mandela, Mbeki and 
Nzo all made visits to Abuja during mid-to-late 1995 to discuss their concerns, and 
the South Africans claimed they were making progress, „because we are certain that 
the Nigerian government is sensitive to the concerns we and many other people have 
raised with regards to clemency‟.68 However, while South Africa repeatedly engaged 
Abacha and his government in quiet bilateral talks, no concrete gains were actually 
achieved because there were neither the incentives nor the means to make Nigeria act 
differently.  
Matters came to a head in November 1995 during the Commonwealth Heads 
of State meeting in New Zealand, when Nigerian activist Ken Saro-Wiwa was 
executed. Mandela was shocked, as he genuinely believed that he had made progress 
in persuading Nigeria to alter its stance. The President furiously condemned the 
execution and „the callous disregard of efforts by the South African and other 
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African governments to lend assistance in the restoration of democracy‟.69 Nigeria 
was suspended from the Commonwealth for its actions, but Mandela personally 
called for greater punishment, including an oil embargo and diplomatic isolation, 
evidenced by his phone calls to the US and UK governments to seek such 
measures.
70
 At Mandela‟s insistence, South Africa withdrew its High Commissioner 
in protest, and convened a regional meeting of SADC Heads of States to formulate a 
cohesive plan of action against Nigeria.
71
 Mandela became increasingly belligerent in 
his attacks on Abacha, describing him as „a corrupt dictator in charge of an 
illegitimate and barbaric regime‟; he argued that Africa should unite behind sanctions 
and the isolation of Nigeria to show its disgust, because otherwise any talk of an 
„African Renaissance‟ would be discredited. 72  It was a principled step by South 
Africa, but unfortunately its efforts were not supported by the rest of the world.  
South Africa‟s diplomatic efforts therefore came to naught. Instead it was 
forced to back down and apologise, with Nzo subsequently insisting that „we have 
never intended to humiliate or destabilise‟ Nigeria.73 Mandela failed to convince 
Abacha to soften his stance; he and South Africa were accused of doing either too 
little or for being too draconian. The international community did not follow 
Pretoria‟s lead by imposing sanctions or isolating Nigeria. In fact, it left South Africa 
as the one that was isolated and humiliated. South Africa was accused by Nigerian 
civil society of being too weak; Nigerian poet laureate Wole Soyinka accused South 
Africa of „appeasement and compared the strategy of quiet diplomacy to the 
notorious strategy of constructive engagement adopted by the Thatcher and Reagan 
administrations in dealing with apartheid‟.74 In hindsight, this statement seems unfair, 
as there was arguably little else South Africa could have done short of invading the 
country. In fact, South Africa had taken the strongest stand of any nation, and was 
pilloried for it. What this does demonstrate is that, regardless of South Africa‟s best 
efforts, many Africans expected more from them, and criticised the country when 
these were not fulfilled. Certainly, the two stages of South Africa‟s approach, quiet 
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diplomacy, followed by over-stated individual condemnation, were inadequate for 
the purpose of altering Abacha‟s behaviour.  
Most damaging for South Africa, was Mandela‟s failure to unite the continent 
behind his initiatives. The OAU‟s inaction was described by The Star’s Foreign 
Editor, Dale Lautenbach, as a „disgraceful silence‟; only four Heads of State attended 
the emergency SADC meeting, leaving Mandela „without the regional solidarity he 
was seeking‟. 75  The SADC meeting agreed to leave any decisions to the 
Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group, meaning that by December 1995 South 
Africa had been forced to effectively surrender its bilateral efforts to influence 
Nigeria‟s leaders, in favour of collective measures.76 These failures damaged South 
Africa‟s prestige, suggesting not only to Pretoria but the rest of the world that it 
lacked the ability to wield decisive influence in Africa. Matters were worsened by 
the barrage of hostility from Nigeria. Abacha openly ridiculed Mandela, arguing that 
„probably because… of being incarcerated for 27 years, he cannot understand the 
complexity of modern diplomacy‟.77 He also cited the history of Nigerian support for 
the South African struggle, stating: „I cannot understand... why [they]… are behaving 
the way they did. These were the same people for whom we have made a lot of 
sacrifices in order to ensure freedom‟.78 Abacha even described South Africa as a 
„traitor‟ for having a western-centred approach because of its supposed desire to win 
permanent membership of the UN Security Council.
79
 These were wounding words 
for the new South African government which had been desperate not to damage 
relations with Africa, nor arouse resentment amongst its governments and peoples. 
Although Abacha‟s statements were detrimental to Pretoria, they would have been 
manageable if they were simply those of an isolated, desperate leader. Abacha‟s 
criticisms were however more damaging because of Africa‟s telling failure to support 
South Africa‟s initiatives. The continent had effectively rejected Mandela‟s efforts to 
pursue a moralistic path on the continent, partly because South Africa had broken 
with diplomatic tradition in so publicly attacking Nigeria.  
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Some have come to consider the moment Mandela spoke out against 
Abacha‟s rule in Nigeria as one of the greatest achievements of his presidency.80 The 
Star’s Foreign Editor argued that Mandela‟s active defence of his principles, it was a 
bold and courageous move „because South Africa has chosen the “right way” … we 
cannot imagine that others should not see the light‟.81 However, notwithstanding the 
merits of South Africa‟s bold moral stance, its handling of Nigeria was an abject 
failure of its foreign policy. It was clear that quiet diplomatic talks had no substance, 
and South Africa lacked any sort of bargaining tool, which allowed Nigeria to 
disregard its efforts. It also became evident that there was no co-ordinated diplomatic 
approach towards Nigeria, and that the DFA had failed to properly brief Mandela.
82
 
The Mail and Guardian exposed the fact that neither Nzo nor Thabo Mbeki had done 
anything substantial to resolve the situation, keeping out of the public eye and 
leaving Deputy Foreign Minister Pahad to pick up the pieces.
83
 It was further 
revealed that the South African High Commissioner to Nigeria, George Nene, had 
failed to follow his instructions to keep in regular contact with opposition groups in 
the country, thus limiting the quality of South African intelligence.
84
 Additionally 
and most harmfully, South Africa had been unable to garner any meaningful support 
for its initiatives from other African nations, leaving it isolated. South Africa had 
also failed to prevent Ken Saro-Wiwa‟s execution, stop other human rights abuses, or 
to foster democracy in Nigeria.  
It would not be overstating the point to suggest that, even though it occurred 
within a year of the advent of democratic rule, the Nigerian crisis was a seminal 
moment in post-apartheid South African foreign policy. It was the moment that 
South Africa learnt a hard lesson about the nature of foreign policy in Africa and 
more widely the international community, which would shape the future. Primarily, 
South Africa realised that a more discerning approach to foreign policy would be 
required. In the wake of the Nigerian crisis, the ANC officially stuck to the belief 
that human rights would be an important tenet of foreign policy, but realised it would 
need to approach its implementation in different ways, primarily through multilateral 
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forums. While bilateral links would still be important, South Africa increasingly 
turned to arenas such as the UN and SADC to promote its agenda. It also realised the 
need to rethink its emphasis on the term „human rights‟, in order to avoid similar 
diplomatic disasters. Pahad argued that „the ANC had not fully elaborated on its 
human rights policy – possibly due to inexperience in government‟. 85  This 
„inexperience‟ was cited by Pahad to defend the ANC‟s position: „we had to learn by 
doing. We were new‟. 86  A senior ANC official thus defended South Africa‟s 
handling of Nigeria by claiming naivety and inexperience. The second major lesson 
for South Africa was its discovery that the international community‟s rhetoric about 
defending human rights and democracy often went untranslated in practice, no matter 
how obvious the abuses were. Although it had been noted during the transition by the 
DFA and SCFA that economic considerations would be a more important influence 
on policy than ideology, the crisis in Nigeria reinforced this position. The 
international community ignored Mandela‟s requests to impose sanctions and 
diplomatic restrictions on Nigeria, and did nothing to support South Africa‟s efforts; 
large oil companies such as Shell continued to do business with Nigeria as normal.
87
 
It also starkly demonstrated that Mandela‟s moral authority did not carry as much 
weight as originally believed.  
However, the most significant and enduring lesson of the Nigerian crisis was 
in its revelations about Africa‟s attitudes towards South Africa. Despite the ANC‟s 
rhetoric of wishing to forge closer relations with Africa, the reality was that after 
thirty years in exile it did not understand the continent, its leaders or their priorities; 
much of Africa was in turn suspicious of South Africa. A Star editorial argued that 
„we fail to understand the power politics of Africa‟, and that the OAU‟s silence on 
Nigeria „reflects the reality of the sum of African states‟. 88 The ANC wished to 
reform the continent, and the international community‟s perceptions of it. However, 
South African foreign policy makers were confronted, in van Aardt‟s words „the 
dilemma of pursuing goals which clash so fundamentally with many of the practises 
and customs of African politics‟. 89  South African foreign policy aims were not 
aligned with the rest of the continent, and were thus rejected by the very leaders the 
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ANC was seeking to work with. South Africa was ostracised on the continent for 
breaking the „unwritten rule, the gentleman‟s agreement, that African leaders don‟t 
criticise each other in public‟.90 Since the end of colonial rule, it had come to be 
understood that African states did not attack one another publicly; rather they closed 
ranks against external threats. Already regarded with a degree of suspicion, South 
Africa had broken the solidarity rule.
91
 From this time forward South Africa was far 
less willing to stick its head above the parapet and take on initiatives on human rights 
by itself. To avoid isolation, South Africa would, where possible, seek consensus 
with others before taking policy actions. The policy was now in the words of 
Geldenhuys, „that you dare not stand alone, don‟t swim against the tide in Africa‟.92 
This was to be the most important lesson that South Africa took from the Nigeria 
crisis, and one which would profoundly influence its future interactions with the 
African continent.  
 
Inconsistencies in South African foreign policy 
 Even before the Nigerian crisis, there was already mounting concern amongst 
academics and observers about the inconsistencies in South African foreign policy, 
and these steadily increased during Mandela‟s presidency. The ANC-led government 
found itself caught between the competing strands of its foreign policy, which 
incorporated its own ideological principles, the recommendations of the SCFA, and 
the expectations of the international community. It resulted in what appeared to be an 
inconsistent approach to international relations. A major problem was that the seven 
stated principles were potentially contradictory, and did not sit neatly with the 
realities of the international community.  
 One key issue that plagued the ANC was the need to be seen repaying its 
debts to former allies which had sustained and supported the liberation struggle. The 
vast majority of these were African states, which correlated with the ANC‟s 
expressed desire of working closely with the continent. In the fight against apartheid 
most of the western world had not supported the ANC, and in fact the movement had 
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been labelled as a terrorist organisation by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
and US President Ronald Reagan.
93
 Lacking western assistance, the ANC had turned 
to the Eastern Bloc and to various authoritarian states for support, putting them 
further at odds with the major economic powers. After the Cold War had ended, the 
bulk of the ANC‟s former liberation allies, such as the USSR, the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR), and Poland had ceased to be communist regimes. They 
had instead embraced democracy and neo-liberal economics. However, a small 
number of communist and radical nations managed to survive the upheaval of the 
early 1990s, becoming the „pariahs‟ of the now much larger capitalist world in the 
process. The ANC-led government of South Africa had meanwhile begun to 
implement the recommendations of the SCFA, which focused upon working in 
multilateral forums and increasing economic ties with the western world. The west 
was however concerned by South Africa‟s emerging ties with socialist or rogue 
nations. The SCFA had committed the ANC to a specific manner of interacting with 
the international community - if South Africa adhered to the status quo, the global 
community would reward it (see Chapter Five). Yet, even at Mandela‟s inauguration, 
there was evidence of the „new‟ South Africa‟s diplomatic ties with the ANC‟s 
former allies; powerful western leaders found themselves sharing the stage with 
dictators past and present, with revolutionary leaders like Yasser Arafat, Muammar 
al-Gaddafi and Fidel Castro.
94
  
 South Africa‟s links with these „pariah nations‟ were further cemented with 
early visits to, and diplomatic missions established in countries such as Cuba, Libya, 
and North Korea.
95
 In the new international order, with foreign policy increasingly 
linked to trade, these countries had almost nothing to offer South Africa, although 
Cuba had supplied doctors to rural health clinics.
96
 However, these links were in the 
eyes of some critics, „purely symbolic, nostalgic and ideological‟.97 They provided a 
means for the ANC to thank its former allies. Mandela personally thanked the ANC‟s 
former allies, making a thinly veiled swipe at the west by insisting „that we never 
forget our friends who were with us when we were all alone, when some of the 
countries, with whom we now have developed special relations, were on the side of 
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the enemy, giving them resources to enable the apartheid regime to continue the 
repression‟.98 This however, presented a major strategic problem for South Africa. 
The west, upon which South Africa relied most heavily on for trade and aid, was 
critical of Pretoria‟s insistence on entertaining isolated nations, believing that 
relations with South Africa provided those states with a degree of legitimacy. 
Mandela was himself criticised on various occasions, especially by the USA, which 
was angered about the direction South Africa was taking under his Presidency, 
exemplified by its ties to Cuba and Libya. The United States expected South Africa 
to conform to western norms, as encouraged by the SCFA. In cultivating links with 
such nations, it was doing exactly the opposite. However, the more the west 
criticised South Africa for these links, the more Mandela promised to retain them, 
which led to a growing sense of unease amongst many observers.
99
 On one occasion, 
when questioned about links to Libya, Mandela reacted furiously, claiming that 
„those who feel we should have no relations with Gadaffi, have no morals. Those 
who feel irritated by our friendship with President Gadaffi can go jump in the 
pool‟.100 Yet, despite such politically explosive statements, the western world did not 
reduce aid or trade. However, it did reflect the increasing confusion about what 
South Africa actually stood for internationally. 
 South Africa‟s links with former ANC allies was also informed by the idea of 
a universal foreign policy. In theory this meant that South Africa would be a totally 
non-aligned country – a friend to all, but particularly of the developing world. Indeed, 
the ANC committed itself to the self determination of oppressed peoples, which in 
turn potentially meant supporting national liberation movements. As the ruling party 
of a major nation, this was certain to ruffle feathers internationally. In the context in 
which „one person‟s terrorist, is another‟s freedom fighter‟, the ANC was in contact 
with groups regarded by some countries as terrorists. However, the ANC argued that 
links with rebel movements provided a means of opening lines of dialogue, so that a 
peaceful solution could be reached. Nonetheless, a number of countries instead 
perceived a powerful African nation to be potentially undermining the sovereignty of 
others by assisting its enemies.  
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Several examples illustrate this point. Throughout the ANC‟s liberation 
struggle it had been closely allied to the People‟s Movement for the Liberation of 
Angola (MPLA) government in Angola, which had provided bases, training, and 
support. The civil war in the country had been raging since Portuguese 
decolonisation in 1975, and the MPLA (and at times the ANC) had fought against the 
guerrilla movement, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
(UNITA). After South Africa‟s own independence, the ANC-led government was as 
part of its efforts to assist the Angolan peace process, in contact with the MPLA‟s 
sworn enemy UNITA. Although South Africa‟s involvement in peace efforts arose 
from the ANC‟s expressed principles, Angola was a powerful Southern African 
nation with strong liberation credentials. The MPLA was also especially offended 
that the ANC had not fully acknowledged its efforts to support the South African 
liberation struggle during exile, especially as Angola was one of the key locations for 
ANC bases in Southern Africa. Furthermore, the ANC had not recognised the 
importance of the battle of Cuito Cuanavale, and Angola‟s role in changing the 
strategic landscape in Southern Africa. Gary Littlejohn also argued that „the fact the 
ANC did not tip off the Angolans when they knew that the SADF was trying to 
provide logistical support for UNITA during the 1992 electoral registration campaign, 
and that the SADF tried to use their presence in Angola at this time to spy on 
Angolan forces cannot have helped to develop mutual trust‟. 101  It did not help 
matters that reports identified South Africa as still providing weapons in February 
1995 to the rebel movement, contravening an arms agreement signed with the 
Angolan government in November 1994.
102
 The insult was worsened by South 
Africa‟s cancelation of Namibia‟s debts and its establishing close links with 
Mozambique, whilst Mandela continued to ignore the MPLA. The extent of the 
MPLA‟s deep mistrust of the ANC was aptly demonstrated in 1997 when the 
Angolan government rejected the South African‟s offer of its Rooivalk helicopters to 
be used as a rapid reaction force to target UNITA.
103
 South Africa‟s position in peace 
negotiations was regarded as a betrayal of Angola‟s earlier support, and this marked 
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the start of a period of extremely poor relations between the two countries which 
steadily worsened under Mbeki‟s presidency.104  
A second example was South Africa‟s actions concerning the Western Sahara, 
a former Spanish colony in West Africa. In 1975, Spain ceded two-thirds of the 
territory to Morocco which occupied the region, despite it being claimed as a 
homeland by the Saharawi people. The Saharawi, represented by the Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO) fought a 
guerrilla war operating out of Algeria until 1991, and still claimed to be the 
„country‟s‟ government in exile. 105  Despite the 1991 ceasefire, negotiations had 
reached a stalemate, and the UN became involved in mediation attempts. The 
apartheid regime had kept close ties with Morocco, while the ANC in exile had 
established relations with POLISARIO, previously agreeing to recognise the 
independence of Western Sahara. After the 1994 elections, the new South African 
government maintained links with both Morocco and POLISARIO as part of its 
universalistic strategy, and the ANC allegedly received financial donations from both 
sides.
106
 However, Mandela, who had given a written promise in June 1995 to 
officially recognise the state of Western Sahara, subsequently reneged on this 
commitment, waiting until the UN decided whether to recognise Western Sahara.
107
 
POLISARIO leaders were furious with Mandela and suspected that the Moroccan 
government had influenced the ANC‟s decision.108 This decision was compounded 
by the fact that the Western Sahara was a full member of the OAU, prompting 
Jeremy Cronin to state „we are absolutely alone in this regard among all Southern 
African states, even Malawi has recently accorded recognition‟.109 As the issue of the 
Western Sahara had not been rectified, and as Pretoria maintained links with both 
sides in the conflict, South Africa decided to join the mediation efforts in accordance 
with its stated foreign policy goals. This sparked a mini-crisis as the Moroccans now 
took exception to South African talks with POLISARIO, which „Moroccan 
diplomatic efforts have focused on preventing‟.110 This forced Mandela to call the 
Moroccan King, in order to bring Foreign Minister „Nzo‟s recent North African trip 
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back from the brink of disaster‟.111 The ANC had tried to work with two mutually 
opposed parties, and had resulted in offending both. 
A final and better known example of South Africa‟s efforts to pursue a 
universal foreign policy was in its relations with the People‟s Republic of China 
(PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC), more commonly referred to as Taiwan. 
Apartheid-era South Africa had maintained close links with Taiwan, as both were 
internationally isolated; Mandela had however expressed an interest in maintaining 
these diplomatic connections. South Africa was nevertheless also keen to establish 
diplomatic relations with the PRC, as it was a growing economic power, a member 
of the UN Security Council, and a powerful developing nation. The problem was that 
the PRC did (and still does) not recognise the sovereignty of Taiwan, and refused to 
establish formal ties with South Africa if the latter pursued dual recognition, the so-
called „Two China‟s Policy‟. It was thought that Mandela‟s moral authority and 
charisma might have been able to overcome this obstacle, but Beijing stood firm and 
tried to pressurise South Africa into dropping its recognition of Taiwan. Mandela 
made clear that he had „no intention of ending ties with Taiwan‟ to achieve 
diplomatic ties with PRC.
112
 To counteract PRC pressure, Taiwan provided large 
financial donations to both the South African state and the ANC election campaigns, 
and was in 1994 the country‟s sixth largest foreign investor.113 The dilemma for 
South Africa was that, on the one hand, it wished to retain links with an important 
investor and supporter; but on the other hand it needed to recognise the PRC, one of 
the world‟s largest and most powerful countries. Ultimately, economic and 
realpolitik considerations won the day; in an interview with journalist Maureen 
Isaacson, Pahad admitted that „it was inevitable that South Africa would follow the 
one-China policy in the end and join the rest of the world – but money “spoke”‟.114 
The „Two China‟s Policy‟ was finally dropped in November 1996, when Mandela 
announced that by the start of 1998, South Africa would establish links with the PRC 
and cease ties with Taiwan. It was a perfectly understandable „realist‟ course of 
action for South Africa to take, bringing the nation into line with the international 
community and providing trade access to China. It however, contradicted the ANC 
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government‟s earlier statements about favouring dual recognition, and its stated 
policy of universalism. The abandoning of this policy marked the moment when 
South Africa realised that a universal approach to foreign policy was not achievable, 
and this aspect of the country‟s foreign policy soon ceased to exist. Jack Spence 
concluded that „it demonstrates that reputation and moral authority achieve little 
when States interests are at stake‟.115 
 A related concern regarding the universalistic element of South African 
foreign policy was that it contradicted the equally important principle that the 
country‟s policies should be based upon human rights. How can a country maintain 
friendly relations with all others, when a sizeable number of these countries abuse 
human rights? How was it possible to be universalistic in relations with countries 
which are non-democratic, when South Africa was committed to promoting 
democracy? Long before South Africa reproached Nigeria for its abuses of human 
rights and democracy, the ANC had been trying to square this circle without much 
luck. The ANC‟s allies in places like North Korea, Sudan, Libya, and Indonesia 
constantly infringed upon human rights and democratic rights. This meant that South 
Africa‟s lofty and well publicised principles were being undermined by its own 
actions. It was thus easy for the west to criticise South Africa for its approach, 
because it was falling far short of its own high ideals and, in theory, those of the 
international community. These ideals were further undermined when economics 
entered the equation. Numerous states had given money to the ANC (both as a 
liberation movement and a post-apartheid political party), as well as to the South 
African state. After the elections, Mandela met on several occasions with President 
Suharto of Indonesia, even though the country was occupying East Timor. It was 
revealed that, notwithstanding human rights abuses in East Timor, he had accepted 
donations from Indonesia.
116
 As already noted, Taiwan donated large sums of money 
to the government, with R35 million dollars going towards the ANC‟s election 
campaign, and a further R141 million towards a demobilisation centre for the South 
African National Defence Force (SANDF).
117
 Mandela was forced to stress that these 
were not bribes, but the correlation between Taiwanese donations and South Africa‟s 
continued diplomatic recognition is striking. It appeared that South Africa was happy 
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to downplay its commitments in return for a donation to the party or a favourable 
trade deal. This drew a number of criticisms. Tony Leon, leader of the opposition 
Democratic Party (DP), argued that „our whole foreign policy is based on the 
electoral debts of the ANC… There is a porous wall between party and state in this 
regard‟. Leon alleged that South African „foreign policy is largely for hire… if you 
make a substantial donation to the ANC you get special foreign policy 
considerations‟.118  
 The new South Africa further undermined its principles over the sale of arms. 
During the country‟s isolation, the apartheid regime had developed one of the most 
successful domestic arms industry in the world and, despite strict sanctions, had 
become a major exporter. In the shape of the Armaments Corporation of South 
Africa (ARMSCOR), the post-apartheid state had inherited a profitable nationalised 
industry, which employed numerous skilled people and was one of the country‟s 
biggest export earners. After the election, there were hopes amongst some domestic 
observers that South Africa would end, or at least vastly diminish, its status as a 
major arms exporter. However, on realising ARMSCOR‟s economic importance, the 
new government delayed addressing this difficult question. It posed several serious 
dilemmas for the ANC; foremost was how could they promote human rights whilst 
selling lethal weaponry? It was revealed that soon after May 1994, South Africa had 
been selling weapons to Yemen, a UN-prohibited weapons destination, providing a 
major embarrassment for the new government. As Xolani Skosana notes, „the 
incident had severe consequences for South Africa‟s international image and was a 
slap in the face to South Africa‟s emerging foreign policy‟.119 In response, the ANC 
established the South African National Conventional Arms Control Committee 
(NCACC) in August 1995. This was a Cabinet-appointed committee designed to 
regulate and exercise control over the country‟s arms sales. It meant the government 
would know to whom South African arms were being exported. Additionally, as part 
of the overhaul of South African arms sales, the Cameron Commission was 
established by Mandela to thoroughly investigate the issue. Mandela had previously 
emphasised the importance of the issue: 
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our morality as a democratic government dictates that we have to 
act in accordance with internationally acceptable norms and 
standards…. In our approach to the sale of arms, we are resolved to 
act responsibly. Arms are for the purpose of defending the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of a country; not to undermine 
any considerations of humanity nor to suppress the legitimate 
aspirations of any community.
120
  
 
One of the most pertinent recommendations of the Cameron Commission 
Report published in 1995 was that South Africa should not sell „arms to repressive 
and authoritarian regimes‟.121 These recommendations were endorsed by the ANC, 
which became a vocal proponent of disarmament, signed numerous treaties such as 
the 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and was an international campaigner for 
the cause of arms reduction. 
However, despite strict government regulations and moralistic political 
statements about the need to avoid controversial arms sales, an evident gap remained 
between rhetoric and practice. While maintaining strict accordance with international 
arms protocols, from 1994 onwards the South Africa government knowingly sold 
weapons to numerous nations that had dubious human rights records, were involved 
in conflicts, or were not entirely democratic. Roger Southall argues that the Arms 
Control Committee knowingly ignored human rights concerns as it „completely 
abandoned any serious attempt to only supply relatively decent countries with 
arms‟.122 Some arms deals involved sales to Rwanda (before and after the genocide) 
and Uganda, both of which invaded Zaire in 1997. Arms sales also took place to 
Turkey, Indonesia, Algeria, Congo-Brazzaville and Angola.
123
 This led the 
Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative to declare that the „disturbing record of 
arms sales since April 1994 has fed the perception, domestically and internationally, 
that the ANC Government's foreign policy is haphazard and that South Africa has 
failed to become a restrained and responsible arms trader‟.124 This was a damning 
indictment, and further evidence that South Africa‟s foreign policy principles were 
being undermined by its own actions. A more worrying tendency was that, despite 
regularly proclaiming the importance of human rights and even after the 
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implementation of reforms to arms sales, South Africa was still unable to implement 
its moral position in practice.  
 
Conclusion 
The ANC came to power on a wave of euphoria, with high expectations of 
what it could achieve internationally. The ANC-led government threw itself into 
reintegrating South Africa back into the international community. This commitment 
was informed both by its own perceptions, and the recommendations of the SCFA. 
The result was that in the first two years after the elections there were many 
demonstrations of the ANC-led government pro-actively engaging with the 
international community. Despite South Africa‟s enthusiasm for international action, 
many problems arose in its foreign policy. The new government‟s room for 
manoeuvre was partially constrained by the outcomes of the SCFA, which had 
predetermined many of its foreign policy interactions along a pro-western path. Yet 
these principles clashed not only with the ANC‟s own interests as a party, but those 
of its developing world allies.  
This chapter has illustrated how many of the lofty principles of the ANC had 
been steadily undermined by its own activities in its first two years in power. Once in 
government, the ANC in many respects still acted as if it was a liberation movement; 
for example it had maintained links with a range of „pariah‟ regimes from exile. 
Once in power, the ANC was surprised to find its foreign policy being roundly 
criticised from many different quarters, especially the west. It became abundantly 
clear that the positions of the ruling party were being blurred, undermining South 
Africa‟s national interests (see Chapter Seven). Former ANC MP Andrew Feinstein 
argued that the „narrow interests of the party are not necessarily in South Africa‟s 
national interest… there has been a combination of national interests and narrow 
political party interests‟.125 Thus, whilst maintaining relations with allies such as 
North Korea, or selling arms to Indonesia may have been a means of the ANC 
recognising and rewarding the support of these countries for its exile struggle, they 
offered South Africa little in terms of national interest, and indeed generated 
widespread opposition. The ANC also attracted criticism from powerful western 
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countries, which were dismayed by the way that South African foreign policy shifted 
between the country‟s declared commitment to work within multilateral forums, and 
its continued links with ostracised nations. Furthermore, the west had believed that 
through the SCFA process they had „captured‟ South African foreign policy, and 
were thus surprised when the government took actions contrary to expectations. In 
the process of pursuing its foreign policy principles, South Africa managed to almost 
irreparably damage relations with former allies such as the MPLA, with which 
diplomatic links would not be repaired until the Presidency of Jacob Zuma. The Mail 
and Guardian rightly argued in 1995 „that we have no coherent foreign policy; we 
have no firm attitude to human rights abuses in other countries; instead we have an 
ad hoc series of responses to world events based on Mandela‟s prestige, his 
reluctance to become too involved in international affairs, and his party‟s need for 
cash‟.126 Chapter Seven will therefore examine how, from 1996, the ANC began the 
process of reviewing its foreign policy to rectify this problem of „coherence‟.   
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Chapter Seven 
South African Foreign Policy under Review, 1996-1999 
  
 As the previous chapter explained, the initial implementation of foreign 
policy in the „new‟ South Africa was a steep learning curve for all involved in the 
ANC-led Government of National Unity (GNU). Although some success was 
achieved in foreign policy (which will be examined in the course of this chapter), the 
initial stages of Mandela‟s presidency were mired by apparent failures. In a short 
space of time, the ANC had periodically reneged on its stated desire to pursue a 
human rights based policy, endured harsh domestic and international criticism for its 
links to „pariah‟ nations, and markedly failed to convince Africa of its guiding 
principles. Stung by the widespread criticism of its actions, and recognising that the 
country still lacked a definitive vision for foreign policy, the ANC, DFA and the 
GNU all sought to rectify this. In the wake of the Nigerian crisis (see Chapter Six), 
1996 proved to be a watershed year for South African foreign policy. It marked the 
beginning of a systematic review of foreign policy, in which key documents were 
produced by both the DFA and the ANC, namely: the „South African Foreign Policy 
Discussion Document‟; „Developing a Strategic Perspective on South African 
Foreign Policy‟; and the „White Paper on South African Participation in International 
Peace Missions‟. Two significant events in 1996 also influenced the ways in which 
the ANC would henceforth interact with the international community. The first was 
the decision by Deputy President De Klerk to withdraw the NP from the GNU, 
leaving the ANC in sole control of the country. The second was Thabo Mbeki‟s 
landmark „I am an African‟ speech on 8 May 1996, which re-emphasised South 
Africa‟s African focus and outlined his vision for the continent. These factors would 
systematically influence foreign policy in subsequent years. 
 The decision by De Klerk to withdraw the NP from the GNU in May 1996 
was in one sense a shock (particularly as the party had fought so hard for a power 
sharing agreement during the transition) but ultimately was not entirely unexpected.
1
 
Since 1994, despite being Deputy President, De Klerk had been increasingly 
marginalised by the ANC and had become frustrated at his lack of influence and 
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power.
2
 There were two significant consequences of his decision: firstly, the NP‟s 
withdrawal placed the ANC in full power of the State; and secondly it provided 
Thabo Mbeki the opportunity to increase his own influence on decision-making as 
the sole Deputy President. The NP‟s abandonment of the GNU prompted Mandela to 
declare that „the country had reached full political maturity‟.3 The NP had not had 
much influence over the GNU, but it had still acted as a counterbalance to the ANC. 
In a practical sense, the foreign policy of South Africa from 1996 onwards was truly 
that of the ANC. The issue was however, that the ANC‟s foreign policy ideals had 
not been fully articulated, and in practice its principles had been implemented 
haphazardly, and inconsistently. The mistakes of previous years had been 
acknowledged, prompting a series of foreign policy discussion reviews, in an attempt 
to clarify what the ANC hoped South Africa could achieve internationally under its 
leadership. 
 At the same time as the NP was withdrawing from the GNU, Mbeki delivered 
his seminal „I am an African‟ speech in Cape Town. This was an important statement 
of intent and a precursor for what South Africa would strive to achieve in the future, 
particularly under Mbeki‟s leadership.4 The rousing speech reasserted parts of the 
Freedom Charter; Mbeki insisted that „African‟ was not something that could be 
simply defined by race. He also argued that, no matter what the historical actions of 
white South Africans may have been, they had played an influential part in creating 
the country and the identity of all its people. However, the speech‟s key message was 
a clarion call for Africa. Mbeki declared: „the time had come that we make a super-
human effort to be other than human, to respond to the call to create ourselves a 
glorious future‟. He emphasised that as a South African, he was „born of the peoples 
of the continent of Africa‟.5 The argument was that as an African, Mbeki shared in 
the pain of violent conflicts across the continent, and „the dismal shame of poverty, 
suffering and human degradation of my continent is a blight that we share‟.6 Mbeki 
concluded that it was time for Africa to lift itself out of these problems, and 
suggested that once this process was under way, the continent would begin an 
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unstoppable rise to peace and prosperity. Mbeki‟s message had several purposes. 
First, it was an effort to dispel Afro-pessimism and cynicism about the continent 
being a poor, aid-dependent, and war ravaged region of the world. Secondly, Mbeki 
sought to emphasise that Africans could resolve these issues by working together. 
Thirdly, it was an attempt to tie South Africa closer to the continent, stressing its 
commitment to Africa in a bid to lessen suspicions about its intentions. It is telling 
that after only two years in power, the ANC felt the need to reaffirm its vows to the 
continent, suggesting the extent of the failures of post-apartheid South African 
foreign policy. Importantly, the speech also set in motion the „African Renaissance‟, 
embodied by the New Partnership for Africa‟s Development (NEPAD), which would 
become the centrepiece of Mbeki‟s foreign policy after his accession to the 
presidency in 1999. Mbeki‟s speech was the moment when the ANC strengthened 
the process of re-aligning South Africa‟s foreign policy towards the continent. 
 
The DFA’s review of South African Foreign Policy 
 The first post-apartheid review of foreign policy was carried out by the DFA 
which published the „South African Foreign Policy Discussion Document‟ in 1996.7 
It must be stressed that this review was not undertaken by the ANC, but rather the 
civil servants of the DFA, which intended to provide an overview of foreign policy 
and make recommendations to the government. In fact, the document emphasised its 
purpose was „not to formulate fine-tuned foreign policy for the democratic 
government‟ but rather to give „an overview of the many components of international 
relations, objectives and priorities which warrant the attention of policy makers and 
the policy dimensions which government and all its extensions need to consider‟.8 
The document was designed to provide a springboard for further discussion, and was 
intended to lead to the formulation of a White Paper on foreign policy.  
The discussion document synthesised the first two years of South Africa‟s 
post-apartheid foreign policy experiences, examining key policies in the context of 
the international changes of the period, predominantly evidenced by the speeches of 
                                               
7 South African Foreign Policy Discussion Document, DFA, 1996, 
http://www.info.gov.za/greenpapers/1996/foraf1.htm (11/5/11). 
8 Ibid. 
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Alfred Nzo and Mbeki. The scope of the review examined the principles and 
cornerstones of the country‟s foreign policy, and the multilateral activities of the 
state. The discussion document concluded by summarising the central tenets of South 
African foreign policy into eight overarching recommendations: 
1. South Africa must consistently endeavour to pursue a coherent foreign policy, 
which includes economic, security and political components.  
2. Preventive diplomacy and pro-active initiatives should be the approach, rather 
than reaction to events. A monitoring network with African partners is 
essential.  
3. South Africa should assume a leadership role in Africa in all those areas 
where a constructive contribution could be made without politically 
antagonising the Country's African partners.  
4. The Government should continue to pursue a non-aligned approach, with due 
regard for South Africa's SADC, OAU, NAM and other membership 
commitments.  
5. A diplomacy of bridge-building between the "North" and the "South" should 
be pursued.  
6. In multilateral forums, South Africa should strive to promote its interests in 
regard to the major global issues such as respect for human rights, democracy, 
global peace, security and the protection of the environment.  
7. South Africa should constantly endeavour to positively influence and change 
the direction of events and developments internationally, to the extent that 
they affect South Africa.  
8. Diplomatic relations and all related aspects should be a means to an end, 
namely to promote the well-being of the country and its citizens.
9
  
The document reiterated what had been previously announced by the government 
and ministers. In fact, this DFA document barely deviated from the ANC‟s principles 
which had been set out in a „Foreign Policy Perspective in a Democratic South 
Africa‟.10 Even though the DFA publication was only seen as one „further step in the 
process of policy review‟, the specific recommendations it offers are few and far 
between.
11
 Its initial proposals were that „South Africa‟s policy initiatives should be 
modest and not overtly ambitious‟, and „that economic imperatives and political 
realities need to be balanced‟.12 However, its main conclusion was that „South Africa 
needs to adopt a more pro-active foreign policy approach, within its means, to 
                                               
9 Ibid. 
10 „Foreign Policy Perspective in a Democratic South Africa‟, 
http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=230 (9/08/10). 
11 South African Foreign Policy Discussion Document, DFA, 1996, 
http://www.info.gov.za/greenpapers/1996/foraf1.htm (11/5/11). 
12 Ibid. 
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achieve strategic objectives‟.13 Therefore the only recommendations offered by the 
document were that South Africa should scale back its ambitions, take advantage of 
the opportunities open to it in order to fulfil its principles, and to do so on a more 
realistic basis. Since 1990, the DFA had largely pursued a „realist‟ approach to 
foreign policy (see Chapters Four and Five), and the findings of this review were 
perfectly attuned to this school of thinking. Although, the review mirrored many of 
the ANC‟s principles, the conclusions however implied that South Africa had not 
achieved any of these under the GNU.   
What is most interesting about the document is what it does not say. The 
document did not provide any in-depth case studies of South African foreign policy 
in action, and certainly did not offer any critical analysis of its successes and failures. 
For example, it highlighted that democracy and human rights were important pillars 
of the nation‟s foreign policy, but there is no comment about how these had been 
implemented in practice, especially after what had occurred in Nigeria or Indonesia, 
and nor did it examine whether the country‟s approach had worked. The only sign of 
criticism, which is not expressed explicitly, is made in regard to the seven broad 
principles which had been set out in 1994. The document states: „it may be 
questioned whether these principles are sufficient… whether they are achievable, or 
how far the government should and can go in imposing them on others‟.14 Indeed for 
a policy review there appeared to be a lack of analysis of how the government should 
actually change its approach, especially as there were no indications of how it could 
be fulfilled. On the whole, the document reverted to reiterating broad aspirational 
statements, which reaffirmed previous ANC positions. A cynical reading would 
suggest that the discussion document, for reasons of political expediency, sought not 
to antagonise the government by criticising its approach.
15
 However, in light of such 
comments, it must be noted that a predominantly white civil service, under a new 
administration would be unlikely to openly criticise government practice. Although 
the document includes the caveat that it does not seek to propose policy changes, it 
may be expected that a major policy review, in a significant government department 
would have done so. Indeed, the very role of the DFA is to advise the Minister for 
                                               
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Civil servants don‟t generally attack the approach of the government in power, so the lack of 
criticism in the „South African Foreign Policy Discussion Document‟ is not especially unusual. 
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Foreign Affairs (Nzo) and other relevant parties, including the President, on all 
aspects of foreign policy and to coordinate South Africa‟s responses to international 
developments. It therefore begs the question, if the DFA was not in the process of 
formulating policy for ministers, who was?     
 
Foreign Policy formulation within the ANC and South Africa: a democratic process? 
Although the ANC had openly expressed that foreign policy belonged to 
South Africa‟s people, what had in fact occurred since 1994 is that a highly 
personalised form of policy-making had emerged in South Africa. Anthony Butler‟s 
study of the ANC‟s internal democracy illustrated that there had been an increasing 
centralisation of decision-making around a small elite, in an apparent throwback to 
exile-style politics, but also replicating foreign policy decision-making under 
apartheid.
16
 The Leninist principles of the ANC in exile had ensured that the lives of 
its cadres were almost completely controlled by the movement‟s elite, with Butler‟s 
assertions applicable to South Africa‟s foreign policy formulation under Mandela. As 
has been previously discussed in Chapters Four and Five, foreign policy decisions 
during the transition were taken by a small number of ANC officials, and this was a 
practice which continued through into democratic government. The process of 
foreign policy-making was centralised to a handful of people within the government, 
with Mandela, Mbeki, Nzo and Pahad the key protagonists. However, given the 
President‟s overwhelming stature and moral authority, Mandela had the final say on 
South Africa‟s foreign policy proceedings. 17  Mandela was a „foreign policy‟ 
president, who busied himself in various aspects of South Africa‟s international 
affairs, ranging from trade delegations to peace missions. Consequently, most of 
South Africa‟s major foreign policy initiatives were carried out by him. Greg Mills 
argued, „it has thus become a highly personalised affair, with President Mandela‟s 
international superstar status overshadowing all else‟.18 Garth le Pere in a report for 
the Presidency declared that „his [Mandela‟s] command and seeming domination of 
                                               
16 A. Butler, „How democratic is the African National Congress‟, Journal of Southern African Studies, 
31 (2005), pp. 719-736. 
17 Barber, Mandela, p. 88. 
18 G. Mills,„Leaning all over the place? The not-so-new South Africa‟s foreign policy‟, in H. Solomon 
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every major foreign policy decision and issue was so complete as to almost 
overshadow the role of the DFA, cabinet and parliament‟.19 Andrea Ostheimer agrees 
that „the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee 
on Foreign Affairs neither set the agenda nor dominate the discussion; it is mainly 
the Presidency that drives the discourse‟.20 Furthermore, Raymond Suttner, chair of 
the Portfolio Committee from 1994-1997, and later the Ambassador to Sweden, was 
well placed to make observations about South African foreign policy: 
 
It is not clear that the Presidency relates on a regular and 
coordinated basis with other foreign policy structures when it 
makes interventions on foreign policy questions. Nor is it clear that 
there is a structure that relates to the President on an advisory basis, 
as one finds with other presidencies in other parts of the world.
21
 
 
Victor Mallet reported in the Financial Times that the DFA‟s ineffectiveness was 
compounded by the fact that „Mandela often creat[ed] policy on the spot in his 
discussions with other world leaders, leaving the foreign ministry stumbling behind, 
with no idea what is happening‟.22 Yet, while Mandela was the figurehead, behind 
the scenes, Mbeki as Deputy President, had a very strong influence over South 
Africa‟s foreign policy. For example, Mbeki had pushed for Nzo‟s appointment as 
Foreign Minister, because despite his „incompetence and tendency to sleep on the 
job‟, this enabled Mbeki to direct „foreign policy himself via his trusted client, Aziz 
Pahad, now deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs‟. 23  The control of the levers of 
power by Mandela, and a small clique of ANC leaders, ensured that the input of 
other important foreign policy contributors was largely ignored.   
Roger Pfister, however has argued that foreign policy contributors outside of 
this ANC-clique still had an important role, because „the Department of Foreign 
Affairs (DFA) has become the most important body in the arena of foreign policy 
                                               
19 G. Le Pere, „South Africa‟s Foreign Policy in a Globalising World An Overview: 1994-2002‟, The 
Policy Co-ordination and Advisory Services in the Presidency as part of a 10 year review, 
http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/docs/pcsa/irps/pere1.pdf (2/9/10), p. 15. 
20 A. Ostheimer, „Foreword‟, in T. Hughes, Composers, Conductors and Players: Harmony and 
discord in South African foreign policy making (Johannesburg, 2004), p. iii. 
21 R. Suttner, „Foreign Policy of the New South Africa: A Brief Review‟, in S. Guimaraes (ed.), South 
Africa and Brazil: Risks and Opportunities in the Turmoil of Globalization (Brasilia, 1996), p. 193. 
22 Financial Times, 27 August 1998. 
23 R.W. Johnson, South Africa’s Brave New World: The beloved country since the end of apartheid 
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making… [and] on the Parliamentary side, the Portfolio Committee on Foreign 
Affairs has gained some importance... This illustrates the democratisation in the 
sense of bringing foreign policy making closer to the electorate‟.24 In reality, quite 
the opposite scenario occurred. What will be illustrated is that both the DFA and the 
Portfolio Committee had increasingly become irrelevant to policy formulation in 
South Africa, and that there was little, if any, democratisation of foreign policy in 
South Africa, despite the transition from apartheid. 
A pertinent example of the centralisation of South Africa‟s foreign policy is 
the exclusion of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs (PCFA) 
from policy formulation. Suttner, in his role as chair of the committee, published 
several studies during the mid-1990s criticising South Africa‟s increasingly 
centralised foreign policy. Suttner claimed the „DFA was pretty useless in its policy 
drafting and they were bypassed almost entirely. Their briefing documents for visits 
to countries seem to have been ignored, by Mbeki and I think Mandela used his own 
perceptions‟.25 He added that the PCFA, which circulated documents to MPs and 
acted as a discussion forum, also „had no influence on government‟.26 A reason for 
this was „the fact that… decision[s] may well have been taken before the Committee 
has had the opportunity to meet with the authorities (a clear example of this was 
around Nigeria in the course of 1995)‟.27 Another example occurred during media 
enquiries into Taiwanese donations (see Chapter Six), to which Suttner was quoted 
as saying that „he had no personal knowledge of any donations to the ANC‟.28 This 
points towards the increasing centralisation of decision-making, whose role and 
influence over the ANC government was vastly diminished after 1994. Furthermore, 
Tim Hughes argues that the PCFA lost some of its relevance and independence in an 
ANC-dominated parliament, which thus dominated the committee.
29
 A factor which 
contributed to the marginalisation of the PCFA was because the South African 
parliament is elected via a system of proportional representation, where the party lists 
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are closed.
30
 The outcome is that MPs are entirely reliant upon the party leadership 
for their nomination to office, and as a consequence many unquestioningly follow the 
policy positions of the leadership, even on controversial foreign policy issues.
31
 He 
concludes that „the PCFA [Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs] receives policy 
as a fait accompli with very little indication of how its comments may or have 
impacted on policy adjustment‟.32 This had much to do with the way the presidency, 
the ANC, the DFA and parliament interacted with each other over foreign policy. 
This prompted Hughes to describe the formulation of foreign policy in South Africa 
as one of „vertical integration from conceptualisation within the Presidency, 
endorsement from the party, implementation by the DFA and largely unquestioning 
and compliant support from parliament‟.33 
The ANC leadership‟s domination of parliament meant that the ruling party 
could, on the whole, push controversial policies through parliament with little debate 
or dissent. Andrew Feinstein depicts, for example, the way in which the ANC‟s 
National Executive Council (NEC) and the Presidency put pressure on him and the 
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) to shelve 
investigations into corruption surrounding the arms deal.
34
 Feinstein also 
demonstrates how the ANC leadership and party whips stifled debate within 
parliamentary committees, so that outcomes conformed to their wishes. However, 
many ordinary ANC cadres were all too aware of the undemocratic practices within 
the party. Delegates to the ANC‟s 50th National Conference in December 1997 
resolved: 
that the policy process within the ANC ha[s] been fundamentally 
affected by the ANC‟s ascension to office in 1994; that since 1994, 
the point of gravity as regards policy development appears to have 
                                               
30 In a system where the party lists are closed, the accountability between MPs and their constituencies 
is reduced, especially because MPs are entirely reliant upon the party leadership for their nomination 
to office. The process of being nominated by the leadership means there is almost no attachment 
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33 Ibid., p. 145. 
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shifted to government and away from ANC constitutional 
structures.
35
 
 
Furthermore, Matthews Phosa had publicly derided the movement for its increasing 
lack of „regard for the principles of collective leadership, democratic practices, 
criticism and self-criticism‟, arguing that there was a very real danger that the 
government‟s policies would now be simply imposed upon the ANC. 36  The 
conference resolution and Phosa‟s criticisms suggest that Pfister‟s claims regarding 
the „democratisation‟ of foreign policy were misplaced. Foreign policy was not a 
democratic process nor, as the ANC claimed, „owned by the people‟. The ANC in 
exile had consistently spoken on behalf of its supporters without consulting them, 
and a similar tendency remained common after apartheid. While foreign policy is 
commonly an elite-dominated activity in even the most democratic nations, the 
situation in South Africa ensured the ANC leadership „actually [had] free hand, to a 
very large extent in foreign policy‟.37 
The fact is that the ANC largely ignored the recommendations of the DFA 
and the PCFA in its foreign policy. It does though offer an explanation as to why 
South African foreign policy was regarded as being so inconsistent after 1994. A 
small group within the ANC controlled the levers of foreign policy, an approach 
which had its roots in the movement‟s experiences of exile, its own centralised 
policy-making and the activities of the SCFA during the transition. This group was 
prone to making decisions based upon its members‟ personal perspectives, without 
always being informed by appropriate briefing documents. The ANC leadership 
could do largely as it wished, pursuing policies which served its own narrow 
perceptions; these policies were unquestioningly supported and adopted by MPs, in 
part aided by a lack of stringent government oversight. Feinstein‟s comments (see 
Chapter Six) that South Africa witnessed the blurring of national and party interests 
should be borne in mind.
38
 The increasing centralisation of foreign policy became 
even more pronounced during Mbeki‟s presidency, with decision-making almost 
solely the preserve of the President‟s Office. The origins of this, however, lay in 
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Mandela‟s tenure. With little domestic constraint, and not seeking the advice on offer, 
the ANC approached foreign policy very much in accordance with its leaders‟ own 
perceptions of their party‟s needs. 
 
The ANC’s perspectives on South African Foreign Policy 
The 1997 ANC document „Developing a Strategic Perspective on South 
African Foreign Policy‟ offers the most effective barometer of the organisation‟s 
thinking on international relations.
39
 While parts of the document offer a pragmatic, 
realist view on foreign policy, it does so however, through a left-wing lens, 
displaying some strikingly undemocratic tendencies in the ANC, as a broader 
movement.
40
 The document illustrates some of the tensions that were being played 
out within the party, concerning the direction of its foreign policy, some of which 
will be explored below. The document also provided an opportunity for the party to 
assess its experiences in the previous three years, and is far more critical and 
analytical than the DFA‟s earlier contribution. The ANC was actually quite candid in 
articulating what it had, and had not achieved in government, and where it could 
learn from its mistakes.  
The document recognised that „human rights are often disputed in their 
interpretation and relevance‟, and in relation to the Nigerian crisis admitted that „it 
highlighted the potential limits of our influence‟.41 Although it renewed the party‟s 
commitment to its „seven pillars‟, the document did not propose a way to translate 
human rights as the cornerstone of its foreign policy into meaningful action. It 
simply stated that „the difficult challenge is to translate these principles into effective 
governmental policies‟.42 It might have been expected that the ANC would have 
developed a strategy to implement a central tenet of its foreign policy, but after three 
years the party was left still pondering how best to do so. In an attempt to reconcile 
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its principled policy with its more pragmatic practices, the document argues that, 
although South Africa still sought to place human rights at the forefront of its foreign 
policy, this „should not mean that we refuse to conduct any diplomatic and trade 
relations with countries whose record in human rights or democracy we regard as 
unsatisfactory‟.43 This was a considerable reverse in the ANC‟s foreign policy vision 
having previously declared in 1994 that it would not be selective in highlighting 
human rights abuses and that this principle would not be „sacrificed to economic and 
political expediency‟. 44  The ANC was thus tacitly admitting that human rights 
concerns would now be applied on a less idealistic, pragmatic, case by case basis, 
and that it would still deal with countries that violated these principles. Gareth van 
Onselen commented that: 
The romantic period under Mandela was constantly juxtaposed by 
his personality and the decisions he made personally as an 
individual, while the party itself, and its particular beliefs always 
lurked just below the surface and when Mandela went, and Mbeki 
replaced him, those undercurrents that under-pinned his 
administration came to the fore which were epitomised by him, and 
you started having hard practical decisions taken that went against 
human rights.
45
 
Given that senior ANC members around Mbeki had major reservations about the 
inclusion of human rights into foreign policy (see Chapter Four), this was the 
moment in which it began to distance itself from such visions. What appears obvious 
is that the ANC had begun to rationalise its failure to consistently implement its 
human rights policy.  
Africa also remained a central feature of the document, and one that the ANC 
was still eager to reinforce. The document attempted to address Africa‟s grievances 
by conceding that „it is not always possible to act in a way that satisfies the 
expectations of other countries, particularly those on the African continent‟.46 It was 
acknowledged that in some instances, especially concerning human rights issues in 
multilateral forums, „[we] have had to vote differently from some of our closest 
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allies‟, and furthermore it had become clear that „international relations are not 
merely based on solidarity… an important lesson for us‟.47 It was a signal that some 
ANC leaders recognised that solidarity-based alliances were an insufficient basis for 
its foreign relations. However, the conclusion apparently contradicts this, insisting 
that „our priority… should be towards our former allies in the liberation struggle in 
Southern Africa‟.48 Furthermore, for the first time, some of the more left-wing and 
communist-inspired views within the ANC began to emerge. In one section, the 
document argued that the movement should strengthen its relations between 
international political parties, because „the ANC as a political movement, has a 
critical role to play in cementing solidarity amongst the progressive forces in the 
world based on the principles of anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism and a democratic 
world‟.49 This focus on anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism later became enshrined 
in the concept of an African Renaissance (see below), and it marked the moment 
when South Africa increasingly championed a developing world agenda. In addition, 
despite the ANC‟s expressed wish to champion global democracy, the document 
takes a surprisingly undemocratic stance, arguing that: „while the right to form 
political parties and participate in democratic elections is undoubtedly a fundamental 
democratic right, multi-party systems have been introduced in Africa in 
circumstances where other conditions have had the effect of weakening the capacity 
of governments‟.50 
Later in that year, at the ANC‟s 50th National Conference at Mafikeng, the 
importance of liberation solidarity was once again highlighted. Yet at the conference, 
delegates bemoaned the fact that „another problem which arises here is that some of 
our former allies (political parties) are no longer in government‟.51 This suggested 
that some ANC cadres struggled to relate to the new democratic Southern African 
governments which had replaced some of the movement‟s former allies. The 
conference recommendations offer an illustration of the diversity of opinions within 
the ANC as a movement. The final resolutions portray a far more radical outlook 
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than the publicly pro-western outlook of the ANC on issues such as Israel, and 
foreign-owned media was too critical of the government.
52
 Such views could not be 
entirely ignored by the leadership (who may well have agreed with these sentiments), 
but it had the dilemma of appeasing the west and its own supporters. Following his „I 
am an African‟ speech, and this document‟s gradual move away from the ANC‟s 
earlier principles, this was the moment when Mbeki began to assert control over 
foreign policy and re-orientate its overall direction. It also coincided with the ANC 
expressing more inflammatory rhetoric about the west, exemplified by Mandela‟s 
outburst over South African ties with Libya (see Chapter Six), which ran contrary to 
external expectations.  
Having raised concerns about the difficulty in meeting the high expectations 
it faced in Africa, whilst defending its record of standing outside the continental bloc 
in multilateral forums, „Developing a Strategic Perspective on South African Foreign 
Policy‟ articulated and set out the grand concept of the „African Renaissance‟. It 
argued the „African Renaissance was being advanced as the main pillar of our 
international policy not only relating to Africa, but in all our international 
relations‟.53 This was a significant re-alignment for South African foreign policy. 
Despite the DFA warning that South Africa should pursue a more realistic foreign 
policy, the notion of an African Renaissance was highly ambitious, supposedly 
acting as a counter balance to western globalisation, and as the focal point for rapid 
economic development, democracy and stability on the continent. The document 
claimed that „an African Renaissance poses a threat to the strategy of globalising 
capitalism. In fact, globalisation contradicts the very agenda of the African 
Renaissance. Therefore, the success of the Renaissance depends on the depth of and 
extent to which it challenges globalisation‟.54 Tinged with liberation rhetoric, the 
African Renaissance is couched in terms of defeating neo-colonialism and preventing 
imperialism. These statements appealed to many of the ANC‟s more radical 
supporters, including its leaders. Not only was it a highly ambitious ideal, it 
contradicted many of South Africa‟s day-to-day polices, not least its ever 
strengthening ties with western capital and the acceptance of a neo-liberal approach 
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to economics. South Africa had strenuously sought economic investment to alleviate 
its domestic problems, which was predominantly obtained from the west. On the 
other hand, the principles of the African Renaissance identified western capitalism as 
a danger to the country. In fact, the ANC had begun to implement a number of 
domestic policies such as affirmative action, which were hardly in line with neo-
liberal principles.
55
 In light of the ANC government‟s acceptance of the principles 
and recommendations of the SCFA in 1994, such sentiments proved surprising to the 
international community, and raised questions about what South Africa stood for. 
The NP‟s departure from the GNU had given the ANC leadership greater freedom to 
truly assert its own views; one expression of which was the articulation of an African 
Renaissance.  
In addition, despite its assurances in 1994 that South Africa would not seek to 
become the leader of Africa (see Chapter Six), this document presented an 
overarching and ambitious plan for the reorganisation and revitalisation of the entire 
continent, but without widespread consultation with Africa. Furthermore, the 
document argued that South Africa should take the lead in this campaign to empower 
the OAU. The ANC government had been under pressure to provide leadership for 
the African continent, and such demands had not just come from South Africa. Since 
1994, there had been many such calls; for example in Julius Nyerere‟s speech to the 
South African parliament in 1997, he demanded that the country fulfil its 
responsibilities in Southern Africa.
56
 In a very different vein, the USA wished South 
Africa to act as a pivotal state, because it believed that it was the only country that 
could provide effective political and economic leadership in the region.
57
 These 
demands put further pressure on the ANC and created further contradictions within 
South Africa‟s foreign policy. 
The ANC‟s „Developing a Strategic Perspective on South African Foreign 
Policy‟ concluded by setting out a series of challenges and tasks which confronted 
South African foreign policy, particularly relating to its activity in multilateral 
forums. It argued that Africa needed to be placed more prominently on the agenda in 
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international forums; that a common „developing world‟ agenda needed to be 
established, utilising organisations such as the UN and the NAM; and that South 
Africa should play a greater leading role in the OAU, to effectively co-ordinate 
continental economic relations and stability. However, after making these bold 
claims, the document also warned that „we should not overestimate ourselves as a 
small middle-income country‟.58 
Just as with the 1994 document „Foreign Policy Perspective in a Democratic 
South Africa‟, this new strategic review by the ANC was predominantly a wish-list 
of proposals for the future. Once again, the ANC failed to take the opportunity to 
define exactly what it believed South Africa‟s national interests were. It claimed 
instead that the identification of the seven foreign policy pillars in 1994 „should be 
seen as an essential part of defining the national interest‟. 59  Without a clearer 
definition of what the national interests were, the ANC‟s foreign policies lacked an 
overarching and co-ordinated strategy. Likewise, the African Renaissance, which 
contained many noble ideas, was largely rhetorical in nature, lacking a definitive 
vision for how it could realistically be achieved. Peter Vale and Sipho Maseko 
described the African Renaissance vision as „an empty vessel‟, which was „high on 
sentiment, low on substance‟, existing only as „an undetermined policy goal 
propounded by a political leadership which faces a particular set of challenges, both 
domestically and internationally‟.60 Such criticism was becoming a recurring theme, 
unsurprising given the gulf between what the ANC claimed it would achieve and the 
unfolding reality.  
 
The White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions 
 It was the 1998 „White Paper on South African Participation in International 
Peace Missions‟ that was arguably one of the most crucial policy documents 
produced during Mandela‟s presidency. 61  On the face of it, the document is 
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unremarkable, primarily acting as the framework for South Africa‟s entry into 
international peacekeeping missions. This was a role South Africa had been 
encouraged to adopt by western powers, and one which it wanted to embrace for 
international political reasons, including its hope of being selected as a permanent 
member of the UN Security Council. It was envisaged that, if UN reforms went 
ahead, Africa would be granted one permanent seat on the Security Council. This 
resulted in South Africa, Egypt, Libya and Nigeria all vying for position in order to 
stake their claim for the seat. One way for South Africa to publicise its suitability 
was through active participation in African peacekeeping missions. However, the 
White Paper‟s importance was far greater. Theo Neethling argued that, „from a 
foreign policy point of view, the White Paper is certainly a groundbreaking 
document. It is possibly the most important foreign policy document yet to pass 
Cabinet, since it forced the South African government to outline its national interests 
and to define… its general approach towards Africa‟.62 Indeed, it is the only example 
of a foreign policy related document during the Mandela period that actually 
attempted to define South Africa‟s national interests. 
The vast majority of the White Paper assessed South Africa‟s future 
contributions to peacekeeping, emphasising preventative diplomacy and declaring 
that only in the last resort would Pretoria send its armed forces overseas. One 
conclusion in this regard was that „the South African approach to conflict resolution 
is thus strongly informed by its own recent history‟.63 The White Paper argued that 
South Africa‟s national interests were underpinned by values enshrined in the 
constitution such as security, promotion of peace and stability, and regional 
development. It also recognised the primacy of the ANC‟s „seven pillars‟ as a guide 
to South Africa‟s foreign policy. However, it ultimately stated that it is „in the South 
African national interest [original emphasis] to assist peoples who suffer from 
famine, political repression, natural disasters and the scourge of violent conflict‟.64 
The publication of the White Paper was also important in terms of South Africa‟s 
ever increasing commitment to conflict resolution on the continent, which had been 
steadily increasing since 1994. By the end of Mandela‟s presidency, South Africa 
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was involved in attempts to resolve conflicts in Africa, most notably in Burundi, 
Cote D‟Ivoire, Lesotho, and Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo or DRC). 
These efforts at peacekeeping are analysed below. 
These various reviews of South African foreign policy did not produce a clear 
foreign policy strategy, but they were nonetheless important steps. The ANC‟s first 
two years in power had seen the party attempt to pursue an ambitious, universalistic 
foreign policy: this appealed to many idealistic observers, but proved unrealistic in 
practice (see Chapter Six). Despite South Africa being regarded as the golden child 
of the international community, justifiable accusations of inconsistency had been 
levelled at Pretoria. The subsequent policy reviews demonstrated that the DFA and 
ANC were fully aware of the criticisms concerning South Africa‟s failure to practice 
what it preached. More pertinently, it was recognised that some of the more 
ambitious principles were not fully compatible with the practical realities of 
international relations. These various reviews importantly sought to resolve these 
issues, and to extend the foreign policy debate within the country. Although there 
was not much change in the overall direction following the reaffirmation of the 
ANC‟s „seven pillars‟, the reviews did mark the beginning of a realignment in South 
Africa‟s foreign policy. What the reviews revealed was that the ANC was becoming 
more cautious about its highly publicised human rights policy, placing qualifications 
on its use and implementation. They also expressed its concern about the intentions 
of western powers in Africa, especially the effects of increasing globalisation on the 
continent. Attempts to rectify these perceived threats would develop during Mbeki‟s 
presidency. The most significant new policy arising from the reviews was the idea of 
the African Renaissance. Born out of South Africa‟s underlying commitment to 
Africa, it was described as an alternative to the negative effects of globalisation. The 
ANC insisted that from this point forward, fulfilling the African Renaissance would 
form the basis of all of the country‟s foreign policy. While this was in one sense an 
extension of its „seven pillars‟, it also marked the shift towards a new approach to 
foreign policy under Thabo Mbeki, one that had an overarching „South‟ agenda and 
which was increasingly anti-western in tone. Nevertheless, after three review 
documents, the ANC remained in a very similar position to 1994, without an 
achievable and practical foreign policy. Rather, it found itself harnessed to an even 
more elaborate and fanciful vision for the future.           
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South Africa’s foreign policy successes under Mandela 
 Despite the many criticisms of foreign policy formulation and practice 
described above and in Chapter Six, it would be wrong to depict South African 
foreign policy as an outright failure. Under Mandela, South Africa made rapid 
progress in reintegrating itself into the international community, and strove to make a 
telling contribution through its multilateral activities. Having been largely a pariah 
state before 1990, within a few years, South Africa had made itself central to the 
developing global agenda. Andrew Feinstein suggests that this reintegration into the 
international system should be regarded as a major success in itself.
65
 This ascension 
to a position of prominence was in part aided by the changed international context 
South Africa found itself in, with a world far more sympathetic to Pretoria‟s 
development needs. Furthermore South Africa‟s successful transition was a shining 
example for the world, an example many nations wished to emulate and it became a 
key part of the „new world order‟ discourse. In its capacity as a leading major moral 
voice, South Africa became a highly respected and active member of a number of 
multilateral organisations such as the UN, the G20, the Commonwealth and the 
NAM.
66
 R.W. Johnson argues that South Africa became „very noticeable 
internationally… it did mean that everybody… came here and wanted to cultivate 
links, be it China or America‟.67 An illustration of the depth of goodwill towards 
South Africa was illustrated by the unprecedented decision by the UN General 
Assembly to absolve payments of the country‟s arrears to the organisation.68 South 
Africa‟s visible international role and its extensive multilateral activities earned the 
country the status of a „middle power‟.69 In fact, South Africa, under Mbeki, became 
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even more active internationally.
70
 This assertive and self-assured international role 
was in part due to the extensive activities and recommendations of the SCFA during 
the transition (see Chapter Five). The SCFA process had introduced South Africa to 
the world and the international community had encouraged it to play an active and 
visible role. As indicated it was a message which South Africa enthusiastically 
embraced. By playing such a role South Africa was making a political statement. 
They were different from what had preceded it. In doing so the new government 
earned world-wide prestige for its activities. The foreign policy principles set out by 
the SCFA, DFA and ANC in the early 1990s, all clearly stated that working via 
international forums was imperative for the new democracy, and it was one which 
was successfully achieved. For such a young democracy, its international successes 
were so impressive that Barber argued that they enabled South Africa „„to punch 
above its weight‟ in international affairs‟.71 
South African activities in the multilateral environment produced some 
significant successes, most notably its role in the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons Treaty (NPT) Conference in 1995.
72
 One of the key purposes of the 
conference was to discuss whether the proposed NPT deal should last for a fixed 
period or indefinitely. South Africa played a crucial role in pushing for an indefinite 
position, which was agreed by the majority of signatories. South Africa‟s endeavours 
in this regard was aided by the fact that it was the only country ever to have 
unilaterally dismantled its nuclear weapons capability, providing it with moral 
diplomatic leverage in the proceedings.
73
 South Africa was also keen to make Africa 
a non-nuclear weapon region, and this vision was enshrined in the Treaty of 
Pelindaba.
74
 However, despite the success of having the treaty approved in June 1995 
by the OAU, it must be noted that by the end of Mandela‟s presidency only eleven 
African countries had ratified the Treaty.
75
 Ironically, although there was an 
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extensive armaments industry in the country, South Africa was particularly active in 
pursuing a disarmament strategy around the world, working hard to apply pressure 
on the international community. Pretoria was key to establishing resolutions and 
practical proposals on a range of arms control issues. These included its major role at 
the OAU „Landmine Conference‟ held at Kempton Park in May 1997, and later that 
year in Oslo, where the „Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, 
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction‟ was 
adopted.
76
 This dedication to global disarmament is regarded by former civil servant 
Tom Wheeler as the greatest success of Mandela‟s presidency.77  
After 1994, South Africa under the ANC had made significant progress when 
it came to economic expansion. In the post-Cold War „new world order‟, the west 
had increasingly shunned the African continent, in favour of Asian and Eastern 
European markets. Western neglect of Africa provided an opportunity for the new 
South Africa to fill the economic void, with the country rapidly becoming the largest 
investor in Africa. The expansion of South African capital northwards was described 
by the New York Times as being „one of the most vivid illustrations of South Africa‟s 
metamorphosis since apartheid ended in 1994‟.78 With little competition, and with 
significant amounts of money available, South African capital initiated an explosion 
of trade with Africa.
79
 This reflected the „realist‟ approach of DFA officials; Suttner 
pointed out, the mantra of the DFA was that „foreign policy is trade, trade, trade‟ and 
it was a message the country‟s markets embraced.80 South African direct investment 
into Africa reached R13 billion in 1997. Within two years of the elections, trade with 
the SADC region alone was valued as R20.3 billion, an indication of just how swiftly 
South African capital was maximising its new found opportunities.
81
 Furthermore, 
the activities of the state owned Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) illustrates 
the immense reach of South Africa‟s investment capabilities on the continent, 
                                                                                                                                     
„African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (ANWFZ) (Treaty of Pelindaba)‟, 
http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/africa/treaties/anwfz.htm (3/11/10). 
76 Foreign Affairs Parliamentary Media Briefing, „South Africa‟s new place in the world‟, 12 
September 1997; Statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs Nzo, to the 52nd Session of the UN General 
Assembly, 22 September 1997.  
77 Interview with Tom Wheeler, Johannesburg, 31 March 2010. 
78 New York Times, 17 February 2002. 
79 Daniel, Naidoo, and Naidu, 'SA expansion into Africa', pp. 14-16; Daniel, Naidoo, and Naidu, „The 
South Africans have arrived‟, pp. 374-375. 
80 Suttner, „Review‟. 
81 Vale and Maseko, „Renaissance‟, p. 279; Daniel, Naidoo, and Naidu, „The South Africans have 
arrived‟, p. 375. 
202 
 
stretching from neighbouring Swaziland, to Egypt in the north.
82
 These figures were 
extremely positive for South Africa, helping to assist economic growth, but many 
other African nations were not so enthusiastic about this rapid expansion. This is not 
the place for a full discussion on this topic, but many observers have analysed the 
widespread fears that South Africa was acting as a selfish hegemon in sub-Saharan 
Africa and damaging its neighbour‟s economies as a result.83 
The best illustration of South African investment in another Southern African 
country is Mozambique. Mark Ashurst, the Director of the Africa Research Institute 
think-tank, argues that this was South Africa‟s most successful interaction in 
Southern Africa, proving Pretoria‟s commitment to regional stability and 
prosperity.
84
 South Africa became particularly active in Mozambique, helping to 
stabilise the country after its civil war and embarking upon several ambitious joint 
projects with the FRELIMO government to rebuild the nation‟s war-torn 
infrastructure. By the time of Mbeki‟s presidency, Mozambique had become South 
Africa‟s largest regional trading partner.85 Two tangible examples, demonstrate the 
strength of this relationship. The first was an agreement on joint police cooperation 
(funded by South Africa) for cross-border seizure and destruction of small arms 
filtering into South Africa.
86
 The second more concrete example, arose in May 1996, 
when the Maputo Corridor Project was announced. The project involved the upgrade 
of road and rail links, plus the expansion of Maputo harbour‟s capacity.87 It was 
hoped that the project would act as a stimulus to the economies of both countries. By 
1997, these links had expanded further to a bilateral agricultural agreement, and the 
construction of the Mozal aluminium smelter.
88
 Mozal I, which has since been 
upgraded to Mozal II, was South Africa‟s largest foreign investment, standing at US 
$1.3 billion, funded by both state and private enterprise, and was the country‟s first 
economic venture beyond its borders under Mandela.
89
 South Africa also acted 
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swiftly to provide humanitarian aid and disaster relief to Mozambique in 1999 after 
severe flooding, with Pretoria sending SANDF soldiers and helicopters to assist in 
the rescue efforts.
90
 These were all important initiatives for South Africa to pursue, 
and Mozambique stands as a practical example of South African assistance to the 
region.  
 
War and Peace in Southern Africa 
Having made peace and stability a core of its foreign policy, the ANC 
immediately engaged in various processes of conflict resolution. Starting in Angola 
and Mozambique, South Africa also became involved in mediation attempts in 
Burundi, Liberia and Zaire. The new government also became an active member of 
the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, sending envoys and observers to 
conflict zones.
91
 Working closely with the UN and OAU, South Africa pursued all 
possible avenues to ensure its principles of peace were upheld on the continent. 
Despite these successful efforts, there were apparent contradictions in South Africa‟s 
initial forays into peacekeeping; only after the Defence White Paper was published 
did the country clarify its position on overseas peace missions. However, the pursuit 
of peace was nevertheless an essential component of the ANC‟s foreign policy, and 
one that encompassed several aspects of its overall vision, including work in 
multilateral forums and the enforcement of human rights.  
After coming to power, South Africa was quick to join the SADC group 
(formerly the SADCC), the multilateral organisation of former Frontline States in the 
region. Originally designed as a means of combating racist settler regimes, SADC 
brought together many of the liberated countries of the region in a loose political 
alliance. After apartheid had ended its original remit was defunct, and SADC was 
redefined as a mechanism for stimulating economic development, promoting close 
cooperation on areas of mutual interest such as crime, and coordinating efforts at 
regional peace and stability. SADC members envisaged that post-apartheid South 
Africa would be a new powerful driving force behind these goals, and in 1996, its 
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member states elected Mandela to the Chair of SADC.
92
 Much has already been 
written about SADC, its merits and deficiencies, but this study, will confine itself to 
an examination of the controversies surrounding the SADC Organ on Politics, 
Defence and Security, and the political infighting this caused within the region, 
worsening the ANC‟s and South Africa‟s already poor relations with many of its 
neighbours (see Chapter Three).
93
    
 Joining SADC was a natural decision for South Africa. First, its members 
were generally the ANC‟s longstanding allies during exile, including the 
governments of Angola, Mozambique and Namibia, and others with which it could 
empathise with, such as Zimbabwe. Secondly, SADC provided a means through 
which the ANC could begin to repay its perceived debts to the region. Thirdly, the 
recommendations of the SCFA had placed a strong emphasis on SADC, because in 
its view, a stable and prosperous region was vital to the fortunes of South Africa, an 
objective the ANC was keen to promote. Finally, it offered South Africa a forum in 
which it could pursue its declared aim of dedicating itself to Africa‟s renewal. From 
1994 onwards, Southern and Central Africa had witnessed a number of conflicts 
including those in Angola, Burundi, Lesotho and Zaire.
94
 It was therefore of 
immense importance for these crises to be solved; not only for regional stability, but 
also for South Africa‟s own self interest. Pretoria was increasingly concerned that 
continuing instability in its own region would scare off foreign investors, 
jeopardising South African development, and also damaging its chances of gaining a 
seat in a reformed UN Security Council. As a means of addressing these problems, 
working closely within SADC to find peaceful solutions became a key priority for 
South Africa.   
In the early 1990s, SADC leaders had started to discuss the idea of a regional 
security system, with peacekeeping capabilities. This peacekeeping force was 
envisaged to be an African-led initiative, in keeping with the principles of the 
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African Renaissance, and out of the control of western powers. The proposal to 
establish an Organ on Politics, Defence and Security was formulated and accepted in 
principle at the SADC Heads of State meeting in June 1996, in Gaborone.
95
 However, 
while the concept had been accepted in principle by the Heads of State, the 
practicalities for establishing such a capability had not been addressed. The 
negotiations were seriously compromised by a long standing feud between Presidents 
Mugabe and Mandela that subsequently spilled over into SADC, threatening to split 
the organisation. The mutual dislike between the two presidents had developed since 
1994, with South African and Zimbabwean relations coming close to breaking point. 
This was in part the legacy of divisions during the exile period (see Chapters Two 
and Three), but it was magnified by the abrasive personalities of the two leaders.
96
 
After Zimbabwean independence in 1980, Mugabe had been feted as an international 
liberation hero, and the country stood out as Southern Africa‟s most prominent 
independent nation. However, after 1994, Zimbabwe‟s international position changed 
drastically. Mandela‟s charismatic personality, moral authority, and South Africa‟s 
successful democratic transition knocked Mugabe from this pedestal, which 
infuriated him.
97
 Mandela personally disliked Mugabe, regarding him as a relic of 
poor African leadership, who was desperately holding onto power.
98
 These tensions 
came to the fore in the SADC negotiations with each leader offering their own 
alternative vision for the SADC Organ. It resulted in an impasse in the discussions 
and a failure to reach a definitive agreement by SADC members.  
The conflict between South Africa and Zimbabwe reflects a wider division in 
SADC between democratic and authoritarian systems of government in the region. 
The SADC region was split into two camps; authoritarian governments such as 
Angola and Zimbabwe which preferred a militaristic foreign policy, and democratic 
governments such as South Africa and Botswana which favoured peaceful, 
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negotiated approaches. Also due to the centralised nature of most SADC states, the 
majority were unwilling to lose part of their sovereignty to a multilateral organisation 
specifically concerning security matters. Furthermore, Southern African countries, 
are relatively poor, and do not possess the capacity to practically support ventures 
like the SADC Organ.
99
 By the end of Mandela‟s presidency the issue of regional 
security had still not been resolved, partly because, as Nathan has argued, „SADC 
was polarised around incompatible pacific and militaristic visions of the Organ‟.100 
Matters were not helped by Mandela‟s uncompromising attitude towards the need for 
political reforms in other African nations; he was personally inclined to pursue his 
own perceived „right path‟ with little concern for the political fallout that might occur. 
The Goedgedacht Forum noted that „at a SADC heads of country meeting in 1997, 
Mandela called Mugabe and Chiluba [the Zambian President] dictators... the 
consequences of this were that South Africa became isolated and its neighbours 
became hostile, forming anti-South African alliances‟. 101  South Africa‟s poor 
regional relations with Angola (see Chapter Six) also continued. This was primarily 
because the MPLA „has long felt unacknowledged by South Africa for the support it 
provided to the ANC since 1975‟.102 The sense of ingratitude was not helped by 
Mbeki‟s personal view of the MPLA leader Dos Santos, whom he regarded as a 
kleptocratic thug.
103
 Furthermore, these relations with Angola were soured by 
Mbeki‟s decision to invite the UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, branded by the MPLA 
as a „war criminal‟, to South Africa in 1997, for talks.104  
Former Financial Times Africa editor, Michael Holman, believes that South 
Africa‟s poor relations with its neighbours were, in part, due to its grandiose self-
defined image, combined with a complete ignorance of its own excessive power. 
Holman depicted the ANC-led South Africa‟s actions towards Southern Africa as 
being „like a huge muscular adolescent, who is willing to help old ladies across the 
street, even if they didn‟t want to‟.105 Ultimately the ANC government failed to unite 
the region behind its vision. The ANC found that its poor relations with political 
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parties in South Africa‟s neighbours had continued through from exile. Many SADC 
leaders still had underlying suspicions of South African intentions, with some 
accusing it of devoting its attentions elsewhere and neglecting the countries it had 
pledged to assist the most.
106
 It was also seen as interfering with the internal affairs 
of these nations, rather than simply providing economic assistance.  
These unresolved problems, and South Africa‟s increasing isolation in the 
region, profoundly affected Pretoria‟s reactions to two different conflicts in Southern 
Africa. The summer of 1998 witnessed two major challenges for South Africa‟s 
foreign policy, involving two SADC members, namely the DRC and Lesotho. The 
reactions of Pretoria to these separate incidents publicly demonstrated the tensions 
between South Africa‟s foreign policy ideals and that of its closest neighbours. It 
also brought into sharp relief the deep divisions within SADC, and the accompanying 
problems this caused for South African foreign policy. 
In July 1998, the DRC President Laurent Kabila was confronted by an 
invasion from the rebel movement the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), 
backed by Rwanda and Uganda (countries which had only a year previously helped 
him overthrow the Zairian dictator President Mobutu).
107
 Facing a well equipped 
invading force advancing on the capital Kinshasa, Kabila urgently requested military 
assistance to repel the invasion. On 8 August 1998, Mugabe convened a special 
meeting of the SADC Heads of States to discuss the request, but he excluded the 
chair, South Africa, from its deliberations, due to the on-going tension between the 
two nations.
108
 South Africa‟s embarrassment about being excluded from a meeting 
of the SADC, of which it was chair, was heightened by Pretoria‟s failure to publicly 
condemn the invasion of the DRC by two African countries. South Africa‟s failure to 
do so went against its own principle of condemning military aggression.
109
 It was a 
setback to South Africa‟s authority and political leverage in Southern Africa, because 
as Chris Landsberg argues, „its neutrality and sincerity as peacemaker [were] 
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questioned‟. 110  South Africa‟s dilemma worsened when Zimbabwe, Angola and 
Namibia jointly announced that they would send troops to the DRC on behalf of 
SADC.
111
 Mugabe claimed SADC had come to a unanimous decision to assist Kabila, 
but his statement prompted Mandela to publicly reproach the Zimbabwean leader for 
his pre-emptive move into the conflict.
112
 The fact that the SADC Organ on Politics, 
Defence and Security was not even in place yet meant that these three countries had 
justified and legalised their decision in the name of SADC, despite not having the 
mandate or the full support of its member states, including the chair. It brought into 
question the very survival of SADC, prompting Landsberg to describe it as „a highly 
balkanised organisation‟.113 South Africa continued to pursue a peaceful, diplomatic 
path in the DRC, but its efforts were undermined by the belligerent actions of its 
neighbours. In the course of the DRC conflict, the ANC-government managed to 
further alienate some of its former allies, and failed to contribute to resolving the 
conflict.  
What made South Africa‟s non-intervention in DRC inexplicable was its 
policy stance concerning Lesotho. In September 1998, elections in Lesotho were 
once again in dispute, and fears of an impending military coup mounted. With 
tensions rising in the country, on 21 September, the Lesotho government appealed to 
South Africa for assistance. The next day South African troops, accompanied by a 
small contingent of soldiers from Botswana, crossed into Lesotho to prevent a 
coup.
114
 The mission was a complete disaster. Expecting no resistance, South African 
troops were shocked by the reaction from Lesotho‟s civilians and military forces. 
The capital Maseru was looted, South African businesses were destroyed, and the 
Lesotho Defence Force killed eight SANDF soldiers during the mission. To make 
matters worse, South Africa was accused of acting illegally under international law, 
and criticised for undermining the ANC‟s own expressed commitment to non-
intervention.
115
 The pledge which Mandela had personally made to African leaders at 
the OAU meeting in Tunis in 1994, in which he had stated his desire to oppose the 
domination of another country through the force of arms in any circumstance, had 
                                               
110 Ibid., p. 170. 
111 The Times, 20 August 1998. 
112 Kent and Malan, „Decisions, Decisions‟, ISS (April, 2003). 
113 Landsberg, „Impossible neutrality‟, p. 170. 
114 R. Southall, „SADC‟s Intervention into Lesotho: an illegal defence of democracy?‟, in O. Furley 
and R. May (ed.), African Interventionist States (Aldershot, 2001), p. 157. 
115 Ibid., pp. 158-159. 
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been shattered (see Chapter Six). South Africa‟s insistence on a political settlement 
in the DRC had isolated it from some of the SADC‟s most powerful members, yet 
within weeks its apparently principled stance had been contradicted, after it had 
invaded Lesotho. South Africa‟s contrasting actions in these two very different 
conflicts confused its neighbours and the wider international community, who were 
left unsure of exactly what the country stood for.  
Although the invasion of Lesotho was an apparent anomaly in South African 
foreign policy, it once again saw its approach to external relations brought into 
question. The intervention in Lesotho, at the request of the government, had 
prevented a coup and maintained a semblance of democracy in the country, but it had 
done little to dampen criticism of South African inconsistency. Both incidents were 
striking examples of South Africa‟s inability to influence its own neighbours, raising 
questions about the country‟s „middle power‟ status. Although South Africa was the 
economic powerhouse on the continent, and one that promoted multilateralism as the 
preferred means of interaction, it had failed to unite the region around a solution to 
the DRC crisis, and was unable to resolve the electoral conflict in Lesotho without 
resorting to arms.
116
 This brought renewed domestic and international criticism over 
its foreign policy and, most importantly, damaged relations with SADC. Echoing the 
Nigerian crisis, South Africa found itself accused by the Southern African leaders 
Kabila, Mugabe, Dos Santos and Nujoma of double standards and of „promoting 
regional apartheid policies‟.117 The DRC went as far as to describe South Africa as 
„puppets of the aggressors‟.118 The ANC, and more pertinently Thabo Mbeki, learnt 
important lessons from these two episodes which had important implications for the 
country‟s future regional policies. By the end of Mandela‟s presidency, South 
African attitudes to Southern Africa was characterised as being one of „neglect – we 
have the objectives, but there is no strategy, therefore the objectives are not met‟.119 
This was a damning indictment of how one of the centre pieces of the ANC‟s foreign 
policy failed. 
 
                                               
116 Nathan, Consistency and Inconsistencies, p. 365. 
117 Landsberg, „Impossible Neutrality‟, p. 174. 
118 The Citizen, 10 December 1998. 
119 „Evaluating the effectiveness of South Africa‟s foreign policy since 1994‟, Goedgedacht Forum for 
Social Reflection, 12 April 1994. 
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Conclusion 
 A key problem for many observers has been identifying what South Africa‟s 
„new‟ foreign policy during Mandela‟s presidency entailed. There is no simple 
answer to this, as South Africa outwardly projected many different approaches to its 
foreign policy. For example, after 1994, South African foreign policy had embraced 
tenets of western, neo-liberal ideology, yet simultaneously pursued a pro-developing 
world agenda. The contradictions in these polar opposite approaches are stark. 
However, the ANC-led government ambitiously set out to engage with the 
international community, and in its self-anointed position as global bridge-builder 
had believed it could overcome these contradictions. As the chapters covering 
Mandela‟s presidency have illustrated, there were a number of striking successes in 
its foreign policy. However, the problem of having to appeal to multiple international 
and domestic constituencies, and the intransigence of the global powers to support a 
reformist agenda, ultimately resulted in a widely oscillating foreign policy. The 
arguments developed in this and the previous chapter have elaborated upon these 
contradictions, and illustrated how they affected the ANC‟s foreign policy after 1994.    
   Following a troubled introduction to foreign affairs, 1996 marked the moment 
in which the ANC-led government attempted to rectify the challenges that had 
confronted it immediately after taking power. Although the ANC had explicitly 
expressed exactly what it wished to achieve internationally, set out in its seven 
guiding principles, the government had struggled to fulfil its highly ambitious plans. 
This inability to implement the ANC‟s ambitious plans was due in part to the 
constraints of the SCFA immediately after 1994, the nature of the international 
community, a serious degree of mistrust from African states concerning South 
African intentions (a legacy from the activities of apartheid state, and the ANC‟s 
exile), a lack of operational capacity and the divergent ideals of the movement‟s 
leaders and supporters. Despite the increasing inability to fulfil its principles, the 
ANC‟s foreign policy reviews failed to properly address the problems, and in turn 
had harnessed South Africa to an even more ambitious, yet unqualified vision for the 
future.  
This chapter has also argued that some of the problems arose because the 
ANC began to reassert its control over South Africa‟s foreign policy, away from 
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some of the dictates of the SCFA and the transition. This process was smoothed by 
De Klerk‟s decision to withdraw the NP from the GNU in 1996, which granted more 
power to Deputy-President Thabo Mbeki. One of the first indications of a new 
direction for South Africa was his „I am an African‟ speech, which was subsequently 
fleshed out in the transformative ideals of the African Renaissance. The human rights 
aspects of South Africa‟s foreign policy, although still included in its policy 
statements after 1996, were quietly dropped by the ANC-government. Furthermore, 
Mbeki‟s, and the ANC leadership‟s control over foreign policy was enhanced by the 
increasing centralisation of power in the South African government. Such 
centralisation allowed a small elite to control foreign policy, ignoring the 
recommendations of government committees and the DFA, with its decisions rubber-
stamped by a largely subservient parliament. It meant that foreign policy objectives 
increasingly represented those of the party and not South Africa. Yet the ANC-
government faced a dilemma. The ANC fully appreciated the need for western 
economic support for South African development, paying lip service to its demands 
and protocols; however, the ideals of the party were far more attuned to those of 
developing nations. Partially a product of its exile struggle, and also its wishes to 
reform the international status quo, the ANC-government increasingly championed 
the global South, and strengthened ties with some dubious regimes. However, as this 
chapter has illustrated, this eventuality increasingly agitated the west, given that it 
had thought that it had „captured‟ South Africa‟s foreign policy during the transition. 
On the other hand, some of the ANC‟s initiatives aimed at developing countries and 
its allies were criticised by the intended recipients of such policies. The result was 
that South African foreign policy under Mandela was criticised for lacking coherence, 
as it failed to conform to either camp, angering many entrenched interests in the 
process. 
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusion 
 
Throughout the ANC‟s existence, international activity has played an 
important role in the movement‟s historical trajectory. Utilising a wide-range of 
sources and approaches, this thesis has sought to chart and analyse the evolution of 
the ANC‟s foreign policy, from 1960 to 1999, focusing primarily on its interactions 
with Southern African states and liberation movements. In doing so, this thesis has 
gone beyond the current historiography on the ANC and post-apartheid South 
African foreign policy in a number of ways. To begin with, there have been no 
studies which have approached the history of the ANC through an analysis of its 
foreign policy activities from exile through to its accession of political power. A 
central purpose of this study has been to provide fresh insights into these 
international interactions. In part, it has done so by breaking from the tendency in the 
current literature to periodise the history of the ANC into compartmentalised time 
frames (exile, South Africa‟s transition, and political power). This has meant that 
important themes of continuity in the ANC‟s historical trajectory have been 
overlooked. One key consequence of this tendency has been that the impact of vital 
decisions made during the negotiated transition have been misunderstood where they 
have not been neglected. By taking a „long-view‟ of the ANC‟s foreign policy, this 
study has provided a framework to link together previously disjointed periods of the 
movement‟s history. Although each distinct period has attracted scholarly interest, 
the integrated approach developed in this thesis has shed new light on the 
formulation and implementation of the ANC‟s foreign policy. Furthermore, by 
encompassing the movement‟s exile, South Africa‟s negotiated transition, and 
Mandela‟s presidency, the overview provided here allows for a deeper understanding 
of the continuities and discontinuities throughout these periods, offering new insights 
into the historic evolution of the ANC‟s foreign policy.  
Pivotal to this study is South Africa‟s negotiated transition from apartheid to 
democracy, 1990-1994. During the transition, decisive foreign policy decisions were 
made by the ANC, and also the civil servants of the Department of Foreign Affairs 
(DFA). These decisions had a significant influence on South Africa‟s immediate 
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international direction and perspectives after 1994. Yet, despite the importance of 
foreign policy formulation in this period to South African foreign policy, the 
significance of the transition is not reflected in the current literature. Due to the 
nature of South Africa‟s „miracle‟ transition there has been a tendency in the 
historiography to focus on the dramatic domestic changes that occurred, rather than 
discussions concerning foreign policy issues. Very few studies have directly 
addressed foreign policy issues during the transition (see Chapter Four). Foreign 
policy in the Mandela era is thus often misleadingly represented as beginning „anew‟ 
in May 1994, with the ANC-led government starting its international work with a 
clean slate. However, such an approach ignores the direct relevance of events that 
preceded the ANC‟s election to power and the considerable degree of continuity 
between the apartheid and democratic administrations. Furthermore, the legacy and 
experiences from the ANC‟s exile also had an influence on the formulation and 
implementation of post-apartheid foreign policy during the transition. This thesis 
goes beyond the current historiography by arguing that such an oversight has resulted 
in the ANC‟s foreign policy after 1994 being misunderstood. It therefore directly 
questions this prevailing oversimplification in the current political analysis, and 
through a different approach and new research, illustrates the significant impact both 
exile and the transition had upon the initial phases of South Africa‟s post-apartheid 
foreign policy.  
This study has argued that the ANC, despite being a non-governmental 
organisation possessed a foreign policy, because of its historic and deeply significant 
interactions and relationships with the international community. The notion that the 
ANC‟s activities constituted a foreign policy is a concept which is contested; 
nowhere else has such a claim been made before in the literature about the South 
African movement. Although the ANC clearly had an extensive international 
dimension to its activities, the current literature has hitherto failed to define the 
nature of the movement‟s international activities, with very few studies focusing on 
this aspect of the ANC‟s history. Furthermore, the ANC‟s foreign policy did not 
cease once it took power. In fact, there is a remarkable amount of continuity between 
the periods of exile and political power. It must of course be recognised that there is 
a distinction between South Africa‟s foreign policy as a sovereign country, the 
foreign policy perspectives of the DFA‟s civil servants, and those of the ANC as a 
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political party. However, during Mandela‟s presidency it became increasingly 
apparent that South Africa‟s „national interests‟ increasingly came (as had occurred 
elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa) to replicate those of the ANC as a party, with all 
the associated problems this caused. This blurring of interests resulted in several 
problems for South Africa and there were a number of instances where the party 
pursued policies which clearly benefited itself and not the country as a whole. For 
example, while on official state visits to Indonesia and Taiwan, Mandela procured 
financial donations for the ANC, something which evidently blurred the boundaries 
between party and state (see Chapter Six).   
The themes discussed above, when taken together, offer a distinctive 
historical analysis of the ANC and its international activities. One important aspect 
which emerges from this study is the complicated and fractious relationship between 
the ANC and the wider international community. Throughout the ANC‟s exile and 
current period of political power it relied enormously upon the international 
community in order to achieve its goals.
1
 However, these longstanding relations with 
the world has brought with it conflicting pressures on the ANC once it was in power. 
The west, the African continent, and the wider developing world (while not 
discounting domestic interests) all had preconceptions about what the ANC and 
South Africa stood for internationally, and consequently what an ANC-led South 
Africa would offer to their disparate interests. Simultaneously, drawing on the 
experiences of its liberation struggle, the ANC developed its own self-perception of 
what it could offer the international community, one of which was as a bridge-
builder between these different international cultures.  
Yet, seeking to meet competing, even opposed interests, has been one fraught 
with complexity for the ANC in government. Each influential bloc, for example the 
west and the developing world, held widely divergent expectations and desires for 
the direction of post-apartheid South African foreign policy. The ANC found that in 
power it was unable to fulfil its own anointed self-image, let alone the expectations 
placed upon it domestically and internationally. The ANC‟s foreign policy thus 
fluctuated between these divergent audiences, trying to please them all at different 
                                               
1 During the ANC‟s exile, the international community refers chiefly to the socialist states of the 
Soviet Bloc; once international communism collapses in 1990, the term is taken to mean the „west‟, 
epitomised by values of liberal democracy and neo-liberalism.  
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times and in different ways. For example, the ANC adopted a western friendly, neo-
liberal economic policy, but also made contradictory political statements through the 
initiative of the African Renaissance, declaring its wish to represent progressive 
forces and oppose western-power (see Chapters Six and Seven). While in exile the 
ANC had been remarkably successful in interacting with protagonists on either side 
of the Cold War divide. This was a major success for its foreign policy and an 
impetus for its attempts to become an international bridge-builder. However, once in 
power such an approach proved impractical, resulting in criticism and confusion 
from either side. The ANC-government‟s foreign policy initiatives for South Africa 
failed to please the majority of its intended recipients and was subsequently 
extensively criticised. 
Importantly, in Chapters Two and Three, this dissertation has illustrated a 
number of occurrences during the ANC‟s exile, which offer insights into the 
formulation of the movement‟s foreign policy in the transition, and the perspectives 
and policies it took once in government. The ANC‟s broad-based international 
support network, spanned the Cold War divide, yet it predominantly had a socialist 
orientation, influenced by its close relations with the Eastern Bloc.
2
 Not only did this 
have implications for the ANC‟s future foreign policy, but also on the ideological 
perspectives of the movement‟s supporters. A vital aspect of the ANC‟s foreign 
policy in exile was establishing relationships with independent Southern African 
states and various Marxist inspired liberation movements. Without these links the 
very survival of the ANC as a viable liberation movement would have been in 
serious doubt. Materially and rhetorically, the ANC was supported by various 
Southern African nations throughout its exile, which allowed the movement to 
function organisationally, establish bases for its guerrilla fighters in their territories, 
and from which to launch armed attacks against South Africa. Although rhetorically 
these relations with Southern African nations and movements were strong, in reality 
they were fragile, and the ANC‟s position in the region was extremely tenuous at 
times. For example, by the end of the 1960s, the ANC had fallen out with its hosts in 
Tanzania and Zambia, with the former expelling the movement from its bases, and 
the latter threatening to do likewise (see Chapter Two). Later, during the 1980s, the 
                                               
2 The ANC positioned itself as to engage in both a socialist struggle, but also one for fundamental 
human rights and democracy, the latter appealing more to a western liberal audience. It was successful 
in doing both. 
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ANC was expelled from Mozambique after the Liberation Front of Mozambique 
(FRELIMO) government had signed the Nkomati Accords with apartheid South 
Africa. Swaziland had earlier signed a similar deal in 1982, and following the New 
York Accords in 1988, it was also banished from Angola (see Chapter Three).  
The legacy of these poor relations survived the transition. Once the ANC took 
power in South Africa its notoriously poor relations with the region continued, 
typified by Mandela‟s conflict with President Mugabe over the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), and the People‟s Movement for the Liberation of 
Angola‟s (MPLA) hostility towards the movement for not recognising and rewarding 
the enormous sacrifices of the region in general, and Angola in particular (see 
Chapter Seven). The South African government found it could do little to please 
regional governments. It was paradoxically criticised for not being active enough, but 
also for being too assertive. This no win situation demonstrated both the continuity 
of regional fears of South African hegemony, but also the inability of the ANC to 
overcome the legacy of its apartheid-era foreign relationships.         
Most pertinent to foreign policy formulation during South Africa‟s transition 
was the ANC‟s overwhelming lack of strategic vision for the future. After thirty 
years in exile the ANC was remarkably unprepared for the transition and its 
subsequent negotiations. In exile the ANC had been forced to be pragmatic in 
accepting assistance from any group or nation that could help the struggle, although 
much of this aid was provided by the socialist bloc. However, as this thesis has 
illustrated, this was not conducted in a co-ordinated fashion, with the focus on the 
immediate need for material assistance and the overthrow of the apartheid regime. 
This was not just symptomatic of foreign policy issues, but all aspects of the future 
day-to-day running of government. The ANC had endlessly theorised about taking 
power, but never fully articulated its plans for South Africa once it had been 
achieved. The only two documents from the exile period with any immediate 
relevance to foreign policy were the Freedom Charter created in 1955, and the more 
detailed „Final Report of the Commission on Foreign Policy‟ from the Kabwe 
Conference of 1985. These two documents could not be described as an adequate 
basis for foreign policy. The ANC‟s lack of readiness for the transition and the 
negotiations was further magnified by the collapse of international communism, 
removing the ideological lodestar of the movement, which seriously affected its 
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cadres‟ thinking. After the ANC was unbanned by De Klerk in 1990, these 
eventualities combined to put the movement at a marked disadvantage during the 
initial stages of the transition (see Chapter Four).    
The arguments put forward in this study in Chapters Four and Five have 
emphasised the importance of two separate, yet intertwined initiatives during South 
Africa‟s transition, which are pivotal to understanding the evolution of the ANC‟s 
thinking and the initial stages of its post-apartheid foreign policy. The first, in 
Chapter Four, is the ANC‟s own process of policy formulation during the transition. 
The movement faced numerous difficulties after being unbanned: it entered the 
1990s with no definitive foreign policy vision; it initially struggled to adapt to the 
immense global changes; it was forced to establish new international alliances; and it 
encountered unexpected competition from the NP government, which sought to re-
establish its own international influence. The movement gradually adapted to these 
problems, but faced with more pressing domestic concerns the ANC subsequently 
delegated parts of the process of formulating foreign policy to academics. Through 
these processes, which certainly involved ANC leaders, these academics aligned the 
movement to the prevailing international norms of human rights, democracy and 
multilateralism. Although the ANC leadership accepted the bold and assertive 
proposals created for them, there were some misgivings about this direction, with 
notable dissent concerning the human rights aspects of the document from ANC 
leaders, particularly those allied to Mbeki. It was not only some of the leadership that 
was displeased with the ANC‟s direction; some of the movement‟s more militant 
supporters desired a more socialist-revolutionary approach to foreign policy, 
reflecting the ANC‟s own recent past. The ANC had widely publicised the human 
rights aspects of its future foreign policy, most notably in the ghost written Foreign 
Affairs journal article.
3
 However, these revelations have implications for the current 
literature about South Africa‟s international relations after 1994, because this thesis 
therefore, has raised important questions about the ANC‟s ownership of its stated 
foreign policy, and the effects that this had once it was in government.  
Secondly, as Chapter Five illustrates, the question of foreign policy direction 
and ownership becomes even more complex, when the concurrent activities and 
                                               
3 N. Mandela, „South Africa‟s Future Foreign Policy‟, Foreign Affairs, 72 (1993), pp. 86-97. 
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recommendations of the Sub Council on Foreign Affairs (SCFA) are factored into 
the equation. The understudied Transitional Executive Council (TEC), and the 
neglected SCFA, as part of the final stage of South Africa‟s transition from apartheid 
to democracy, was tasked with establishing a comprehensive set of recommendations 
on foreign policy for the new government. The significance of the SCFA was that its 
work had the ability to shape and influence the direction of post-apartheid foreign 
policy. The power of the SCFA to shape foreign policy was not lost on the DFA, and 
this study argues that its civil servants manipulated the process so that the final 
recommendations closely mirrored both its own, and the western international 
community‟s perspectives on the world. This thesis contends that entrenched elite 
interests thus partially „captured‟ the „new‟ South Africa‟s initial foreign policy, by 
ensuring that the recommendations of the SCFA were attuned to the international 
status quo of the early 1990s. As part of a wider-process of „domestication‟ of the 
ANC underway in South Africa at this time, the process acted as a means of 
encouraging the SCFA, and the ANC, into conforming to international norms, as 
well as demonstrating the advantages that doing so would bring to South Africa. The 
new ANC-led government was essentially forced to accept these proposals in order 
to be accepted back into the fold of international respectability. 
When the ANC-led Government of National Unity (GNU) came to power in 
May 1994, the new ANC dominated administration faced a number of cumulative 
pressures and constraints that arose both from exile and the transition period. 
However, as this study demonstrates in Chapters Six and Seven, these neglected 
aspects of the ANC‟s history are vital in explaining and understanding some of its 
foreign policy initiatives, and its policy successes and failures while in government. 
Firstly, the successes of the ANC‟s foreign policy. Stemming from the bold and clear 
assertions made in the ANC‟s foreign policy documents (albeit with the question of 
ownership hanging over it) created during the transition, demonstrated that the 
movement was clear in what it wished to achieve internationally during Mandela‟s 
presidency. It sought to pro-actively promote democracy, peace, development, and 
human rights across the world, as set out in its seven guiding principles. These 
principles were publicly outlined from the earliest moments of the ANC-led 
government. South African attempts to fulfil these principles were evident in the 
country‟s dynamic work within multilateral organisations; the key role it played in 
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several international treaties, most notably in the field of disarmament; efforts at 
bridging global divisions by adopting an all-encompassing universalistic policy 
towards all nations; active involvement in conflict resolution, especially in promoting 
peaceful, democratic solutions; and standing up to international abuses of power. 
Within five years, South Africa became a highly active and respected member of the 
international community. This in itself was a significant achievement. Moreover, the 
ANC was not afraid to speak out on issues which it thought should be placed on the 
global agenda, and refused to be deflected from its guiding philosophies, even if it 
meant upsetting its western or African allies. This commitment, in the face of 
hostility from entrenched interests, was admirable. The ANC did not wish to sit back, 
but to actively engage the international community with ambitious and challenging 
policies. All of these had been clearly elucidated by the ANC before and after taking 
power. Tom Lodge believes that these achievements offer a „strong case for 
representing the foreign policy of Mandela‟s presidency as… more success than 
failure‟.4  James Barber similarly argues that the ANC‟s activities in government 
enabled South Africa „„to punch above its weight‟ in international affairs‟ (see 
Chapter Seven).
5
 
The ANC government has been very successful in this regard, as it is evident 
that South Africa, since 1999, under the leadership of Presidents‟ Thabo Mbeki and 
Jacob Zuma, has continued to punch above its weight internationally. Despite South 
Africa‟s well documented domestic and international problems (see below), the ANC 
government ensured that the country remained an active member of the international 
community. This is in part due its unrivalled economic and political position in 
Africa, allowing it to act in ways other similar sized or even larger nations cannot. 
For example, since 1999, (and outside the immediate confines of this study) the ANC 
government has played a strong role in the formation of the African Union (AU); 
successfully won a seat as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council; and 
(although it does not really fit in economically or politically) has since secured 
membership of the informal BRICs club (named after the initials of its members 
                                               
4 T. Lodge, Mandela: A Critical Life (Oxford, 2006), p. 213. 
5 J. Barber, Mandela’s World: The international dimension of South Africa’s political revolution 
(Oxford, 2004), p. 200. 
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Brazil, Russia, India, China and now South Africa).
6
 Mbeki was not wrong in 2000 
when he announced that „South Africa‟s voice is indeed listened to with a certain 
degree of attention by many on our Continent and the rest of the world‟. 7  This 
success illustrates that because of South Africa‟s unique status on the continent, and 
the country‟s own self-perceived „exceptionalism‟, the ANC has been able to take 
advantage of its international position and the patronage of the global community to 
carve out opportunities for its foreign policy.      
Despite the successes noted above, South African foreign policy has 
encountered a number of problems and constraints that stemmed from the ANC‟s 
exile, the transition period, the nature and realities of the international environment, 
as well as the distinctive character of the ANC as a party and movement. The 
difficulty of having to reconcile the international expectations on the ANC-led 
administration has already been discussed above. This was however only one of a 
multitude of factors which conspired to constrain the „new‟ South Africa after 1994.  
Although the GNU adopted many of the recommendations of the SCFA, 
which enabled it to „hit the ground running‟ in foreign policy matters and allowed 
South Africa to swiftly and easily reintegrate into the international community, it 
also brought about a number of problems for the ANC-led government. By accepting 
the recommendations of the SCFA, the ANC-led administration committed South 
Africa to an orthodox „realist‟ path for its international interactions. In doing so, it 
had agreed to interact within the constraints of the normative practices of the 
international community of the time. This meant that the ANC‟s own universalistic, 
and moralistic foreign policy positions clashed with the neo-liberal, western friendly 
recommendations of the SCFA. In the initial years of the GNU, these widely 
divergent and ultimately contradictory perspectives resulted in a foreign policy 
riddled with inconsistency and apparent incoherencies (see Chapter Six). 
 Another factor which contributed to this „clash‟ was the very nature of the 
ANC as a movement. Although the ANC has and continues to speak as a monolithic 
organisation, stressing the over-riding need for unity, this is far from the reality. The 
                                               
6 See: Guardian, 19 April 2011; Business Day, 10 December 2010; Birth of the African Union, 
http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2002/au0621.htm (3/7/11). 
7 T. Mbeki, „Speech on the occasion of the consideration of the budget vote of the presidency‟, 13 
June 2000. 
222 
 
ANC has always been a broad nationalist church, containing a vast spectrum of 
views within its structure, ranging from socialism to neo-liberalism.
8
 The result is 
that behind the external image of unity, the ANC is internally a divided movement. 
For example, during its exile, the ANC leadership found it difficult to match the 
demands of some of its more militant cadres, and in some instances worked closely 
with allied African governments, such as the MPLA in Angola, to quell internal 
dissent (see Chapters Two and Three). Furthermore, as this study has illustrated, the 
foreign policy that the ANC leadership had promoted at the end of the transition was 
not universally popular within the movement, and most strikingly amongst its leaders. 
What has become clear from this investigation is that through the SCFA, parts of the 
old regime and the western international community had succeeded in influencing a 
section of the ANC elite, which had promised that South Africa would adhere to the 
international status quo in its foreign policy. However, due to the characteristics of 
the ANC and its umbrella structure, this small (divided) elite was unable to contain 
all of the contradictory elements that resided within the party and its leadership, 
especially those who had during exile been influenced by socialist interpretations of 
the world. After May 1994, the ANC leadership were unable to placate all the 
demands of either the international community or its supporters‟ demands (see 
Chapters Six and Seven). For example, the new South African government 
maintained links with the ANC‟s former exile allies, some of which were regarded as 
„pariah‟ nations by the international community. The result was a wildly oscillating 
foreign policy. 
The fluctuations in South African foreign policy also emanated from the 
increasing centralisation of decision-making in the structures of the new government 
(see Chapter Seven). During the ANC‟s first term in office, presidential personality 
became a dominant feature and under Mandela, South Africa witnessed the increased 
centralisation of foreign policy decision-making amongst a small number of the 
ANC‟s leaders.9 As previously discussed, this study has shown that by ignoring the 
                                               
8 Key to this is that the ANC is a nationalist movement, not just a political party, and thus ideological 
coherence does not necessarily come naturally to it. 
9 Such an occurrence during Mandela‟s presidency arguably represents continuity with the apartheid 
era, when DFA officials were similarly marginalised by a small group of NP leaders and securocrats 
who controlled foreign policy. „Both BOSS [Bureau of State Security] and the Department of 
Information outmanoeuvred the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) as the engine that drove South 
Africa‟s foreign policy‟, S. Ndlovu, „The ANC‟s Diplomacy and International Relations‟, in SADET, 
The Road to Democracy in South Africa. Volume 2, 1970-1980 (Pretoria, 2006), p. 630. 
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recommendations of parliamentary committees and marginalising the DFA, the ANC 
arguably conceptualised and pursued a foreign policy which suited its own needs 
rather than those of the country. Without either the guidance of experts or an 
effective process of accountability to the wider party, foreign policy increasingly 
depended on the personal perspectives of specific leaders, contributing to the ad hoc 
implementation of the ANC‟s guiding principles.  
Furthermore, the ANC‟s bold but inherently contradictory foreign policy 
principles created during the transition led to numerous constraints. It proved 
impossible to pursue western-orientated economic policies, in tandem with a 
universalistic policy, while also trying to promote human rights and democracy. 
These contradictions became increasingly apparent in South Africa‟s interactions 
with countries like Indonesia and China, where economic matters took precedent 
over human rights concerns (see Chapter Six). This thesis has demonstrated in 
Chapter Four that the concept of a human rights-based foreign policy had been 
largely imposed upon the ANC leadership during the transition. Although the new 
South Africa did initially strive to implement this publicly declared policy, after 
Pretoria failed to change the attitudes of Nigeria (and the international community at 
large) in 1995, its leaders increasingly began to ignore it (see Chapters Six and 
Seven). Moreover, the ANC-led government repeatedly undermined its own stated 
principles by the party‟s willingness to accept donations from any willing nation or 
organisation; permitting continued arms sales to foreign regimes with dubious human 
rights records; acting internationally as if it was still a liberation movement, with 
little concern for the consequences of its actions; and frequently pursuing policies 
which resulted in confusion amongst both its western and African allies. The 
outcome was that there was (and continues to be) no apparent coherence in the 
ANC‟s approach to foreign policy, which has confounded many global actors. For 
example, Prince Dr Seeiso Bereng Seeiso, the High Commissioner of the Kingdom of 
Lesotho for the United Kingdom, remarked ‘does South Africa even have a foreign 
policy?’.10 This demonstrates the confusion about South Africa’s foreign policy, even 
amongst its immediate neighbours. These problems were neatly summarised by Greg 
Mills, who argued that South Africa‟s foreign policy „could be said to lack the 
                                               
10 Discussion with HRH Prince Dr Seeiso Bereng Seeiso High Commissioner of the Kingdom of 
Lesotho for the United Kingdom, States of Insecurity Conference, Sheffield, 30 June 2011. 
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necessary broad orientation and strategic purpose‟, with the ANC promoting 
ambitious plans, but failing to plan how these could be practically implemented.
11
 
The dichotomy regarding South African foreign policy needs to be 
understood historically to provide an explanation for some of the outcomes for its 
foreign relations. It must be stressed that there was not an overwhelming „capture‟ of 
South African foreign policy by western interests through the SCFA process. The 
western international community did in many respects capture South African 
economic and trade policies. A clear demonstration of this is the ANC led-
government‟s adoption of neo-liberal principles, epitomised by Growth, Employment, 
and Redistribution (GEAR) (see Chapter Six). It is typified by its international trade 
balances; although trade with SADC was important to South African initiatives, eight 
of its top ten trading partners in 1999 were western states.
12
 This occurrence reflects 
the extent to which South Africa‟s continued integration with western partners during 
the 1990s made anything other than a free market, neo-liberal approach unlikely. 
Adherence to these economic principles led western leaders to believe that the ANC-
led government also subscribed to the other basic tenets of western international 
thinking. However, post-apartheid South Africa disappointed the west by pursuing 
and maintaining links with nations such as Libya, Cuba and Iran, which did not fit 
with their view of the world. The west had believed that through the capture of trade 
relations, South Africa‟s foreign policy would simply follow suit. There was 
however a failure by the west to recognise or fully understand the principles and 
political culture of the ANC. The ANC‟s publicly stated desire to pursue a 
universalistic and moralistic foreign policy seems to have been disregarded, or 
treated as largely rhetorical. The west also failed to fully take into account the lack of 
homogeneity within the ANC. Despite having influenced a small number of ANC 
leaders, as a broad based movement the variance in ideals amongst its supporters was 
striking. In fact, after the withdrawal of the NP from the GNU in 1996, Mbeki began 
to assert personal control over South African foreign policy, directing it away from 
the recommendations of the SCFA and towards the earlier tenets of the ANC‟s 
principles. This trend continued throughout his presidency. The western-dominated 
international community, regardless of its own perceptions, had not therefore fully 
                                               
11 G. Mills, „South Africa‟s Foreign Policy: From isolation to respectability?‟, in Simon, D., (ed.) 
South Africa in Southern Africa: Reconfiguring the Region (Oxford, 1998), p. 74. 
12 South Africa‟s Main Trading Partners by Value, 1997 – 2007, http://www.sars.gov.za/ (3/7/11). 
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captured all elements of South Africa‟s foreign policy making. This has been starkly 
demonstrated by western surprise and anger towards South African foreign policy 
during the rebel uprising against Colonel Gaddafi‟s rule in Libya, in August 2011. As 
the rebel movement took control of the capital Tripoli, its leaders appealed to the UN 
to immediately release $1.5 billion of frozen assets to provide humanitarian aid.
13
 
However, South Africa‟s „blocking tactics‟ in the UN Security Council towards its 
former ally, prevented the funds from being released, prompting a furious response 
from the US and British governments‟.14 UK Defence Secretary, Liam Fox, urged 
South Africa to think again, arguing that „there will be huge moral pressure on South 
Africa‟, adding that, „they wanted the world at one point to stand with them against 
apartheid. I think they now need to stand with the Libyan people‟. 15 This thesis 
therefore demonstrates the importance of historical analysis and interpretation as a 
means of explaining the supposedly unpredictable direction of South African foreign 
policy.  
However, many of the ANC‟s guiding principles ultimately failed to be 
implemented because they were far too ambitious for such a „new‟ nation. The ANC 
demonstrated this inexperience in foreign affairs through many of its international 
activities. Former DFA Director General Jackie Selebi, himself a veteran of the exile 
struggle, acknowledged this inexperience:  
South Africa went from pariah state to being a significant player on 
the world stage in the very short space of five years. This meant we 
were thrust into immediate action on the international stage, a 
situation not all of our own choice, but one dictated to us by the 
international community which forced the country to both plan and 
execute simultaneously.
16
  
The new ANC-led government desperately wanted South Africa to match the high 
international expectations placed upon it. However, this meant that the ANC 
government engaged with the international community with little time for effective 
planning or reflection. Given the severe limitations on the new South Africa‟s 
operational capabilities, the ideals of the government could not always be matched in 
                                               
13 The New Age (SA), 25 August 2011. 
14 Business Day (SA), 25 August 2011. 
15 BBC News Online, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14610722 (25/8/11). 
16 J. Selebi, „South African Foreign Policy: Setting new goals and strategies‟, South African Journal of 
International Affairs, 6 (1999), p. 210. It must be noted that Jackie Selebi was subsequently sentenced 
in August 2010 to 15 years in prison, convicted on corruption charges. 
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practice. There was a tendency by the ANC to think „big‟ internationally, epitomised 
by the notion of the African Renaissance and this trend continued through into 
Mbeki‟s presidency, exemplified later by the New Partnership for Africa‟s 
Development (NEPAD) and the African Parliament. However, the reality was that 
the government could not fulfil its own expectations, let alone those of other nations. 
Many of the ANC‟s principles did not fit neatly with the realities of power, 
and were poorly or incoherently executed by the new administration. The „new‟ 
South Africa came into being with an idealistic vision for the future, but also faced 
many constraints, as the western world pressured it to work within the dominant 
international parameters of the 1990s. The picture which emerges is that the initial, 
seemingly unconstrained possibilities for South African foreign policy were in fact 
highly constrained: by leading individuals in the ANC; the movement‟s experiences 
from exile; the nature of the international community; South Africa‟s transition; and 
the influence of the SCFA. The bright new dawn for South African foreign policy 
was further hampered by an overall lack of coherence amongst ANC decision makers. 
The ANC soon came to realise that it would be unable to freely pursue the policies it 
wished to. 
 By establishing continuities, by emphasising the pivotal moment of the 
transition, and by disaggregating „the‟ ANC, this thesis has provided an 
interpretation of the ANC‟s foreign policy which can encompass its myriad twists 
and turns. In foreign policy, as in so much else, it was as Mark Gevisser rightly terms, 
„the condition of the dream deferred‟.17 
                                               
17 M. Gevisser, Thabo Mbeki: The Dream Deferred (Johannesburg, 2007), p. 658. 
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